The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan: Twenty-Volume Series

The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan: Twenty-Volume Series

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The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan: Twenty-Volume Series

This monumental twenty-volume series presents the writings of James M. Buchanan, one of the great twentieth-century scholars of liberty. Buchanan, the Nobel laureate in Economics in 1986, has much wisdom to offer—not just to economists and academics—but to all who seek to understand the challenges and opportunities of governance in our age.

"This is a series," write the editors, "that no serious scholar of public choice theory, public economics, or contemporary political theory will want to be without. It has—perhaps more than any other contemporary scholar—helped us to view politics without the romantic gloss that characterizes much normative political theory and that slips unthinkingly into so much popular commentary. Buchanan has been a resolute defender of 'the ideal of a society of free and responsible individuals' and has been a painstaking analyst of the institutional structure that might best support such a society. Buchanan stands with von Mises, Hayek, Popper, and Friedman as one of the great twentieth-century scholars of liberty.'

The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan is a vast and significant twenty-volume series that includes ten monographs and all of the important journal articles, papers, and essays that Buchanan has produced in a distinguished career spanning more than half a century. Among the monographs are such famous works as The Calculus of Consent (coauthored by Gordon Tullock) and The Limits of Liberty, as well as such gems as Cost and Choice: An Inquiry in Economic Theory. The monographs have been cast into a new format, and in those cases in which no index, or only a partial index, was originally provided, new indexes have been created. In addition, each volume includes a foreword by one of the three editors of the series, each of whom is a distinguished economist in his own right.

Volume 20 presents a comprehensive index to the entire series and an annotated copy of the entire curriculum vitae, indicating in which volume in the series the various items appear and, correspondingly, those items that have been omitted.

The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan is an important contribution to the study of an important economist and a scholar of liberty, a man who has always been able to view his work from an appropriate perspective. As James Buchanan has written, "My interest in understanding how the economics interaction process works has always been instrumental to the more inclusive purpose of understanding how we can learn to live with one another without engaging in Hobbesian war and without sacrificing ourselves to the dictates of the state."

James M. Buchanan is an eminent economist who won the Alfred Nobel Memorial Prize in Economic Sciences in 1986 and is considered one of the greatest scholars of liberty of the twentieth century. He is also Professor Emeritus at George Mason and Virginia Tech Universities.

Gordon Tullock is Professor Emeritus of Law at George Mason University, where he was Distinguished Research Fellow in the Center for Study of Public Choice and University Professor of Law and Economics. He also taught at the University of South Carolina, the University of Virginia, Rice University, Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, and the University of Arizona. In 1966 he founded the journal that became Public Choice and remained its editor until 1990.

The entire series includes:

Volume 1: The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty
Volume 2: Public Principles of Public Debt
Volume 3: The Calculus of Consent
Volume 4: Public Finance in Democratic Process
Volume 5: The Demand and Supply of Public Goods
Volume 6: Cost and Choice
Volume 7: The Limits of Liberty
Volume 8: Democracy in Deficit
Volume 9: The Power to Tax
Volume 10: The Reason of Rules
Volume 11: Politics by Principle, Not Interest
Volume 12: Economic Inquiry and Its Logic
Volume 13: Politics as Public Choice
Volume 14: Debt and Taxes
Volume 15: Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory
Volume 16: Choice, Contract, and Constitutions
Volume 17: Moral Science and Moral Order
Volume 18: Federalism, Liberty, and the Law
Volume 19: Ideas, Persons, and Events
Volume 20: Indexes

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780865979642
Publisher: Liberty Fund, Incorporated
Publication date: 06/30/2003
Series: The Collected Works of James M. Buchanan
Pages: 7154
Product dimensions: 5.90(w) x 9.00(h) x 1.20(d)
Age Range: 18 Years

Table of Contents

The Logical Foundations of Constitutional Liberty, Volume 1Foreword xi The Royal Swedish Academy of Sciences Press Release 3 1. Introduction
Better than Plowing 11
What Should Economists Do? 28 2. Politics without Romance
Politics without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public Choice Theory and Its Normative Implications 45
Politics, Policy, and the Pigovian Margins 60
Individual Choice in Voting and the Market 75
Social Choice, Democracy, and Free Markets 89
Rent Seeking and Profit Seeking 103 3. Public Finance and Democratic Process
The Pure Theory of Government Finance: A Suggested Approach 119
Taxation in Fiscal Exchange 133
Public Debt, Cost Theory, and the Fiscal Illusion 150
Keynesian Follies 164
Socialism Is Dead but Leviathan Lives On 179 4. The Economist and Economic Order
Positive Economics, Welfare Economics, and Political Economy 191
The Relevance of Pareto Optimality 210
Politics and Science: Reflections on Knight's Critique of Polanyi 230
Order Defined in the Process of Its Emergence 244
Natural and Artifactual Man 246
Rights, Efficiency, and Exchange: The Irrelevance of Transactions Cost 260 5. Ethics and Economics
The Foundations for Normative Individualism 281
The Justice of Natural Liberty 292
Ethical Rules, Expected Values, and Large Numbers 311
The Samaritan's Dilemma 329
The Supply of Labour and the Extent of the Market 346
Markets, States, and the Extent of Morals 360
The Ethics of Constitutional Order 368 6. The Reason of Rules
The Domain of Constitutional Economics 377
Predictability: The Criterion of Monetary Constitutions 396
Generality as a Constitutional Constraint 419
Before Public Choice 429
The Relatively Absolute Absolutes 442
The Constitution of Economic Policy 455 Appendixes
A. James M. Buchanan Biographical Data 471
B. Contents of the Collected Works of James M. Buchanan 478 Name Index 505
Subject Index 511

