Different types of markets exist throughout the world but how are they created? In this book, an interdisciplinary team of authors provide an evolutionary vision of how markets are designed and shaped. Drawing on a series of case studies, they show that markets are far from perfect and natural mechanisms, and propose a new view of markets as social construct, explaining how combinations of economic, political and legal constraints influence the formation and performance of markets. Historical trajectories and interdependencies among institutional dimensions make it difficult to build costless, non-biased co-ordination mechanisms, and there are limitations to public and private attempts to improve the design of markets. The authors show that incomplete and imperfect modes of governance must be improved upon and combined in order for markets to work more efficiently. This timely book will interest practitioners and academics with backgrounds in economics, law, political science and public policy.
|Publisher:||Cambridge University Press|
|Product dimensions:||5.98(w) x 8.98(h) x 1.38(d)|
About the Author
Jean-Michel Glachant is Director of the Florence School of Regulation and holder of the Loyola de Palacio Chair at the European University Institute in Florence. He has been coordinator or scientific adviser for several European research projects such as THINK, Optimate, SESSA, CESSA, Reliance, EU-DEEP, RefGov, TradeWind and Secure. He is chief editor of EEEP: Economics of Energy and Environmental Policy, the new academic journal of the International Association for Energy Economics, and is a member of the board of IAEE.
Table of ContentsIntroduction: 1. Manufacturing markets: what it means and why it matters? Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant; Part I. Public and Private Complementarities in Securing Exchange: Introduction to Part I Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant; 2. Measurement systems as market foundations: perspectives from historical markets Aashish Velkar; 3. How to manufacture quality: the diversity of institutional solutions and how they interact in agrifood markets Marta Fernandez Barcala, Manuel Gonzalez-Diaz and Emmanuel Raynaud; 4. The law of impersonal transactions Benito Arruñada; Part II. Path Dependency and Political Constraints in Establishing Property Rights Systems: Introduction to Part II Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant; 5. 'Manufacturing markets': the efficiency advantages of grandfathering allocations over auctions Terry L. Anderson, Ragnar Arnason and Gary D. Libecap; 6. Allocation in air emissions markets A. Denny Ellerman; 7. Auction versus negotiation in public procurement: looking for empirical evidence Eshien Chong, Carine Staropoli and Anne Yvrande-Billon; Part III. The Political Origin of Competition: Introduction to Part III Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant; 8. Why competitive markets aren't self-actuating: the political economy of limited access John J. Wallis; 9. The creation of a market for retail electricity supply Stephen Littlechild; 10. The institutional design of European competition policy Antonio Manganelli, Antonio Nicita and Maria Alessandra Rossi; Part IV. The Myopia of the Public Hand: Introduction to Part IV Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant; 11. Third-party opportunism and the theory of public contracts: operationalization and applications Marian W. Moszoro and Pablo T. Spiller; 12. The cycling of power between private and public sectors: electricity generation in Argentina, Brazil and Chile Witold J. Henisz and Bennet A. Zelner; 13. Politics and the manufacturing of a transatlantic market for civil aviation (1944-2007) Yannis Karagiannis and Adrienne Héritier; Part V. The Challenge of Balancing Public and Private Ordering: Introduction to Part V Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant; 14. The microstructure of the first emerging markets in Europe in the eighteenth century Larry Neal; 15. Money reconstructed: Argentina and Brazil after hyperinflation Jérôme Sgard; 16. For a renewal of financial regulation Michel Aglietta and Laurence Scialom; Part VI. The Daily Adjustment of Market Technology: Introduction to Part VI Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant; 17. Antitrust liability in the U.S. for unilateral refusals to deal in intellectual and other property Howard A. Shelanski; 18. How do firms exercise unilateral market power? Empirical evidence from a bid-based wholesale electricity market Shaun D. Mcrae and Frank A. Wolak; 19. Exchanges: the quintessential manufactured markets Craig Pirrong; 20. Conclusion: tatonnement in the manufacturing of markets Eric Brousseau and Jean-Michel Glachant; References; Index.