ISBN-10:
0262522918
ISBN-13:
9780262522915
Pub. Date:
08/14/2000
Publisher:
MIT Press
Workbook to Accompany Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy

Workbook to Accompany Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy

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Overview

This book accompanies Political Economics: Explaining Economic Policy and sugggests solutions to the problems contained in each chapter.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780262522915
Publisher: MIT Press
Publication date: 08/14/2000
Series: The MIT Press
Edition description: Workbook
Pages: 248
Sales rank: 1,016,608
Product dimensions: 7.00(w) x 8.94(h) x 0.52(d)
Age Range: 18 Years

Table of Contents

I Tools of political economics 1(54)
Preferences and institutions
3(14)
Existence and non existence of a Condorcet winner under simple majority rule
3(2)
Simple majority rule and uni-dimensional public consumption
5(2)
Labor and consumption taxation
7(2)
Multidimensional public consumption in the presence of a Condorcet winner
9(4)
Structure induced equilibrium and multidimensional public consumption
13(4)
Electoral competition
17(10)
Non credible commitments and probabilistic voting
17(2)
Downsian competition in a simple public good model
19(1)
A simple model of probabilistic voting
20(2)
Probabilistic voting in the presence of groups of voters
22(3)
Lobbying
25(2)
Agency
27(14)
Political rents in lop-sided elections
27(4)
Political rents with term limits
31(2)
Electoral cycles with seignorage
33(3)
Equilibrium selection in the adverse selection model
36(2)
Challenger selection procedure
38(3)
Partisan politicians
41(14)
Probabilistic voting with outcome-seeking politicians
41(2)
The citizen-candidate model
43(2)
Lobbying in a representative democracy
45(4)
Equilibria when the single-crossing condition is violated
49(2)
The agenda-setting model
51(2)
Rents with endogenous value of being in office
53(2)
II Redistributive politics 55(30)
General-interest politics
57(14)
The Meltzer-Richard model
57(2)
Pensions
59(3)
Pensions and probabilistic voting
62(3)
Unemployment insurance
65(1)
Unemployment insurance with multiple equilibria
66(5)
Special-interest politics
71(14)
Legislative bargaining with amendment rights
71(3)
Budgetary powers and amendments rights in legislatures
74(2)
Truthful strategies in the lobbying model
76(1)
Coalition formation in a three-party legislature
77(3)
Legislative bargaining and lobbying
80(5)
III Comparative Politics 85(34)
Electoral Rules and Electoral Competition
87(10)
Proportional elections and concave utility
87(3)
Existence of majoritarian equilibria
90(2)
Distortionary taxes and electoral competition
92(1)
Districts and voter groups that do not coincide
93(1)
Broad vs. Targeted policy
94(3)
Institutions and Accountability
97(10)
Local vs. national elections and externalities among local public goods
97(3)
Yardstick competition
100(1)
Groups with coordinated voting
101(2)
Checks and balances with bilateral bargaining
103(1)
Separation of powers and the common pool problem
104(3)
Political Regimes
107(12)
A model with a prime minister
107(1)
Adding a president
108(2)
Infinitely repeated presidential-congressional regime
110(2)
The "caretaker government" subgame
112(1)
Calculating the equilibria in the Parliamentary regime
113(1)
Presidential regime with line-item veto
114(5)
IV Dynamic politics 119(60)
Dynamic policy problems
121(16)
Debt structure, labor taxation and money
121(3)
Credibility problems in labor taxation when government consumption is endogenous
124(3)
Debt structure and labor taxation
127(3)
Capital taxation and inflation surprise
130(4)
Labor and capital taxation when agents are heterogeneous
134(3)
Capital taxation
137(16)
Multiple equilibria and credibility in taxation problems
137(4)
Solving time-inconsistency problems through social contracts
141(5)
Tax competition and international cooperation
146(3)
The effects of capital mobility on taxation
149(4)
Public debt
153(16)
Preelection politics and government spending when parties are opportunistic
153(3)
Population structure's influence on dynamic inconsistency
156(3)
When there is overindebtedness
159(2)
Endogenous (in) efficiency of the tax system
161(3)
Voting on the budget deficit: Consequences of a balanced budget rule
164(5)
Growth
169(10)
Public debt, political instability and growth
169(2)
Inequality and growth-human capital
171(2)
Unions and taxation
173(2)
Growth and the common-pool problem
175(1)
Inequality and growth: a specific functional form for A(I)
176(3)
V Monetary politics 179
Credibility of monetary policy
181
Reputation with state-dependent incentives
181
Optimal punishment rules
183
Reputation with incomplete information
185
The inflation and stabilization biases
188
Monetary policy with employment persistence
191
Inflation and default
196
Electoral cycles
201
Timing, moral hazard, adverse selection and the political business cycle
201
Partisan political competition and the strategic use of inflation
204
Monetary policy in majoritarian elections
208
Monetary policy in proportional elections
210
Institutions and incentives
213
Escape clauses within a simple rule
213
Endogenous credibility of the central bank
216
Political competition and optimal delegation
218
Optimal delegation with persistent output shocks
220
Optimal delegation when ther is employment persistence
222
International policy coordination
227
Commitment and cooperation
227
Output directly dependent on the real exchange rate
230
Exchange rate pegs with symmetric supply shocks
232
Exchange rate pegs with asymmetric supply shocks
234
Endogenous exchange rate pegs
236

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