For a century and a half, the artists and intellectuals of Europe have scorned the bourgeoisie. And for a millennium and a half, the philosophers and theologians of Europe have scorned the marketplace. The bourgeois life, capitalism, Mencken’s “booboisie” and David Brooks’s “bobos”—all have been, and still are, framed as being responsible for everything from financial to moral poverty, world wars, and spiritual desuetude. Countering these centuries of assumptions and unexamined thinking is Deirdre McCloskey’s The Bourgeois Virtues, a magnum opus that offers a radical view: capitalism is good for us.
McCloskey’s sweeping, charming, and even humorous survey of ethical thought and economic realities—from Plato to Barbara Ehrenreich—overturns every assumption we have about being bourgeois. Can you be virtuous and bourgeois? Do markets improve ethics? Has capitalism made us better as well as richer? Yes, yes, and yes, argues McCloskey, who takes on centuries of capitalism’s critics with her erudition and sheer scope of knowledge. Applying a new tradition of “virtue ethics” to our lives in modern economies, she affirms American capitalism without ignoring its faults and celebrates the bourgeois lives we actually live, without supposing that they must be lives without ethical foundations.
High Noon, Kant, Bill Murray, the modern novel, van Gogh, and of course economics and the economy all come into play in a book that can only be described as a monumental project and a life’s work. The Bourgeois Virtues is nothing less than a dazzling reinterpretation of Western intellectual history, a dead-serious reply to the critics of capitalism—and a surprising page-turner.
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About the Author
Deirdre N. McCloskey is distinguished professor of economics, history, English, and communication at the University of Illinois at Chicago. Among her many books are Crossing: A Memoir and If You’re So Smart: The Narrative of Economic Expertise, both published by the University of Chicago Press.
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The Bourgeois VirtuesEthics for an Age of Commerce
By Deirdre N. McCloskey
The University of Chicago PressCopyright © 2006 University of Chicago Press
All right reserved.
Chapter OneModern Capitalism Improves Our Ethics
If we had gained a better material world, two cars in the garage and Chicago-style, deep-dish, stuffed-spinach pizza on the table, but had thereby lost our souls, I personally would have no enthusiasm for the achievement. I urge you to adopt the same attitude. A good name is rather to be chosen than great riches. For what is a man profited, if he shall gain the whole world, and lose his own soul?
I do not want to rest the case for capitalism, as some of my fellow economists feel professionally obligated to do, on the material achievement alone. My apology attests to the bourgeois virtues. I want you to come to believe with me that they have been the causes and consequences of modern economic growth and of modern political freedom.
True, any well-wisher of humankind will count the relief of poverty over large parts of the world as desirable, at least if she could be sure that no excess corruption of souls was involved. No good person delights in the misery of others. Even many people skeptical of a Washington consensus of neoliberal capitalism agree that globalization has been desirable materially. It has, as one ofthe skeptics, Joseph Stiglitz, wrote in 2002, "helped hundreds of millions of people attain higher standards of living, beyond what they, or most economists, thought imaginable but a short while ago."
He means bringing the 1.3 billion people-70 percent of them women-now living on a dollar a day to two dollars, and then to four, and then to eight, not merely the further enrichment of the West, which neither he nor I regard as especially important. "The capitalist achievement," wrote Joseph Schumpeter in 1942, "does not typically consist in providing more silk stockings for queens." That can be achieved merely by redirecting aristocratic plundering to silk factories. The achievement consists "in bringing [silk stockings] within the reach of factory girls in return for steadily diminishing amounts of effort."
To halt such a good thing, as some of the Seattle-style opponents think they wish, would be according to Stiglitz "a tragedy for all of us, and especially for the billions who might otherwise have benefited." The economist Charles Calomiris, who supports globalization on egalitarian grounds, as I do, argues that "if well-intentioned protestors could be convinced that reversing globalization would harm the world's poorest residents (as it surely would) some (perhaps many) of the protestors would change their minds." One would hope so.
But fattening up the people, or providing them with inexpensive silk stockings, I will try to persuade you, is not the only virtue of our bourgeois life. The triple revolutions of the past two centuries in politics, population, and prosperity are connected. They have had a cause and a consequence, I claim, in ethically better people. I said "better." Capitalism has not corrupted our souls. It has improved them.
