The Anti-Politics Machine in India: State, Decentralization and Participatory Watershed Development
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The Anti-Politics Machine in India: State, Decentralization and Participatory Watershed Development
280Hardcover(First)
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Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9780857287670 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Anthem Press |
| Publication date: | 03/01/2011 |
| Series: | Anthem South Asian Studies,Diversity and Plurality in South Asia |
| Edition description: | First |
| Pages: | 280 |
| Product dimensions: | 6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x 1.50(d) |
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The Anti-Politics Machine in India
State, Decentralization and Participatory Watershed Development
By Vasudha Chhotray
Wimbledon Publishing Company
Copyright © 2011 Vasudha ChhotrayAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-0-85728-767-0
CHAPTER 1
IDEA OF 'ANTI-POLITICS'
The Machine that Depoliticizes
In 1990, James Ferguson wrote a book called The Anti-Politics Machine: "Development", Depoliticisation and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho. This book contained an anthropological analysis of the disproportionately large donor-driven development machinery in this small landlocked country in southern Africa. Its implications had profound resonances for the critical treatment of development far beyond Lesotho, in all of Africa and certainly most of the developing world. The reason for this prima facie appears to be a simple one, and indeed Ferguson offers it to us. No one before Ferguson or at the very least few as clearly and cogently, had turned their critical attentions to analysing the actual apparatus that drove development. While scholarly analyses and critiques galore had thrashed out the political, social and economic potential of development, there was a surprising gap in understanding about the development industry itself. The existing literature in the field was dominated by the ideas of 'insiders' or 'sympathetic outsiders' who believed in development planning and therefore scrutinized it with a fix-it attitude, or at the other extreme, by radical Marxist and dependency theorists for whom the entire development effort was a great capitalist sham. There was little insight into how the bureaucrats, experts, consultants and planners that populated development organizations and establishments actually operated and the effects their operations created beyond their own proclamations.
Interrogating the limits of such analyses, Ferguson posed a somewhat different question. What if the real issues lay not in deciding whether or not a development project was a 'success' or 'failure' in relation to its stated objectives, but instead in the unintended effects that result from the actions of development bureaucrats? Were we not in danger of missing out on understanding key aspects of social reality that resulted not from intentional actions alone, but from unintentional ones as well, and were intentional actions important in a way other than that imagined by their architects? Inspired by Michel Foucault, Ferguson thus problematized the complex relationship between the 'intentionality of planning' and the 'intelligibility of outcomes' (1990, 20). In doing so, he developed his central thesis – the anti-politics machine – which he characterized as the two-fold 'instrument effect' of a large rural development project funded by the World Bank and the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA). While the first effect was an 'institutional' one as it strengthened the hold of bureaucratic state power, the second effect was 'ideological' as it 'depoliticized' both poverty and the state. In other words, Ferguson explains, much like an anti-gravity machine popularized by science fiction stories, the anti-politics machine seemed to be able to suspend politics from even the most 'sensitive political operations' at the symbolic flick of a button, all the while reinforcing its own power. So even though the project was a 'failure' – which Ferguson unambiguously concluded it was – such failure was accompanied by the very significant effects of depoliticization and the entrenchment of state power.
Ferguson's study went on to spark much interest both in the form and content of the metaphor of the anti-politics machine. The idea of the development apparatus, and development discourse more generally, eschewing politics seemed to strike at the heart of the problem of development itself. The 'depoliticisation' of development acquired tremendous currency. A number of scholars have commented on how fundamentally political issues are articulated or framed in an apolitical idiom. They noted that such an idiom had little bearing with the reality of development thinking and practice and was misleading with seriously detrimental effects. In his well-known study Depoliticising Development: The World Bank and Social Capital, John Harriss attacked Robert Putnam's well-known conceptualization of social capital (1993, 2000) in a 'realm apart from politics and government' (2001, 60), which had resulted in the denial of issues of context and power, the attribution of a dubious causality to social capital, and the depoliticisation of poverty and social justice. Sangeeta Kamat's Development Hegemony: NGOs and the State in India also explicitly evoked the anti-politics machine idea, to show how the law is used by the Indian state to decree all development activities and agencies as non-political (Kamat 2002). In her interpretation, such deployment of the law was specifically aimed at excluding any 'radical' or 'militant' action, both ambiguously defined, from the fold of development with fascinating effects. A rich literature has since emerged on the myriad ways in the rational models and technical discourses of development 'naturalise poverty and objectify the poor and depoliticise development' (Mosse 2004, 643 citing Long 2001, Ludden 1992, Scott 1998, Skaria 1998 and Tsing 1993). Admittedly, many of these authors may not engage directly with Ferguson's anti-politics machine metaphor but the broad thrusts of their arguments endorse his depoliticization thesis. Ferguson's work symbolizes the central concerns of the many scholars who have commented on the depoliticising thrust of development.