Public Principles of Public Debt, Volume 2Foreword xi Preface xvii 1. The Economists and Vulgar Opinion 3
2. The New Orthodoxy 5
3. The Methodology of Debt Theory 18
4. Concerning Future Generations 26
5. The Analogy: True or False? 38
6. Internal and External Public Loans 58
7. Consumption Spending, the Rate of Interest, Relative and Absolute Prices 67
8. A Review of Pre-Keynesian Debt Theory 79
9. Public Debt and Depression 95
10. War Borrowing 104
11. Public Debt and Inflation 111
12. When Should Government Borrow? 115
13. Should Public Debt Be Retired? 134
14. Debt Retirement and Economic Stabilization 143 Appendix. A Suggested Conceptual Revaluation of the National Debt 149 Index of Authors 165
Index of Subjects 166

The Calculus of Consent, Volume 3Foreword ix Preface xv I. The Conceptual Framework
1. Introduction 3
2. The Individualistic Postulate 11
3. Politics and the Economic Nexus 16
4. Individual Rationality in Social Choice 31 II. The Realm of Social Choice
5. The Organization of Human Activity 43
6. A Generalized Economic Theory of Constitutions 63
7. The Rule of Unanimity 85
8. The Costs of Decision-Making 97 III. Analyses of Decision-Making Rules
9. The Structure of the Models 119
10. Simple Majority Voting 132
11. Simple Majority Voting and the Theory of Games 149
12. Majority Rule, Game Theory, and Pareto Optimality 172
13. Pareto Optimality, External Costs, and Income Redistribution 190
14. The Range and Extent of Collective Action 200
15. Qualified Majority Voting Rules, Representation, and the Interdependence of Constitutional Variables 210
16. The Bicameral Legislature 231
17. The Orthodox Model of Majority Rule 247 IV. The Economics and the Ethics of Democracy
18. Democratic Ethics and Economic Efficiency 265
19. Pressure Groups, Special Interests, and the Constitution 282
20. The Politics of the Good Society 295 Appendix 1. Marginal Notes on Reading Political Philosophy, by James M. Buchanan 305
Appendix 2. Theoretical Forerunners, by Gordon Tullock 326 Name Index 351
Subject Index 353

Public Finance in Democratic Process, Volume 4Foreword ix Preface xiii I. The Effects of Institutions on Fiscal Choice
1. Introduction 3
2. Individual Demand for Public Goods 11
3. Tax Institutions and Individual Fiscal Choice: Direct Taxation 22
4. Tax Institutions and Individual Fiscal Choice: Indirect Taxation 44
5. Existing Institutions and Change: The Effects of Time in Fiscal Decisions 57
6. Earmarking Versus General-Fund Financing: Analysis and Effects 71
7. The Bridge Between Tax and Expenditure in the Fiscal Decision Process 87
8. ”Fiscal Policy' and Fiscal Choice: The Effects of Unbalanced Budgets 97
9. Individual Choice and the Indivisibility of Public Goods 112
10. The Fiscal Illusion 125
11. Simple Collective Decision Models 143
12. From Theory to the Real World 169
13. Some Preliminary Research Results 181 II. The Choice Among Fiscal Institutions
14. The Levels of Fiscal Choice 215
15. Income-Tax Progression 227
16. Specific Excise Taxation 243
17. The Institution of Public Debt 258
18. Fiscal Policy Constitutionally Considered 269
19. Fiscal Nihilism and Beyond 282 Index of Authors 303
Index of Subjects 305

The Demand and Supply of Public Goods, Volume 5Foreword ix Preface xiii 1. A Methodological Introduction 3
2. Simple Exchange in a World of Equals 12
3. Simple Exchange in a World of Unequals 29
4. Pure and Impure Public Goods 48
5. Many Private Goods, Many Persons—The “Free-Rider” Problem 74
6. Many Public Goods, Many Persons—The World Without a Numeraire 96
7. The Publicness of Political Decisions 120
8. The Institutions of Fiscal Choice 142
9. Which Goods Should Be Public? 161
10. Toward a Positive Theory of Public Finance 180 Supplementary Reading Materials 191 Author Index 195
Subject Index 197

