Ethical Intuitionism / Edition 1

by M. Huemer

Overview

This book defends a form of ethical intuitionism, according to which (i) there are objective moral truths; (ii) we know some of these truths through a kind of immediate, intellectual awareness, or "intuition"; and (iii) our knowledge of moral truths gives us reasons for action independent of our desires. The author rebuts all the major objections to this theory and shows that the alternative theories about the nature of ethics all face grave difficulties.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9781403989680
Publisher:	Palgrave Macmillan UK
Publication date:	10/11/2005
Edition description:	2005
Pages:	309
Product dimensions:	5.51(w) x 8.50(h) x 0.03(d)

About the Author

Michael Huemer is Professor of Philosophy at the University of Colorado at Boulder, USA, where he has worked since 1998. He is the author of Skepticism and the Veil of Perception and Ethical Intuitionism , as well as more than 40 articles in ethics, epistemology, political philosophy, and metaphysics.

Table of Contents

Preface Introduction PART I: ALTERNATIVE METAETHICAL THEORIES Non-Cognitivism Subjectivism Reductionism PART II: ETHICAL INTUITITIONISM Moral Knowledge Disagreement and Error Practical Reasons Further Objections Conclusion Index

Editorial Reviews

'Read this. It is the best book ever written on meta-ethics. Even philosophers who know the field may feel as though they are confronting these issues for the first time. I used to think of ethical intuitionism as a silly, naIve, even ridiculous theory, but Michael Huemer has made an intuitionist out of me.' - Stuart Rachels, Department of Philosophy, University of Alabama, Tuscaloosa, USA

'Huemer's book may be the best, most comprehensive defense of ethical intuitionism since Moore's Principia Ethica...[it] is an outstanding defense of the view that there are objective moral truths knowable through intuition. Whether or not one agrees with Huemer's conclusions, one cannot ignore the power of his arguments.' - Richard Fumerton, Department of Philosophy, University of Iowa

'A terrific book. Now philosophers will have no excuse for treating ethical intuitionism as if it were a silly and easily-refuted view.' - James W. Nickel, Arizona State University College of Law, USA

'This is among the best books in metaethics, and one of the best defenses of ethical intuitionism, in recent years. It is admirably clear and very thorough, covering a wide range of important metaethical topics and views. While it is well suited for use in advanced ethics classes, it will surely be of interest to anyone working in the field.' - MIND Association Vol 117 466 April 2008

From the Publisher