There were many others that recognized Ferguson's ideas on depoliticization as influential, but were less convinced of particular aspects of his analysis. Mosse (2004) in particular is doubtful of the extent to which Ferguson pushes his case for the (unintended) effects of development which apparently occur 'behind the backs or against the wills of even the most powerful actors' (1990, 18). Tordella (2003) is milder in his appraisal, but equally uncertain about the merits of assuming the 'inevitability' of depoliticization. In his view, it would be more helpful if the analysis could be directed at understanding 'where development planning tends to "go wrong" and what specific assumptions must be discarded for more effective interventions' (2003, 5). Also, critics are less than convinced by Ferguson's verdict that the infuriating tedium of development, with its cycle of 'failed' projects, is no mystery but in fact is a clear outcome of the very concrete expansion in bureaucratic state power accompanying development. Even if Ferguson is not suggesting a conspiracy theory he does argue that development project work is simply too convenient for development planners for them to abandon their endeavours at lack of success. Kumar and Corbridge (2002) have argued that the Indian state simply does not need to sponsor failed development projects in order to strengthen its power.
The larger persuasiveness of Ferguson's argument about depoliticization stems from its resonance with several important critiques of neoliberal and neo-institutional economic theory that have dominated development discourse since the 1980s. Neoliberal thinking in particular has had an overarching influence on the stripping away of politics from development discourse, for it constructs all individuals as 'rational egoistic utility maximizer(s)' (Mueller 1979). Not only does this formulation glide over cultural differences, it also accentuates the economic traits of individuals in governing their behaviour. A very narrow construction of individual behaviour in the market place becomes a template for regarding individual behaviour more generally, in a social as well as a political context. Neoliberalism staunchly advocates market-led development on the grounds that markets allow for the best expression of individual preferences (Self 1993, Colclough and Manor 1991). In contrast, states are held to act in the private interests of a few, and neoliberals seek to reduce the role of the state in economic-decision making. The relationship between individuals and states is understood principally in terms of how the aggregation of individual preferences can check the corrupt and rent-seeking tendencies of the state. Over attention to these aspects of the individual-state relationship has resulted in the disregarding of very profound political questions, as those concerning the responsibility of the states towards its citizens, its accountability as well as its legitimacy (see Pateman 1985, Habermas 1975). Moreover, the practical experiences of neoliberal economic reform following the Washington Consensus revealed serious contradictions with neoliberal theory. Several writers have commented on the sheer fallacy of the neoliberal anti-state rhetoric, arguing that neo-liberalism actually relies on more not less of state intervention to further its cause, which in fact is in the limited interest of a powerful few (see the many contributions to Saad-Filho and Johnston 2005).
The dismal experiences of neoliberal economic reform and the rise of the East Asian developmental states generated an intellectual response to the Washington Consensus within the World Bank and its associates. The PWC recognized that it was not enough to propagate free markets, and that it was necessary to work with social and political institutions more generally. This stance was theoretically underpinned by the 'new institutional economics' (NIE) which turned attention away from competition and markets alone to the problem of human cooperation (which had no place in neoliberal theory) and the role of institutions in this respect. This was an important development, and it is easy to see how much of the good governance agenda is derived from the new institutionalist emphasis on institutional reform. However, radical critics like Ben Fine (2001) argue that the PWC did not mark a paradigm shift in economic thinking from the Washington Consensus. Although PWC allowed policy makers to get out of the 'trap' of minimal state intervention, according them greater freedom to discuss measures relating to the state, it continued to base its analysis on taking individuals rather than social structures as its starting point. The new consensus continues to rely on methodological individualism, where the economy is still conceptualized as comprising an aggregate of individual agents, all of whom maximize utility. Fine explains how the capitalist economy is seen as a construct of imperfectly informed individuals, imperfectly coordinated through the market place, an approach that utterly disregards concepts of power as reflected in unequal social structures.
More generally, new institutionalism has been attacked for being 'profoundly apolitical' (Bates 1995, 46). The core emphasis in new institutional economics is on choice, not on constraints, and thus what is omitted from the accounts of NIE is that institutions are often imposed, not chosen, and that being backed by the power of the state, institutions provide the means whereby some individuals can and do benefit more than others. Although prominent theorists like Douglass North (1990) recognize that institutions are not created to be socially efficient and that at least the formal rules are created to serve the interests of those with the bargaining power, yet politics and the state find no explicit treatment within new institutionalist economics. This orientation has had far-reaching influences on development thinking. It has been abundantly argued that the explosion of interest in 'community-level institutions' reflects the enthusiasm about communities possessing 'self-governing capacities' but without due consideration of the historical linkages between local communities and the state at different levels (Sundar 2000, Agrawal 2005 to name a few). New institutionalism has been sharply criticized for providing a 'predictive and generalising theory' of the economic and social conditions for collective action while also creating homogenising myths about all communities being self-sufficient and harmonious (Mosse 2003, 274).
