This fresh look at the 1963 crisis in the western alliance following de Gaulle's veto of the British EEC application uses new unpublished source material to offer a fascinating insight into the personal relationships of the western leaders. It challenges the orthodox view, showing that the ultimate breakdown came after Anglo-German and Anglo-American cooperation to ensure that de Gaulle made the sole scapegoat, in order to isolate France within the EEC.
About the Author
Oliver Bange has taught and researched at the Institut für Politische Wissenschaft, Aachen and the London School of Economics.
Table of Contents
• Part I: Grand Designs and the Rationale Behind the First British EEC Negotiations, 1960-63
• Fundamental Questions
• Macmillan's Grand Design (1959/60) as a Starting Point for the Application
• The Main Obstacle: de Gaulle
• Quid-pro-Quo Deal?
• Differing American Ideas
• Kennedy's Rethinking: The American Offer
• Adenauer Takes his Stand
• Part II: The Story of Adenauer's and de Gaulle's "Compromise:" A Fresh Look at the Critical Events of January 1963
• Nassau, a New Look at its Meaning and its Promotion
• Heath and the Atlanticists--Heath's "Big Push"
• Before the Veto
• de Gaulle's Infamous Press Conference
• The Ministerial Meeting--A First Dramatic Encounter
• Anglo-American Co-ordination Towards a Breakdown in Brussels
• Adenauer's and de Gaulle's Plan for a Compromise
• Hysteria in the Western Camp: The Days Between January 22 and 28, 1963
• The Breakdown in Brussels--Purely the Fault of the French?