Unbelievable Errors defends an error theory about all normative judgements: not just moral judgements, but also judgements about reasons for action, judgements about reasons for belief, and instrumental normative judgements. This theory states that normative judgements are beliefs that ascribe normative properties, but that normative properties do not exist. It therefore entails that all normative judgements are false.
Bart Streumer also argues, however, that we cannot believe this error theory. This may seem to be a problem for the theory. But he argues that it makes this error theory more likely to be true, since it undermines objections to the theory and it makes it harder to reject the arguments for the theory.
He then sketches how certain other philosophical theories can be defended in a similar way. He concludes that to make philosophical progress, we need to make a sharp distinction between a theory's truth and our ability to believe it.
|Publisher:||Oxford University Press|
|Product dimensions:||5.50(w) x 8.60(h) x 1.00(d)|
About the Author
Bart Streumer is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Groningen. He previously taught at the University of Reading. His work on metaethics has appeared in the Journal of Philosophy, Philosophical Studies, and the Australasian Journal of Philosophy.
Table of Contents
1. Normative Judgements and Properties
2. The Reduction Argument
3. Further Versions of the Reduction Argument
4. The False Guarantee and Regress Objections
5. Further Defences of Realism
6. The Symmetry Objection
7. Further Views
8. The Error Theory
9. Believing the Error Theory
10. Reason to Believe the Error Theory
11. Objections, Rejection, Revision
12. Effects, Parallels, Progress