While the rise of new institutionalism has made it possible to talk about wider social and political institutions, as opposed to the excessively market-oriented approach of the 1980s, prescriptions following from a new institutional philosophy often do little to strengthen states in developing countries (Doornboos 2000). The pervasive influence of neoliberalism has meant that there is a limited ability to respond to common problems of 'deinstitutionalization'. In other words, it is quite possible to talk about state reform without actually engaging seriously with it, in any ways other than presiding over its fragmentation. There is a genuine disquiet about how the rise of social capital has blocked any serious treatment of the developmental state. While it has made it possible for those who opposed the free-market consensus of the 1980s to engage with development discourse, it has simultaneously circumscribed the terms of such engagement. There is not much space for power in such analysis; capital is simply a 'non-physical atomized resource' as opposed to a social relation, and society itself is interpreted on the basis of the micro-foundations of macroeconomics rather than with the concepts of radical political economy such as class (Fine 1999, 13). Most conveniently for the World Bank and its associates, their awkward stance of state minimalism is a thing of the past, but without conceding the basic neoliberal orientation towards the role of the state and of politics in development (Moore 1999).
The rise of good governance in development studies came about following the realization that politics could not be disregarded, but much of the treatment of governance since has been criticized for being technocratic and universalistic in emphasis (Chhotray and Stoker 2009, Chhotray and Hulme 2009). The agenda of poverty reduction pursued through poverty technologies like the Poverty Reduction Strategy Papers (PRSPs) and the top-down Millennium Development Goals has also been attacked for reinforcing the 'rule of experts' (Easterly 2006) and not treating politics explicitly and seriously enough (Hickey 2008). The debate on whether politics has truly made a return to development and to development studies is raging on.
Where Anti-Politics Began
It would seem politics is the unsung hero of development. Politics as power, politics as expression and resolution of social conflict, politics as the relationships between unequal structures of social organization, politics as state: time and again, it is these facets of politics that critics complain are missing from development thinking and policy-making. In a general sense, such depoliticization of development discourse reveals the disturbing dominance of neoliberalism and new institutionalism, and a rich and varied literature has established this. Indeed, the history of development is testimony to the ascendancy of neoliberal economics and the marginalization of radical political approaches within the orthodoxy (see Kothari 2005). This chapter will not probe this point any further.
It will explore whether there are any other explanations for why it becomes possible for the experts, planners, bureaucrats and consultants that constitute Ferguson's metaphorical machine to shun or appear to shun politics. How did development come to be associated with such a strong antipathy to politics, and why does politics become such an easy theme to manipulate into a negative image, especially for the purposes of development? Where did the idea of anti-politics originate? In particular, are there other theoretical as well as philosophical explanations that might help us account further for the sheer potency of the idea? Let me offer two propositions to respond to this question, and to organize the following discussion. The first is that development has been closely associated with the economy. A number of historical factors have contributed to the conceptualization of the economy as a domain that is principally autonomous of society, culture and politics. This process has been the subject of very lively intellectual debates which will be briefly summarized. The second is the lingering influence of a tradition of thought about politics which depicts political behaviour in very dark and unflattering terms, and appears to dominate over other traditions of thinking about politics. A very negative view of politics has further abetted the zealous restriction of development to this 'autonomous' economy. At the core of these two conceptualizations also lie judgements about individual economic behaviour as rational and necessary for development, and in contrast, about individual political behaviour as irrational and unnecessary for development. While such views are widely reflected in popular or lay perceptions of the economy and of politics, these are not without deeper theoretical underpinnings.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from The Anti-Politics Machine in India by Vasudha Chhotray. Copyright © 2011 Vasudha Chhotray. Excerpted by permission of Wimbledon Publishing Company.
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Table of Contents
List of Tables and Maps; Acknowledgements; Introduction: The Anti-Politics Machine in India; Chapter 1: The Idea of ‘Anti-Politics’; Chapter 2: The Indian ‘Anti-Politics Machine’; Chapter 3: The Anti-Politics Watershed Machine: The Making of Watershed Development in India; Chapter 4: Two Landscapes of Decentralization; Chapter 5: Depoliticizing Local Institutions? Panchayats and Watershed Committees; Chapter 6: The Dialectics of Consent in Participatory Practice; Conclusion; Notes; References; IndexWhat People are Saying About This
'Vasudha Chhotray has written an intelligent, incisive and sometimes witty account of the politics of anti-politics in contemporary India. Her important book shows us that bureaucratic development is never anti-political, however anodyne many of its formulations have become; rather, is political in particular ways and with important social consequences.' —Stuart Corbridge, Professor of Development Studies, London School of Economics and Political Science
'This is a fascinating account of how “development as anti-politics machine” actually plays out in practice… To weave this understanding through detailed empirical cases of actual development interventions and governance reforms, as based on a thorough primary research effort, is an admirable act of synthesis. Last but not least, the text is very well-written, with complex theoretical ideas, processes and events all clearly articulated.' —Samuel Hickey, Senior Lecturer, IDPM, University of Manchester
'This is an ambitious book that examines why the idea that development should be non-political continues to have a broad appeal, while tracking the political entanglements of development interventions through a comparative, empirical analysis. The focus on India’s national development regime is a welcome balance to studies of transnational interventions.' —Tania Murray Li, Professor and Canada Research Chair in the Political-Economy and Culture of Asia-Pacific, University of Toronto