Cost and Choice, Volume 6Foreword xi Preface xiii Acknowledgments xvii 1. Cost in Economic Theory 3 Classical Economics 3
Marginal-Utility Economics 9
The Marshallian Synthesis 12
Frank Knight and American Neoclassical Paradigms 13 2. The Origins and Development of a London Tradition 17 Wicksteed and the Calculus of Choice 17
H. J. Davenport 18
Knight on Cost as Valuation 19
Robbins, 1934 19
Mises, Robbins, and Hayek on Calculation in a Socialist Economy 21
Hayek, Mises, and Subjectivist Economics 23
The Practical Relevance of Opportunity Cost: Coase, 1938 26
G. F. Thirlby and “The Ruler” 29
Mises' Human Action 33
The Death of a Tradition? 34
Appendix to Chapter 2: Shackle on Decision 35 3. Cost and Choice 37 The Predictive Science of Economics 37
Cost in the Predictive Theory 40
Cost in a Theory of Choice 41
Choice-Influencing and Choice-Influenced Cost 42
Opportunity Cost and Real Cost 43
The Subjectivity of Sunk Costs 45
Cost and Equilibrium 46 4. The Cost of Public Goods 49 The Theory of Tax Incidence 50
Costs and Fiscal Decision-Making: The Democratic Model 52
Costs and Decision-Making: The Authoritarian Model 55
Costs and Decision-Making: Mixed Models 55
The Choice Among Projects 57
The Costs of Debt-Financed Public Goods 59
Ricardo's Equivalence Theorem 61
Tax Capitalization 63 5. Private and Social Cost 65 Summary Analysis 65
A Closer Look 66
Internal Costs, Equilibrium, and Quasi-Rents 69
An Illustrative Example 70
Pigovian Economics and Christian Ethics 72
Narrow Self-Interest and Alternative-Opportunity Quasi-Rents 74
Conclusion 76 6. Cost Without Markets 77 Prices, Costs, and Market Equilibrium 77
Resource-Service Prices as Final-Product Costs 78
Market Equilibrium, Costs, and Quasi-Rents 80
The Cost of Military Manpower: An Example 81
The Cost of Crime: Another Example 84
Artificial Choice-Making 86
Socialist Calculation and Socialist Choice 87
Costs in Bureaucratic Choice 89 Author Index 93
Subject Index 95

The Limits of Liberty, Volume 7Foreword xiii Preface xv 1. Commencement 3
2. The Bases for Freedom in Society 22
3. Postconstitutional Contract: The Theory of Public Goods 46
4. Constitutional Contract: The Theory of Law 69
5. Continuing Contract and the Status Quo 96
6. The Paradox of Being Governed' 116
7. Law as Public Capital 136
8. The Punishment Dilemma 165
9. The Threat of Leviathan 186
10. Beyond Pragmatism: Prospects for Constitutional Revolution 209 Selected Bibliography 229
Index 237

Democracy in Deficit, Volume 8Foreword xi Preface xvii Acknowledgments xxi I. What Happened?
1. What Hath Keynes Wrought? 3
The Political Economy 4
A Review of the Record 5
The Theory of Public Choice 7
Fiscal and Monetary Reform 8 2. The Old-Time Fiscal Religion 10
Classical Fiscal Principle 10
Fiscal Practice in Pre-Keynesian Times 13
Balanced Budgets, Debt Burdens, and Fiscal Responsibility 16
Fiscal Principles and Keynesian Economic Theory 21
The Fiscal Constitution 23 3. First, the Academic Scribblers 25
“Classical Economics,” a Construction in Straw? 26
The Birth of Macroeconomics 29
The New Role for the State 31
The Scorn for Budget Balance 32
The New Precepts for Fiscal Policy 33
Budget Deficits, Public Debt, and Money Creation 34
The Dreams of Camelot 37 4. The Spread of the New Gospel 38
Introduction 38
Passive Imbalance 38
Built-in Flexibility 41
Hypothetical Budget Balance 42
Monetary Policy and Inflation 43
The Rhetoric and the Reality of the Fifties 45
Fiscal Drag 47
The Reluctant Politician 49
Political Keynesianism: The Tax Cut of 1964 50
Economists, Politicians, and the Public 52
Functional Finance and Hypothetical Budget Balance 53 5. Assessing the Damages 56
Introduction 56
The Summary Record 57
Budget Deficits, Monetary Institutions, and Inflation 59
Inflation: Anticipated and Unanticipated 61
Why Worry about Inflation? 62
Inflation, Budget Deficits, and Capital Investment 66
The Bloated Public Sector 71
International Consequences 73
Tragedy, Not Triumph 75 II. What Went Wrong?
6. The Presuppositions of Harvey Road 79
Introduction 79
The Presuppositions of Harvey Road 80
The Economic Environment of “General Theory” 83
Strings Can Be Pulled 85
The Great Phillips Trade-off 87
Post-Keynes, Post-Phillips 90
Reform through National Economic Planning 92 7. Keynesian Economics in Democratic Politics 95
Introduction 95
Budgetary Management in an Unstable Economy 96
Taxing, Spending, and Political Competition 98
Unbalanced Budgets, Democratic Politics, and Keynesian Biases 101
Deficit Finance and Public-Sector Bias 106 8. Money-Financed Deficits and Political Democracy 110
Introduction 110
Budget Deficits Financed by Money Creation 111
Benevolent and Independent Monetary Authority 114
The Political Environment of Monetary Policy 117
The American Political Economy, 1976 and Beyond 125 9. Institutional Constraints and Political Choice 129
Introduction 129
The Public Economy and the Private 130
Fiscal Perception and Tax Institutions 131
Debt-Financed Budget Deficits 138
Money-Financed Budget Deficits 147
Institutions Matter 149 III. What Can Be Done?
10. Alternative Budgetary Rules 153
Budget Balance over the Cycle 154
Built-in Flexibility 155
Budget Balance at Full Employment 157
The Budget Reform Act of 1974 162
Short-Term Politics for Long-Term Objectives 164 11. What about Full Employment? 167
Introduction 167
Current Unemployment and the Quandary of Policy 167
The Keynesian Theory of Employment 170
The Inflation-Unemployment Trade-o€ 172
The Inflation-Unemployment Spiral 174
Biting the Bullet 177
So, What about Full Employment? 178 12. A Return to Fiscal Principle 180
The Thrill Is Gone 180
The Case for Constitutional Norms 182
The Case for Budget Balance 183
Fiscal Decisions under Budget Balance 184
Tax Rates and Spending Rates as Residual Budget Adjustors 185
A Specific Proposal 187
Debt Retirement and Budget Surplus 189 In Summation 190
Author Index 195
Subject Index 197

