Social Choice and the Mathematics of Manipulation

Social Choice and the Mathematics of Manipulation

by Alan D. Taylor
     
 

View All Available Formats & Editions

ISBN-10: 0521008832

ISBN-13: 9780521008839

Pub. Date: 05/31/2005

Publisher: Cambridge University Press

In what election-theoretic context is honesty in voting the best policy, asks Taylor (mathematics, Union College), and answers that there is only one. That is a voting procedure for an election of three or more candidates in which voters rank their preferences: each candidate wins at least one hypothetical election, and no voter can ever gain by changing their ballot.

Overview

In what election-theoretic context is honesty in voting the best policy, asks Taylor (mathematics, Union College), and answers that there is only one. That is a voting procedure for an election of three or more candidates in which voters rank their preferences: each candidate wins at least one hypothetical election, and no voter can ever gain by changing their ballot. He explains that the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theory of the early 1970s asserts that there can be no other, and that this theorem is related to, some would say equivalent to, the celebrated 1950 result known as Arrow's impossibility theorem. Annotation ©2005 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR

Product Details

ISBN-13:
9780521008839
Publisher:
Cambridge University Press
Publication date:
05/31/2005
Series:
Outlooks Series
Edition description:
New Edition
Pages:
190
Product dimensions:
5.98(w) x 8.98(h) x 0.39(d)

Table of Contents

1. Introduction; 2. The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem; 3. Additional results for single-valued elections; 4. The Duggan–Schwartz theorem; 5. Additional results for multi-valued elections; 6. Ballots that rank sets; 7. Elections with outcomes that are lotteries; 8. Elections with variable agendas; References; Index.

Customer Reviews

Average Review:

Write a Review

and post it to your social network

     

Most Helpful Customer Reviews

See all customer reviews >