I realize that such optimism is not widely credited. It makes the clerisy uneasy to be told that they are better people for having the scope of a modern and bourgeois life. They quite understandably want to honor their poor ancestors in the Italy of old or their poor cousins in India now, and feel impelled to claim with anguish as they sip their caramel macchiato grande that their prosperity comes at a terrible ethical cost.
On the political left it has been commonplace for the past century and a half to charge that modern, industrial people, whether fat or lean, are alienated, rootless, angst-ridden, superficial, materialistic; and that it is precisely participation in markets which has made them so. Gradually, I have noted, the right and the middle have come to accept the charge. Some sociologists, both progressive and conservative, embrace it, lamenting the decline of organic solidarity. By the early twenty-first century some on the right have schooled themselves to reply to the charge with a sneering cynicism, "Yeah, sure. Markets have no morals. So what? Greed is good. Bring on the pizza."
The truth I claim is closer to the opposite. In his recent book on the intellectual history of modern capitalism Jerry Muller notes that "the market was most frequently attacked by those who viewed its intrinsic purposelessness as leading to an intrinsic purposelessness in human life as such, and who sought radical alternatives on the left and right." That is indeed what the left and right believed, and still believe. They believe in the cultural critique of capitalism, a critique which once justified the Arts and Crafts movement and socialist realism on the left and the architecture and poetry of fascism on the right, and justifies now sneering at red states by blue.
I say that the cultural critique is mistaken. Production and consumption, to be sure, are "intrinsically purposeless." Mere eating is not a "purpose" in the sense that people mean the word as a commendation. But this is true of any production and consumption, in any economy imaginable, in a medieval or pastoral utopia as much as in actually existing socialism or capitalism.
Humans make their consumption meaningful, as in the meal you share with a friend or the picture frame in which you put the snapshot of your beloved. It is not obvious that consuming in Midtown Manhattan is less purposeful than consuming in an anticapitalist North Korea or in an antibourgeois hippie commune. Isn't it more purposeful, speaking of the transcendent? The grim single-mindedness of getting and spending in a collectivist village is not obviously superior to the numberless levels, varieties, and capacities of Paris or Chicago. Vulgar devotion to consumption alone is more characteristic of pre- and anticapitalist than of late-capitalist societies.
I claim that actually existing capitalism, not the collectivisms of the left or of the right, has reached beyond mere consumption, producing the best art and the best people. People have purposes. A capitalist economy gives them scope to try them out. Go to an American Kennel Club show, or an antique show, or a square-dancing convention, or to a gathering of the many millions of American birdwatchers, and you'll find people of no social pretensions passionately engaged. Yes, some people watch more than four hours of TV a day. Yes, some people engage in corrupting purchases. But they are no worse than their ancestors, and on average better.
Their ancestors, like yours and mine, were wretchedly poor, engaged with getting a bare sufficiency. It does not have to be that old way. In 1807 Coleridge quoted an economist of the time, Patrick Colquhoun, asserting that "poverty is ... a most necessary ... ingredient in society, without which nations ... would not exist in a state of civilization.... Without poverty there would be no labor, and without labor no riches, no refinement." This was a standard argument against the relief of poverty, joining eight other ancient arguments against doing something about poverty-the eight are a recent count by the philosopher Samuel Fleischacker.
Coleridge sharply disagreed with Colquhoun's pessimism. A man is poor, he wrote, "whose bare wants cannot be supplied without such unceasing bodily labor from the hour of waking to that of sleeping, as precludes all improvement of mind-and makes the intellectual faculties to the majority of mankind as useless as pictures to the blind." Can such waste be necessary for a high civilization? Coleridge didn't think so.
In 1807 the debate was still unsettled. Is a class of exploited people necessary for high civilization, as Colquhoun, or Nietzsche, claimed? Or is the disappearance of such a class as a result of material progress exactly how we get a mass high civilization, as Coleridge, or Adam Smith, claimed?