The Power to Tax, Volume 9Foreword xiii Preface xxi 1. Taxation in Constitutional Perspective 3 1.1 The Notion of a “Constitution” 5
1.2 The Logic of a Constitution 6
1.3 The Means of Constitutional Constraint 8
1.4 The Wicksellian Ideal and Majoritarian Reality 9
1.5 The Power to Tax 11
1.6 The Enforceability of Constitutional Contract 13
1.7 Normative Implications 14 2. Natural Government: A Model of Leviathan 16 2.1 Leviathan as Actuality and as Contingency 18
2.2 Monopoly Government and Popular Sovereignty 20
2.3 The Model of Leviathan': Revenue Maximization 33
2.4 The Model of Leviathan as Monolith 35
2.5 The Constitutional Criteria 37 3. Constraints on Base and Rate Structure 42 3.1 Government as Revenue Maximizer Subject to Constitutional Tax Constraints 46
3.2 Tax-Base and Tax-Rate Constraints in a Simple Model 48
3.3 One among Many 55
3.4 Tax Limits and Tax Reform 59
Appendix: Progression in the Multiperson Setting 61 4. The Taxation of Commodities 67 4.1 The Conventional Wisdom 68
4.2 Constitutional Tax Choice 70
4.3 Alternative Forms of Commodity Tax: The Choice of Base 71
4.4 Uniformity of Rates over Commodities 79
4.5 Uniformity of Rates over Individuals 83
4.6 Discrimination by Means of the Rate Structure 84
4.7 Summary 95
Appendix 96 5. Taxation through Time: Income Taxes, Capital Taxes, and Public Debt 99 5.1 Income Taxes, Capital Taxes, and Public Debt in Orthodox Public Finance 101
5.2 The Timing of Rate Announcement 103
5.3 Income and Capital Taxes under Perpetual Leviathan 110
5.4 Leviathan's Time Preference 116
5.5 The Time Preference of the Taxpayer-Citizen with Respect to Public Spending 121
5.6 The Power to Borrow 122
5.7 Conclusions 126 6. Money Creation and Taxation 129 6.1 The Power to Create Money 131
6.2 Inflation and the Taxation of Money Balances: A “Land” Analogy 134
6.3 Inflation and the Taxation of Money Balances 138
6.4 Inflationary Expectations under Leviathan 144
6.5 Inflation, Wealth Taxation, and the Durability of Money 149
6.6 The Orthodox Discussion of Inflation as a Tax 150
6.7 The Monetary Constitution 153
6.8 Inflation and Income Tax Revenue 155
6.9 Monetary Rules and Tax Rules 157 7. The Disposition of Public Revenues 160 7.1 The Model 162
7.2 Public-Goods Supply under a Pure Surplus Maximizer: Geometric Analysis 164
7.3 The Surplus Maximizer: Algebraic Treatment 170
7.4 The Nonsurplus Maximizer 175
7.5 Toward a Tax Policy 177 8. The Domain of Politics 181 8.1 Procedural Constraints on Political Decision Making 182
8.2 The Rule of Law: General Rules 184
8.3 The Domain of Public Expenditures 190
8.4 Government by Coercion 192 9. Open Economy, Federalism, and Taxing Authority 197 9.1 Toward a Tax Constitution for Leviathan in an Open Economy with Trade but without Migration 198
9.2 Tax Rules in an Open Economy with Trade and Migration 200
9.3 Federalism as a Component of a Fiscal Constitution 203
9.4 An Alternative Theory of Government Grants 212
9.5 A Tax Constitution for a Federal State 214
9.6 Conclusions 215 10. Toward Authentic Tax Reform: Prospects and Prescriptions 218 10.1 Taxation in Constitutional Perspective 221
10.2 Tax Reform as Tax Limits 224
10.3 Tax-Rate Limits: The Logic of Proposition 13 229
10.4 Tax-Base Constraints 231
10.5 Aggregate Revenue and Outlay Limits: Ratio-Type Proposals for Constitutional Constraint 233
10.6 Procedural Limits: Qualified Majorities and Budget Balance 234
10.7 Toward Authentic Tax Reform 237 Epilogue 239
Selected Bibliography 241
Index 249

