Side-payments, compensation, and other material incentives have been used throughout history to influence the behavior of recipient countries, but only in recent years have analysts of international politics started to amass empirical evidence on the use of such incentives in fields as diverse as international trade, environmental policy, and arms control.
Soliciting Cooperation from Critical States poses the question whether or not it is sensible to "buy" cooperation from critical states and examines various recent cases of nuclear nonproliferation diplomacy, including experiences with Ukraine and North Korea. In exploring the conditions under which positive incentives are effective in resolving international collaboration problems, Thomas Bernauer, Dieter Ruloff, and four other contributors draw on a range of social science theories and results of empirical research.
The contributors examine seven explicit transactions in nuclear nonproliferation policy, including two detailed case studies: the freeze and eventual closure of North Korea's nuclear-weapons program and the denuclearization of Ukraine. Soliciting Cooperation from Critical States demonstrates that under specific conditions positive incentives are indeed superior to threats and sanctions.
Table of Contents
|List of Figures and Tables||vii|
|Introduction and Analytical Framework||1|
|Incentives Provided for in Major Multilateral Arms Control Agreements||47|
|North Korea: A Case in Progress||73|
|The Denuclearization of Ukraine||111|
|Positive Incentives in Nuclear Nonproliferation and Beyond||157|
What People are Saying About This
The reader will learn a great deal from these chapters…
9James W. Davis, Ludwig-Maximilians-Universitat, Munich)