The results are now in. Modern economic growth has led to more, not less, refinement, for hundreds of millions who would otherwise have been poor and ignorant-as were, for example, most of your ancestors and mine. Here are you and I, learnedly discussing the merits and demerits of capitalism. Which of your or my ancestors in 1800 would have had the leisure or education of a Colquhoun or a Coleridge to do that? As the economic historian Robert Fogel noted in 2004, "Today ordinary people have time to enjoy those amenities of life that only the rich could afford in abundance a century ago. These amenities broaden the mind, enrich the soul, and relieve the monotony of much earnwork [Fogel's term for paid employment].... Today people are increasingly concerned with the meaning of their lives." He points out that in 1880 the average American spent 80 percent of her income on food, housing, and clothing. Now she spends less than a third. That's a rise from a residual 20 percent of a very low income spendable on "improvements of mind" to about 70 percent of a much larger income. All right: a lot of it is spent on rap music rather than Mozart, alas; and on silly toys rather than economics courses, unfortunately. But also on book clubs and birdwatching.
Some noble savages have been ripped or enticed from admirable cultures by capitalism. But some ignoble savages, too, have learned a better life free of tribal patriarchy and family violence. You yourself probably have, for example, by comparison with your ancestors of, to put it conservatively, some dozens of generations ago. The cultural relativist claims that one cannot tell whether it is better to be a Tahitian as idealized by Paul Gauguin or a realtor of Zenith as satirized by Sinclair Lewis. I say that idealizations or satires aside, a soul choosing from behind a prenatal veil would opt for bourgeois life now over Tahitian agriculture in 1896. Their mothers and fathers surely would, for their children. Billions have voted this way with their feet.
And whether or not one honors such personal choice, hypothetical or actual, if you adopt an Aristotelian criterion, then most people after capitalism are more fulfilled as humans. They have more lives available. The anthropologist Grant McCracken has written of the "plenitude" that the modern world has brought. He half-seriously instances fifteen ways of being a teenager in North America in 1990: rocker, surfer-skater, b-girls, Goths, punk, hippies, student government, jocks, and on and on. By now the options are even wider. "In the 1950s," he notes, there were only two categories. "You could be mainstream or James Dean. That was it." I was there in the 1950s, and agree-though in places like California, richer and fresher than Ontario or Massachusetts in the 1950s, the options were richer, too. The plenitude has come from free people sifting through the cornucopia, making themselves in their music and their clothing.
As the economic historian Eric Jones put it, "There is a tendency to lament the loss of earlier values and practices, however inappropriate they may be for modern circumstances"-think of French village life in Lorraine in 1431 or headhunting Ilongot in the Philippines in 1968-"without allowing for the greater wealth of opportunities and novelties that is continually being created." Mario Vargas Llosa does not believe that globalization has impoverished the world culturally. On the contrary, Vargas Llosa writes,
globalization extends radically to all citizens of this planet the possibility to construct their individual cultural identities through voluntary action, according to their preferences and intimate motivations. Now, citizens are not always obligated, as in the past and in many places in the present, to respect an identity that traps them in a concentration camp from which there is no escape-the identity that is imposed on them through the language, nation, church, and customs of the place where they were born.
Participation in capitalist markets and bourgeois virtues has civilized the world. It has "civilized" the world in more than one of the word's root senses, that is, making it "citified," from the mere increase in a rich population. It has too, I claim, as many eighteenth-century European writers also claimed, made it courteous, that is, "civil." "The terrestrial paradise," said Voltaire, "is Paris."
Richer and more urban people, contrary to what the magazines of opinion sometimes suggest, are less materialistic, less violent, less superficial than poor and rural people. Because people in capitalist countries already possess the material, they are less attached to their possessions than people in poor countries. And because they have more to lose from a society of violence, they resist it.
You can choose to disbelieve if you wish some of the things said to go along with the capitalist revolution of the past two centuries, such as the emerging global village, the rise in literacy, the progress of science, the new rule of law, the fall of tyrannies, the growth of majority government, the opening of closed lives, the liberation of women and children, the spread of free institutions, the enrichment of world culture. But if only a few of these alleged consequences were justified, then capitalism itself would be justified. And not by bread alone.
The late Robert Nozick wrote that "what is desired is an organization of society optimal for people who are far less than ideal, optimal also for much better people, and which is such that living under such an organization itself tends to make people better and more ideal." Nozick and I say it's capitalism. We say that socialism works only for an impossibly ideal Socialist Man, or a Christian saint, and that socialism tends to make people worse, not better.