The Reason of Rules, Volume 10Foreword xi Preface xv 1. The Constitutional Imperative 3
I. Introduction 3
II. Reasons for Rules 5
III. Rules of Games 8
IV. Rules of the Road 10
V. Rules of the Market Order 16
VI. Rules of Political Order 18
VII. The Importance of Rules 19 2. The Contractarian Vision 23
I. Introduction 23
II. Noncontractarian Constitutionalism 24
III. Individuals as Sources of Value 25
IV. Contract and Exchange 27
V. Politics in the Exchange Perspective 29
VI. Unanimity as the Contractual Ideal 31
VII. Agreement on Rules and the Veils of Ignorance and Uncertainty 33
VIII. Conclusions 36 3. The Myth of Benevolence 38
I. Introduction 38
II. Private Good and Public Good 39
III. Science, Truth, and Politics 43
IV. The Authoritarian Imperative 46
V. Majoritarian Democracy in the Noncontractarian Paradigm 48
VI. The Aim of Politics 50 4. Modeling the Individual for Constitutional Analysis 53
I. Introduction 53
II. Homo economicus in Politics: The Argument for Symmetry 56
III. Science and the Empiricist Defense 58
IV. A Methodological Defense of the Differential Interest Model of Behavior 59
V. Social Evaluation and Quasi–Risk Aversion 61
VI. Gresham's Law in Politics 68
VII. Summary 73 5. Time,Temptation, and the Constrained Future 76
Preface 76
Part 1. Individual Private Choice
I. Introduction 77
II. The Ultimate Z 's 77
III. Preferences for Preferences 78
IV. Past, Present, and Future 80
Part 2. Individual Public Choice
I. Introduction 83
II. Society with a History 84
III. Temporal Interdependence 85
IV. An Illustration 87
V. Moral Rules and/or Constitutional Commitment 89 6. Politics Without Rules, I: Time and Nonconstrained Collective Action 92
I. Introduction 92
II. The Social Discount Rate 93
III. The High-Tax Trap 94
IV. The Inflation Trap 101
V. The Public-Debt Trap 104
VI. Other Examples 106
VII. Conclusions 107 7. Rules and Justice 108
I. Introduction 108
II. Just Conduct and the Notion of Desert 109
III. Justice and Promise Keeping 111
IV. Justice among Rules 117
V. Just Rules, Agreed-on Rules, and Just Conduct 119
VI. Conclusions 123 8. Politics Without Rules, II: Distributive Justice and Distributive Politics 125
I. Introduction 125
II. Distributive Justice: The Conventional View 126
III. The Constitutional Perspective and Institutional Incidence 128
IV. The Incidence of Unrestricted Majoritarianism 131
V. Tax Rules and Distribution under Majority Rule 135
VI. Direct Constitutionalismand Distributive Justice 142
VII. Summary 146 9. Is Constitutional Revolution Possible in Democracy? 149
I. Introduction 149
II. Pareto-Superior Change and Wicksellian Unanimity 151
III. Distributional Limits and Prospective Rules 152
IV. Status Quo Entitlements and Distributional Envy 155
V. Constitutional Change and Free Riders 160
VI. The Role of Norms 162
VII. Toward a Civic Religion 165 Index 169

Economic Inquiry and Its Logic, Volume 12Foreword xi 1. The Practice and Method of Economic Theory Is Economics the Science of Choice? 3 General Implications of Subjectivism in Economics 22 There Is a Science of Economics 30 Economics as a Public Science 44 Ceteris Paribus: Some Notes on Methodology 52 Marshall's Mathematical Note XIX
(James M. Buchanan and Charles Plott) 67 The Normative Purpose of Economic Science': Rediscovery of an Eighteenth Century Method
(Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan) 70 Predictive Power and the Choice among Regimes
(Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan) 87 The Economizing Element in Knight's Ethical Critique of Capitalist Order 110 Professor Alchian on Economic Method 128 2. Competition and Entrepreneurship Cognition, Choice, and Entrepreneurship
(James M. Buchanan and Alberto di Pierro) 141 Resource Allocation and Entrepreneurship 154 Entrepreneurship and the Internalization of Externalities
(James M. Buchanan and Roger L. Faith) 169 3. The Theory of Monopoly The Theory of Monopolistic Quantity Discounts 191 The “Dead Hand” of Monopoly
(James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock) 206 On Monopoly Price
(Geoffrey Brennan, James M. Buchanan, and Dwight Lee) 219 A Regional Countermeasure to National Wage Standardization
(James M. Buchanan and John E. Moes) 236 4. Input Prices Saving and the Rate of Interest: A Comment 245 The Backbending Supply Curve of Labor: An Example of Doctrinal Retrogression? 253 The Homogenization of Heterogeneous Inputs
(James M. Buchanan and Robert D. Tollison) 260 Trying Again to Value a Life
(James M. Buchanan and Roger L. Faith) 278 5. Opportunity Cost and Efficient Prices Opportunity Costs and Legal Institutions 285 Peak Loads and Efficient Pricing: Comment 298 The Optimality of Pure Competition in the Capacity Problem: Comment 308 Private Ownership and Common Usage: The Road Case Re-examined 311 Introduction: L. S. E. Cost Theory in Retrospect 327 6. Increasing Returns and the Work Ethic Economic Interdependence and the Work Ethic 343 The Economics and the Ethics of Idleness 366 The Simple Economics of the Menial Servant 377 Constitutional Implications of Alternative Models of Increasing Returns
(James M. Buchanan and Yong J. Yoon) 388 Who Cares Whether the Commons Are Privatized? 397 7. Economic Theory in a Postsocialist World Asymmetrical Reciprocity in Market Exchange: Implications for Economies in Transition 409 Economic Science and Cultural Diversity 426 Structure-Induced Behaviour in Markets and in Politics 435 We Should Save More in Our Own Economic Interest 453 Economic Theory in the Postrevolutionary Moment of the 1990s 470 Name Index 487
Subject Index 491

