Parliamentary debate is a fundamental aspect of democratic law-making. While law makers everywhere seek to express their views in parliament, there are large discrepancies in who has access to the floor across political systems. This book explains how parties and their members of parliament (MPs) structure parliamentary debate. Parties may actively seek to prevent some members from taking the floor while promoting opportunities for others. In doing so, they attempt to control the message that their partisans convey in parliament. The authors provide a theoretical model to explain the design of procedural rules in parliament, how the party leadership interacts with rebel backbenchers, and how MPs represent voters. The book explores political institutions, intra-party politics, electoral politics and legislative behavior. It develops and tests a new theory of parliamentary debate, using data from the UK, Germany, New Zealand and the European Parliament.
|Publisher:||Cambridge University Press|
|Product dimensions:||5.98(w) x 9.02(h) x 0.55(d)|
About the Author
Jonathan B. Slapin is Associate Professor of Political Science and Director of the Center for International and Comparative Studies at the University of Houston. His research focuses on comparative political institutions, legislative behavior, European politics, and European integration. He is the author of Veto Power: Institutional Design in the European Union (2011).
Table of ContentsIntroduction; Part I. Modeling Parliamentary Debate: 1. A theory of parliamentary debate; 2. Empirical implications; 3. Research design; Part II. Empirical Studies of Parliamentary Debate: 4. Debates and institutions; 5. Debate participation: Germany and the UK; 6. Dissent in parliament and the media: Germany and the UK; 7. Candidate selection and debate participation: a European perspective; 8. New Zealand: changing institutions; Conclusion.