The Rights of the Accused Under The Sixth Amendment: Trials, Presentation of Evidence, and Confrontation

The Rights of the Accused Under The Sixth Amendment: Trials, Presentation of Evidence, and Confrontation


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The Rights of the Accused Under The Sixth Amendment: Trials, Presentation of Evidence, and Confrontation by David Duncan, Tommy E. Miller, Joelle Anne Moreno, Paul Marcus

This essential resource takes a close look at The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution and those key provisions which impact mightily on defendants in criminal prosecutions.
The book was authored by four noted legal professionals, each from different backgrounds (private practice of law, former prosecutors, academics, jurists) and from different parts of the nation. This fascinating book examines the wide range of essential criminal justice topics that fall within the scope of the Sixth Amendment.
This book is an essential resource for judges, academics, and lawyers working in the field. It offers fascinating historical perspective, modern interpretations, and insight on this critical component of the United States Constitution. It's one book that is a must for every lawyer's library.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9781614386476
Publisher: American Bar Association
Publication date: 12/07/2013
Pages: 216
Product dimensions: 6.01(w) x 8.97(h) x 0.49(d)

About the Author

Paul Marcus is the Haynes Professor of Law at the College of William and Mary and lives in Pheonix Arizona. Joëlle Anne Moreno is a Professor of Law and the Associate Dean for Faculty Research & Development at Florida International University and klives in Miami, Florida. Tommy E. Miller is a United States Magistrate Judge for the Eastern District of Virginia and resides in Washington D.C. David K. Duncan is a United States Magistrate Judge sitting in Phoenix, he resides in Pheonix Arizona.