Politcs as Public Choice, Volume 13Foreword xi 1.General Approach
An Economist ’Approach to “Scientific Politics” 3
The Public Choice Perspective 15
Toward Analysis of Closed Behavioral Systems 25
From Private Preferences to Public Philosophy: The Development of Public Choice 39
Notes on the History and Direction of Public Choice 57
Foreword to Gordon Tullock ‘s Politics of Bureaucracy 62
Notes on Politics as Process 71 2.Public Choice and Its Critics
Is Public Choice Immoral? The Case for the ‘‘Nobel’’ Lie
(Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan) 79
Foundational Concerns: A Criticism of Public Choice Theory 90
The Achievement and the Limits of Public Choice in Diagnosing
Government Failure and in Offering Bases for Constructive Reform 112 3.Voters
The Political Economy of Franchise in the Welfare State 129
Voter Choice: Evaluating Political Alternatives
(Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan) 153
Hegel on the Calculus of Voting 170
Public Choice and Ideology 173 4.Voting Models
What If There I No Majority Motion? 179
Towards a Theory of Yes-No Voting
(Roger L. Faith and James M. Buchanan,) 195
Vote Buying in a Stylized Setting
(James M. Buchanan and Dwight R .Lee) 213
Democracy and Duopoly: A Comparison of Analytical Models 227
Majoritarian Logic 239 5.Rent Seeking
Rent Seeking under External Diseconomies 251
Rent Seeking, Noncompensated Transfers, and Laws of Succession 263
The Incumbency Dilemma and Rent Extraction by Legislators
(James M. Buchanan and Roger D. Congleton ) 281
The Coase Theorem and the Theory of the State 297
Consumerism and Public Utility Regulation 316
In Defense of Advertising Cartels 333
Reform in the Rent-Seeking Society 346 6.Regulation
The Politicization of Market Failure
(James M. Buchanan and Viktor J. Vanberg ) 357
A Public Choice Approach to Public Utility Pricing 372
Cartels, Coalitions, and Constitutional Politics
(James M. Buchanan and Dwight R. Lee ) 387
Politics and Meddlesome Preferences 410
Polluters’ Profits and Political Response: Direct Controls versus Taxes
(James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock ) 419 7.Public Choice and Public Expenditures
Easy Budgets and Tight Money 435
Notes for an Economic Theory of Socialism 450
Tax Rates and Tax Revenues in Political Equilibrium: Some Simple Analytics
(James M. Buchanan and Dwight R. Lee ) 466 Name Index 481
Subject Index 485

Debt and Taxes, Volume 14Foreword xi 1.Taxation, Politics, and Public Choice
Public Finance and Public Choice 3
Public Choice and Public Finance 25
Democratic Values in Taxation 36
Tax Reform a Political Choice 46
The Theory of Public Finance 54
Richard Musgrave, Public Finance, and Public Choice 64 2.Earmarking and Incidence in Democratic Process
The Economics of Earmarked Taxes 71
The Constitutional Economics of Earmarking 89
Fiscal Choice through Time: A Case for Indirect Taxation? (James M. Buchanan and Francesco Forte ) 101
Externality in Tax Response 121
On the Incidence of Tax Deductibility (James M. Buchanan and Mark V. Pauly) 134 3.Analytical and Ethical Foundations of Tax Limits
Towards a Tax Constitution for Leviathan (Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan) 151
The Logic of Tax Limits: Alternative Constitutional Constraints on the Power to Tax (Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan) 175
Proportional and Progressive Income Taxation with Utility-Maximizing Governments (James M. Buchanan and Roger Congleton ) 196
The Ethical Limits of Taxation 212
Coercive Taxation in Constitutional Contract 228
Constitutional Constraints on Governmental Taxing Power 250 4.The Fiscal Constitution
The Tax System as Social Overhead Capital: A Constitutional Perspective on Fiscal Norms (Geoffrey Brennan and James Buchanan) 269
Tax Reform without Tears (James Buchanan and Geoffrey Brennan) 284
The Political Efficiency of General Taxation 305
Rational Majoritarian Taxation of the Rich: With Increasing Returns and Capital Accumulation (James M. Buchanan and Yong J. Yoon) 321 5.Confessions of a Burden Monger
Debt, Public 343
Confessions of a Burden Monger 357
The Icons of Public Debt 361
Public Debt and Capital Formation 365 6.Ricardian Equivalence
Barro on the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem 385
The Logic of the Ricardian Equivalence Theorem (Geoffrey Brennan and James M. Buchanan) 392
The Incidence and Effects of Public Debt in the Absence of Fiscal Illusion (James M. Buchanan and Jennifer Roback) 408 7.The Constitution of a Debt-Free Polity
Organization Theory and Fiscal Economics: Society, State, and Public Debt (Viktor Vanberg and James M. Buchanan) 429
The Economic Consequences of the Deficit 445
Budgetary Bias in Post-Keynesian Politics: The Erosion and Potential Replacement of Fiscal Norms 455
Dialogues Concerning Fiscal Religion (James M. Buchanan and Richard E. Wagner) 473
The Moral Dimension of Debt Financing 486
The Balanced Budget Amendment: Clarifying the Arguments 493
The Ethics of Debt Default 519 Name Index 535
Subject Index 539

