Social Choice and the Mathematics of Manipulationby Alan D. Taylor
Pub. Date: 05/31/2005
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
In what election-theoretic context is honesty in voting the best policy, asks Taylor (mathematics, Union College), and answers that there is only one. That is a voting procedure for an election of three or more candidates in which voters rank their preferences: each candidate wins at least one hypothetical election, and no voter can ever gain by changing their ballot. He explains that the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theory of the early 1970s asserts that there can be no other, and that this theorem is related to, some would say equivalent to, the celebrated 1950 result known as Arrow's impossibility theorem. Annotation ©2005 Book News, Inc., Portland, OR
Table of Contents1. Introduction; 2. The Gibbard–Satterthwaite theorem; 3. Additional results for single-valued elections; 4. The Duggan–Schwartz theorem; 5. Additional results for multi-valued elections; 6. Ballots that rank sets; 7. Elections with outcomes that are lotteries; 8. Elections with variable agendas; References; Index.
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