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This collection of articles represents Professor Williamson Murray's efforts to elucidate the role that history should play in thinking about both the present and the future. They reflect three disparate themes in Professor Murray's work: his deep fascination with history and those who have acted in the past; his fascination with the similarities in human behavior between the past and the present; and his belief that the study of military and strategic history can be of real use to those who will confront the daunting problems of war and peace in the twenty-first century. The first group of essays addresses the relevance of history to an understanding of the present and to an understanding of the possibilities of the future. The second addresses the possible direct uses of history to think through the problems involved in the creation of effective military institutions. The final group represents historical case studies that serve to illuminate the present.
|Publisher:||Cambridge University Press|
|Product dimensions:||6.00(w) x 8.90(h) x 0.90(d)|
About the Author
Williamson Murray is Professor Emeritus of History at The Ohio State University. At present he is a defense consultant and commentator on historical and military subjects in Washington, DC. He is co-editor of The Making of Peace (with Jim Lacey); The Past as Prologue (with Richard Hart Sinnreich); The Dynamics of Military Revolution, 1300-2050 (with MacGregor Knox); Military Innovation in the Interwar Period (with Allan R. Millett); and The Making of Strategy (with Alvin Bernstein and MacGregor Knox).
Table of Contents
1. History and the future; 2. Thucydides and Clausewitz; 3. Clausewitz out, computers in, military culture and technological hubris; 4. Changing the principles of war; 5. Military culture does matter; 6. History and strategic planning, from Rome to 1945; 7. Thoughts on red teaming; 8. The distant framework of war; 9. The problem of German military effectiveness, 1900-45; 10. Reflections on the combined bomber offensive; 11. The air war in the Gulf, the limits of air power; 12. Thoughts on British intelligence in WWII and the implications for intelligence in the twenty-first century; 13. The meaning of World War II.
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