Externalities and Public Expenditure Theory, Volume 15Foreword xi 1.Public Services and Collective Action
The Bases for Collective Action 3
The Evaluation of Public Services (Francesco Forte and James M. Buchanan) 39
‘‘La scienza delle .nanze’’: The Italian Tradition in Fiscal Theory 59 2.Externalities
Externality (James M. Buchanan and Wm. Craig Stubblebine) 109
Public and Private Interaction under Reciprocal Externality (James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock) 126
External Diseconomies in Competitive Supply (Charles J. Goetz and James M. Buchanan )156
External Diseconomies, Corrective Taxes, and Market Structure 169
The Institutional Structure of Externality 174 3.Clubs and Joint Supply
An Economic Theory of Clubs 193
Joint Supply, Externality, and Optimality 210 4.Public Goods Theory
Cooperation and Conflict in Public-Goods Interaction 227
A Note on Public Goods Supply (James M. Buchanan and Milton Z. Kafoglis) 244
Public Goods in Theory and Practice: A Note on the Minasian-Samuelson Discussion 259
Breton and Weldon on Public Goods 265
Convexity Constraints in Public Goods Theory (James M. Buchanan and António S. Pinto Barbosa )271
Public Goods and Natural Liberty 282 5.Applications —City, Health, and Social Security
Public Goods and Public Bads 301
Principles of Urban Fiscal Strategy 321
The Inconsistencies of the National Health Service 340
Technological Determinism Despite the Reality of Scarcity: A Neglected Element in the Theory of Spending for Medical and Health Care 361
The Budgetary Politics of Social Security 376
Social Security Survival: A Public-Choice Perspective 390
Social Insurance in a Growing Economy: A Proposal for Radical Reform 407
Commentary 421 6.Distributive Norms and Collective Action
What Kind of Redistribution Do We Want? 427
Distributive and Redistributive Norms: A Note of Clarification 434
Government Transfer Spending 440
Who Should Pay for Common-Access Facilities? 460
Who Should Distribute What in a Federal System? 471 Name Index 491
Subject Index 495

Choice, Contract, and Constitutions, Volume 16Foreword xi 1.Foundational Issues
Constitutional Economics 3
A Contractarian Perspective on Anarchy 15
The Contractarian Logic of Classical Liberalism 28
Constitutional Restrictions on the Power of Government 42
Contractarian Political Economy and Constitutional Interpretation 60
Justification of the Compound Republic: The Calculus in Retrospect 68 2.The Method of Constitutional Economics
A Contractarian Paradigm for Applying Economic Theory 79
Boundaries on Social Contract 87
Constitutional Design and Construction: An Economic Approach 101
The Use and Abuse of Contract 111 3.Incentives and Constitutional Choice
Constitutional Choice, Rational Ignorance and the Limits of Reason (Viktor J. Vanberg and James M. Buchanan) 127
How Can Constitutions Be Designed So That Politicians Who Seek to Serve ‘‘Public Interest’’ Can Survive and Prosper? 148
Interests and Theories in Constitutional Choice (Viktor Vanberg and James M. Buchanan) 155
Student Revolts, Academic Liberalism, and Constitutional Attitudes 172
A Theory of Leadership and Deference in Constitutional Construction (James M. Buchanan and Viktor Vanberg) 185
Individual Rights, Emergent Social States, and Behavioral Feasibility 201 4.Constitutional Order
Contractarianism and Democracy 215
Democracy within Constitutional Limits 225 5.Market Order
[Untitled ] 237
The Minimal Politics of Market Order 253 6.Distributional Issues
Distributional Politics and Constitutional Design 267
Political Constraints on Contractual Redistribution (James M. Buchanan and Winston C. Bush) 277
Subjective Elements in Rawlsian Contractual Agreement on Distributional Rules (James M. Buchanan and Roger L. Faith) 285 7.Fiscal and Monetary Constitutions
Procedural and Quantitative Constitutional Constraints on Fiscal Authority 307
Tax Reform in ‘‘Constitutional’’ Perspective: The Case for a Fiscal Constitution 313
The Relevance of Constitutional Strategy 330 8.Reform
The Economic Constitution and the New Deal: Lessons for Late Learners 339
Sources of Opposition to Constitutional Reform 356
Achieving Economic Reform 372
Pragmatic Reform and Constitutional Revolution (James M. Buchanan and Alberto di Pierro) 384
Lagged Implementation as an Element in Constitutional Strategy 398
Prolegomena for a Strategy of Constitutional Revolution 417
The Structure of Progress: National Constitutionalism in a Technologically Opened World Economy 428
Notes on the Liberal Constitution 439
Dismantling the Welfare State 449 Name Index 459
Subject Index 462

Moral Science and Moral Orders, Volume 17Foreword xi 1.Methods and Models
Economics and Its Scientific Neighbors 3
The Domain of Subjective Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy 24
The Related but Distinct ‘‘Sciences’’ of Economics and of Political Economy 40
Rational Choice Models in the Social Sciences 55
An Ambiguity in Sen’s Alleged Proof of the Impossibility of a Pareto Libertarian 71
Choosing What to Choose 80
Law and the Invisible Hand 96
On Some Fundamental Issues in Political Economy: An Exchange of Correspondence (James M. Buchanan and Warren J. Samuels) 110
Economic Analogues to the Generalization Argument (James M. Buchanan and Gordon Tullock) 142
Monetary Research, Monetary Rules, and Monetary Regimes 146 2.Belief and Consequence
The Potential for Tyranny in Politics as Science 153
Belief, Choice and Consequences: Reflections on Economics, Science and Religion 171 3.Moral Community and Moral Order
Moral Community, Moral Order, or Moral Anarchy 187
Moral Community and Moral Order: The Intensive and Extensive Limits of Interaction 202
A Two-Country Parable 211
Economic Origins of Ethical Constraints 215 4.Moral Science, Equality, and Justice
Political Economy and Social Philosophy 235
An Individualistic Theory of Political Process 251
Constitutional Democracy, Individual Liberty, and Political Equality 266
Equality as Fact and Norm 281
Political Equality and Private Property: The Distributional Paradox 297
Fairness, Hope, and Justice 311 5.Contractarian Encounters
Rawls on Justice as Fairness 353
A Hobbesian Interpretation of the Rawlsian Difference Principle 360
The Matrix of Contractarian Justice (James M. Buchanan and Loren E. Lomasky) 379
Notes on Justice in Contract 403
The Libertarian Legitimacy of the State 415
Utopia, the Minimal State, and Entitlement 429
The Gauthier Enterprise 437
Constructivism, Cognition, and Value 459 Name Index 469
Subject Index 473