Table of Contents

About the Authors ix

Acknowledgments xi

Preface xiii

Chapter 1 The Right to a Speedy Trial 1

I Historical Basis 1

II Constitutional Speedy Trial Issues 2

A Delay in Charging or Arresting the Defendant 2

B Postcharge or Postarrest Delay 6

C Delay in Sentencing 8

D Delay in Appeals 8

E Sanctions for a Constitutional Violation of the Speedy Trial Right 9

III Dismissals Pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48 10

A History of Rule 10

B Dismissal under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 48(b) 10

IV Federal Speedy Trial Act 11

A General Time Limitations 12

B Exceptions and Tolling Provisions 13

C Sanctions for Violating the Statute 17

V State Speedy Trial Provisions 19

A State Constitutional Provisions 20

B State Speedy Trial Statutes 22

VI Speedy Trial Requirements in the Interstate Agreement on Detainers 24

A Introduction 24

B Provision for Speedy Trial on Request of the Prosecutor 25

C Provisions for Speedy Trial on Notice by Prisoner 25

D Sanctions 26

Chapter 2 The Right to a Public Trial 27

I Historical Origin of the Right 27

II Whose Right Is It? 29

A Right of the Accused 29

B Right of the Public under the First Amendment 30

C Incorporation of the Sixth Amendment Public Trial Right 30

III Interests Served by the Public Trial Right 31

IV When May a Trial Be Closed? 32

A Overriding Interest That Is Likely to Be Prejudiced 32

B Closure Must Be No Broader than Necessary 34

C Trial Court Must Consider Reasonable Alternatives 34

D Findings Adequate to Support the Closure 35

V Partial Closures 35

VI Application to Different Phases of the Proceedings 36

VII Assertion of the Right 38

VIII Remedy for a Violation 38

IX Trivial or De Minimis Closures 39

X Public Trial Implications for Cooperating Defendants 41

Chapter 3 The Right to a Jury Trial 43

I Historical Basis and Constitutional Language 43

A Development in England 43

B American Colonial Experience 44

II Petty versus Nonperty Offenses 46

A Background 46

B Unresolved Applications 47

III Application of the Right 49

A Contempt Actions 49

B Juvenile Proceedings 49

C Deportation Matters 50

D Sentencing 50

IV Size of Juries in Criminal Cases 52

A Historical Basis for Twelve Jurors 52

B Fewer than Twelve Jurors 53

C Federal Juries 54

D State Juries 54

E Unanimity 55

V Unanimity in Criminal Proceedings 55

A Constitutional Principles 55

B Waiver 56

C Deadlocked Juries and the Allen Charge 58

D States and the Allen Charge 59

VI Waiver of Jury Right 60

VII Jury Selection 62

A Eligibility for Service 62

B Qualifications 63

C Death Penalty Prosecutions 64

D Jury Makeup 65

VIII Challenging Jurors 69

A Information Given to the Lawyers, Understanding Voir Dire 69

B Process of Voir Dire 69

C Challenges for Cause 71

D Peremptory Challenge 71

IX Disclosing the Identity of Jurors 75

A Standards to Enforce Anonymity 75

B First Amendment Analysis 78

X Jury Nullification 79

Chapter 4 Place of Prosecution 83

I Historical Basis 83

II Venue 85

A Distinguished from Jurisdiction 85

B In General 85

C State Practice 86

III Transfer for Trial 87

A Waiver of Venue 88

B Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 21 90

C State Rules on Venue Transfer in Criminal Cases 91

D Motion to Transfer 92

E The Judicial Test 101

F Multiple Transfers 102

IV Specific Venue Issues 103

A Multiple Jurisdiction Crimes 103

B Crimes Not Committed in a District 105

C Multiple Defendant Crimes 105

D Failure to Act Crimes 106

E Accessories 106

F Crimes Furthered through Electronics 106

G Crimes Furthered through the United States Mail 107

Chapter 5 The Right to Be Informed of the Nature and Cause of the Accusations 109

I When an Indictment or Information Is Required in Federal Prosecutions 109

A Definitions 109

B The Indictment 110

C Waiver 111

D The Information 111

II When an Indictment Is Required in State Prosecutions 112

A Generally 112

B Indictment 112

C Waiver of the Indictment 113

D States That Use an Information 113

III Grand Juries 113

A Historical Basis 113

B Composition and Selection 114

C The Process 115

D The Critique 116

IV The Preliminary Hearing 116

V Waiver of the Indictment Requirement 119

A Federal 119

B States 120

VI Challenging the Sufficiency of the Indictment 120

VII Claims of Duplicity and Multiplicity 121

A Duplicity 121

B Multiplicity 123

VIII Bill of Particulars 124

IX Secret Indictments 126

Chapter 6 The Confrontation Clause 129

I The History of Confrontation 129

II The Supreme Court's Early Confrontation Jurisprudence 131

A Confrontation Defined 131

B Incorporation to the States 132

III The Right to Confrontation, 1968 to 2004 133

A Defining the Scope of Confrontation 133

B Limiting the Scope of Confrontation 136

C Special Confrontation Cases: Sex Crimes Prosecutions and Statements from (Alleged) Child Victims 137

IV The Revitalized Confrontation Clause: Crawford v. Washington 140

A The Facts 140

B Ohio v. Roberts (Partially) Overruled 140

C A New Focus on the Text and History of the Confrontation Clause 141

D The Advent of the "Testimonial Statement" 142

V The Right to Confrontation from 2004 to Present: Applying Crawford in the Federal and State Courts 143

A A New Focus on the Primary Purpose of the Interrogation and the Ongoing Emergency 143

B Defining the Primary Purpose of the Interrogation and the Ongoing Emergency 144

C The Growing Importance of the Formality of the Statement and Interrogation 148

D Reliability Redux 150

VI Forfeiture of the Right to Confrontation 151

VII The Right to Confront Expert Witnesses 152

A Recognizing the Right to Confront Experts 152

B Defining the Right to Confront Experts 154

C New Cases and Statutes That May Limit the Right to Confront Experts 156

VIII The Right to Confront Witness Who Made Specific Types of Statements 160

A Official Records 160

B Nonhearsay Statements 163

C Statements to Nonofficials 166

IX The Right to Confrontation in Nontrial Proceedings 167

X Confrontation and Codefendant Confessions 168

A The Bruton Rule 168

B Applying Crawford to Limit Bruton 170

Chapter 7 The Compulsory Process Clause 171

I Historical Foundations of the Compulsory Process Clause 171

A Development of Compulsory Process in England 171

B Development of Compulsory Process during the American Colonial and Revolutionary Periods 173

C Compulsory Process as a Constitutional Right 173

II Compulsory Process and the Supreme Court 175

A The Treason Trial of Aaron Burr 175

B Incorporation of the Right to Compulsory Process to the States 176

C Defining the Scope of the Right to Compulsory Process 176

D Limiting the Right to Compulsory Process 179

E Interference with the Right to Compulsory Process 187

Table of Cases 193

Index 211

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