The ethical betterment is not achieved, I repeat, at the cost of the remaining poor people. That is a fact to be established. I do not expect you to agree with everything I am saying. If you do, you are not the antibourgeois, anticapitalist, or antiethical reader I am trying to persuade. I need to persuade you that capitalism and bourgeois virtues have been greater forces eliminating poverty than any labor union or welfare program or central plan. We have the eight-hour day mainly because we got rich, and therefore we won't tolerate eleven-hour days-unless we are yuppie attorneys in New York fresh from Yale Law School making well over $100,000 a year in exchange for a seventy-seven-hour work week. Some poor people now work long hours and can't make it. No one should deny that. But it was worse in 1900, and worse yet in 1800. Better working conditions have prevailed not because of union negotiations or governmental regulations, but because capitalism has worked.
I need to persuade you also that, contrary to Colquhoun, poverty is not a most necessary ingredient in society. I need to show you empirically, for example, and will try in volume 4, what most economists know: that if the allegedly exploitative trade of the first world with the third were halted tomorrow the first world would suffer a mere hiccup in its rate of growth. I need to show you empirically that if presently poor people in rich countries all became engineers and professors, the presently rich people would be better off, not worse off, though with fewer poor people to bus the tables and mind the children.
We will not have the heaven-on-earth of perfect equality, ever, and I lament this fact. But equality over the long term-despite an unhappy reversal in the trend in the United States in the 1980s-has been increased by capitalism, and in absolute terms the poor even in the 1980s and after got better and better off.
In asserting capitalism's innocence of causing poverty, understand, I am not simply disrespecting the poor, or elevating material abundance to trumps, or recommending a cold heart. I have emphasized that all our ancestors were poor, that everyone descends overwhelmingly from poor people, even from slaves, since almost all societies before the eighteenth century had lesser or smaller numbers of slaves and all such societies were by your standards and mine astoundingly poor. Try to imagine living on one dollar a day, with the prices of food and clothing and housing as they now are. Imagine, if you wish, an economy with very many such people, and so having commercial provision for mats to sleep hundreds abreast on the streets of Calcutta and for rice-by-the-bowl with pebbles and clay mixed in. It's still no picnic. Ninety-nine percent of our great-great-great-great grandparents lived on a dollar a day, and more than a billion people I said do still.
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Table of Contents
Apology: A Brief for the Bourgeois Virtues
I. Exordium: The Good Bourgeois
II. Narratio: How Ethics Fell
III. Probatio A: Modern Capitalism Makes Us Richer
IV. Probatio B: And Lets Us Live Longer
V. Probatio C: And Improves Our Ethics
VI. Refutatio: Anticapitalism Is Bad for Us
1. The Very Word “Virtue”
2. The Very Word “Bourgeois”
3. On Not Being Spooked by the Word “Bourgeois”
Part 1 - The Christian and Feminine Virtues: Love
4. The First Virtue: Love Profane and Sacred
5. Love and the Transcendent
6. Sweet Love vs. Interest
7. Bourgeois Economists against Love
8. Love and the Bourgeoisie
Part 2 - The Christian and Feminine Virtues: Faith and Hope
10. Faith as Identity
11. Hope and Its Banishment
12. Against the Sacred
13. Van Gogh and the Transcendent Profane
14. Humility and Truth
15. Economic Theology
Part 3 - The Pagan and Masculine Virtues: Courage, with Temperance
16. The Good of Courage
17. Anachronistic Courage in the Bourgeoisie
18. Taciturn Courage against the “Feminine”
19. Bourgeois vs. Queer
20. Balancing Courage
21. Prudence Is a Virtue
22. The Monomania of Immanuel Kant
23. The Storied Character of Virtue
24. Evil as Imbalance, Inner and Outer: Temperance and Justice
25. The Pagan-Ethical Bourgeois
Part 5 - Systematizing the Seven Virtues
26. The System of the Virtues
27. A Philosophical Psychology?
28. Ethical Striving
29. Ethical Realism
30. Against Reduction
32. Antimonism Again
34. Dropping the Virtues, 1532–1958
35. Other Lists
36. Eastern and Other Ways
37. Needing Virtues
Part 6 - The Bourgeois Uses of the Virtues
38. P & S and the Capitalist Life
39. Sacred Reasons
40. Not by P Alone
41. The Myth of Modern Rati