Federalism, Liberty, and the Law, Volume 18Foreword xi 1.The Analytics of Federalism
Federalism and Fiscal Equity 3
An Efficiency Basis for Federal Fiscal Equalization (James M. Buchanan and Richard E. Wagner) 23
Efficiency Limits of Fiscal Mobility: An Assessment of the Tiebout Model (James M. Buchanan and Charles J. Goetz) 44 2.Federalism and Freedom
Federalism as an Ideal Political Order and an Objective for Constitutional Reform 67
Federalism and Individual Sovereignty 79
Economic Freedom and Federalism: Prospects for the New Century 90
Europe ’Constitutional Opportunity 99
National Politics and Competitive Federalism: Italy and the Constitution of Europe 118
On a Fiscal Constitution for the European Union (James M. Buchanan and Dwight R. Lee) 131
Secession and the Limits of Taxation: Toward a Theory of Internal Exit (James M. Buchanan and Roger L. Faith) 148 3.Liberty, Man, and the State
Man and the State 167
Criteria for a Free Society: Definition, Diagnosis, and Prescription 173
The Individual as Participant in Political Exchange 185
Towards the Simple Economics of Natural Liberty: An Exploratory Analysis 198
Property as a Guarantor of Liberty 216 4.The Constitution of Markets
On the Structure of an Economy: A Re-emphasis of Some Classical Foundations 263
Market Failure and Political Failure 276
The Market as a Creative Process (James M. Buchanan and Viktor J. Vanberg) 289
Cultural Evolution and Institutional Reform 311 5.Economists, Efficiency, and the Law
Good Economics —Bad Law 327
Comment 338
Politics, Property, and the Law: An Alternative Interpretation of Miller et al. v. Schoene 342
In Defense of Caveat Emptor 358
Notes on Irrelevant Externalities, Enforcement Costs and the Atrophy of Property Rights 369 6.Law, Money, and Crime
Gold, Money and the Law: The Limits of Governmental Monetary Authority (James M. Buchanan and T. Nicolaus Tideman) 385
A Defense of Organized Crime? 432 Name Index 449
Subject Index 453

Ideas, Persons, and Events, Volume 19Foreword xi 1.Autobiographical and Personal Reflections
Born-Again Economist 3
From the Inside Looking Out 18
Italian Retrospective 28
Political Economy:1957 –82 38
Virginia Political Economy: Some Personal Reflections 50
A Theory of Truth in Autobiography (James M. Buchanan and Rober D. Tollison) 64 2.Reflections on Fellow Political Economists
Frank H. Knight: 1885 –1972 77
Knight, Frank H. 86
The Qualities of a Natural Economist 95
Preface to Essays on Unorthodox Economic Strategies: A Memorial Volume in Honor of Winston C. Bush 108
Jack Wiseman: A Personal Appreciation 110
I Did Not Call Him ‘‘Fritz ’’: Personal Recollections of Professor F. A. v. Hayek 116
Methods and Morals in Economics: The Ayres-Knight Discussion 123
Economists and the Gains-from-Trade 135
Shackle and a Lecture in Pittsburgh 153
Review of Imagination and the Nature of Choice 158
Review of Politics and Markets: The World ’s Political Economic Systems 162
Liberty, Market and State 165 3.Political Economy in the Post-Socialist Century
America ’Third Century in Perspective 173
Analysis, Ideology and the Events of 1989 187
Politicized Economies in Limbo: America, Europe and the World,1994 199
The Epistemological Feasibility of Free Markets 210
Consumption without Production: The Impossible Idyll of Socialism 221
Economics in the Post-Socialist Century 239
Post-Socialist Political Economy 248
The Triumph of Economic Science: Is Fukuyama Wrong and, If So, Why? 263
Public Choice after Socialism 276 4.Reform without Romance
Adam Smith as Inspiration 289
The Potential for Politics after Socialism 304
I Did Not Call Him ‘‘Fritz ’’: Personal Recollections of Professor F. A. v. Hayek 116
Methods and Morals in Economics: The Ayres-Knight Discussion 123
Economists and the Gains-from-Trade 135
Shackle and a Lecture in Pittsburgh 153
Review of Imagination and the Nature of Choice 158
Review of Politics and Markets:The World ’s Political Economic Systems 162
Liberty, Market and State 165 3.Political Economy in the Post-Socialist Century
America’s Third Century in Perspective 173
Analysis, Ideology and the Events of 1989 187
Politicized Economies in Limbo: America, Europe and the World,1994 199
The Epistemological Feasibility of Free Markets 210
Consumption without Production: The Impossible Idyll of Socialism 221
Economics in the Post-Socialist Century 239
Post-Socialist Political Economy 248
The Triumph of Economic Science: Is Fukuyama Wrong and, If So,Why? 263
Public Choice after Socialism 276 4.Reform without Romance
Adam Smith as Inspiration 289
The Potential for Politics after Socialism 304
Ideas, Institutions, and Political Economy: A Plea for Disestablishment 318
Can Policy Activism Succeed? A Public-Choice Perspective 331
Society and Democracy 344
Reform without Romance: First Principles in Political Economy 356 Name Index 365
Subject Index 369

Indexes, Volume 20Name Index 1
Subject Index 27
Title Index 165
Curriculum Vitae 175

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