The Transaction Cost Economics Project: The Theory and Practice of the Governance of Contractual Relations

by Oliver E. Williamson

Overview

Transaction cost economics has and continues to be a fruitful area of research. There is still much to be done in the field with past research being used in conjunction with the vast number of contractual phenomena that have yet to be investigated in transaction cost economics terms. New challenges are posed by the need to move beyond the design of new contractual instruments (such as financial derivatives) to include an examination of the lurking hazards that attend contract implementation.

This important collection brings together Professor Williamson's key papers on transaction cost economics. It will be of benefit to academics, scholars and practitioners with an interest in this progressive subject.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780857938770
Publisher:	Edward Elgar Publishing
Publication date:	06/30/2013
Pages:	444
Product dimensions:	6.60(w) x 9.50(h) x 1.00(d)

About the Author

The late Oliver E. Williamson, formerly Professor, Graduate School and Edgar F. Kaiser Professor Emeritus of Business, Economics, and Law, University of California, Berkeley, US and 2009 Winner of the Nobel Prize in Economics for Studies of Economic Governance

Table of Contents

Contents:

Acknowledgements

Introduction Oliver Williamson

PART I THEORY AND CONCEPTS
1. O.E. Williamson (2001), ‘Hierarchies and Markets’
2. Oliver E. Williamson (1971), ‘The Vertical Integration of Production: Market Failure Considerations’
3. Oliver E. Williamson (1979), ‘Transaction Cost Economics: The Governance of Contractual Relations’
4. Oliver E. Williamson (1983), ‘Credible Commitments: Using Hostages to Support Exchange’
5. Oliver E. Williamson (1991), ‘Comparative Economic Organization: The Analysis of Discrete Structural Alternatives’
6. Oliver E. Williamson (1985), ‘The Limits of Firms: Incentive and Bureaucratic Features’
7. Oliver E. Williamson (1991), ‘Strategizing, Economizing, and Economic Organization’

PART II PUBLIC POLICY
8. Oliver E. Williamson (1976), ‘Franchise Bidding for Natural Monopolies – in General and with Respect to CATV’
9. Oliver E. Williamson (2009), ‘Opening the Black Box of Firm and Market Organization: Antitrust’
10. Oliver E. Williamson (1988), ‘Corporate Finance and Corporate Governance’
11. Oliver E. Williamson (2008), ‘Corporate Boards of Directors: In Principle and in Practice’

PART III INTERDISCIPLINARY SOCIAL SCIENCE
12. Oliver E. Williamson (1993), ‘Transaction Cost Economics and Organization Theory’
13. Oliver E. Williamson (1993), ‘Calculativeness, Trust, and Economic Organization’
14. Oliver E. Williamson (2005), ‘Why Law, Economics, and Organization?’

PART IV PERSPECTIVES
15. Oliver E. Williamson (2009), ‘Pragmatic Methodology: A Sketch, with Applications to Transaction Cost Economics’
16. Oliver E. Williamson (2010), ‘Transaction Cost Economics: The Natural Progression’

Editorial Reviews

‘This book provides a terrific opportunity to have a collection of Oliver Williamson’s best papers on transaction cost economics all in one convenient volume.’

Paul L. Joskow

As recognized by the Economics Sciences Prize Committee in awarding the 2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics, Oliver Williamson altered irreversibly the way we approach and analyze organization. But such is the depth of Williamson insights that often his contributions can only be fully appreciated in the context of real world organizational phenomena. It is thus not uncommon that, after struggling with some particularly thorny problem of economic organization, I will discover on rereading a familiar piece that Williamson had anticipated and already addressed the subject of my efforts. This collection contains the articles and chapters to which I most frequently return and provides the essential readings for anyone seriously interested in the science of organization. —Scott Masten, University of Michigan

From the Publisher

‘Oliver Williamson’s contributions to economics are certainly among the most important of the past several decades, and their importance will be increasingly recognized as economists come to grips with all that he has accomplished. This collection provides an unparalleled view of those contributions, and it belongs on the bookshelf of everyone who wants to understand complex economic transactions.’

David Kreps

‘As recognized by the Economics Sciences Prize Committee in awarding the 2009 Nobel Memorial Prize in Economics, Oliver Williamson altered irreversibly the way we approach and analyze organization. But such is the depth of Williamson’s insights that often his contributions can only be fully appreciated in the context of real world organizational phenomena. It is thus not uncommon that, after struggling with some particularly thorny problem of economic organization, I will discover on rereading a familiar piece that Williamson had anticipated and already addressed the subject of my efforts. This collection contains the articles and chapters to which I most frequently return and provides the essential readings for anyone seriously interested in the science of organization.’

Scott Masten

‘The presence of transaction costs greatly modifies the traditional picture of the allocation of resources through the market. It gives rise to many phenomena inexplicable in the simple market view and to problems of government policy. Oliver Williamson has been a leading figure in this analysis. His interpretations of corporate governance and of the complementarity between internal controls and the market have been the most profound in the literature. It is good that his leading essays are now available in collected form.’

Kenneth J. Arrow

‘Williamson’s work on transaction cost economics has shaped the thinking of all social scientists about organizations and institutions. This volume reprints many of his seminal papers on the subject, and is valuable both as commemoration and for reference.’

Avinash Dixit