Eddie Dekel
Evolutionary game theory has recently become an extremely active area of research. This book provides a unified presentation of Samuelson's comprehensive and wide-ranging research in this area. Samuelson is one of the foremost researchers in evolutionary game theory, and the book includes his significant contributions to, and developments of, these important models.
Eric S. Maskin
Larry Samuelson is one of the leading figures in the burgeoning field of evolutionary game theory. This book is a careful and lucid exposition of some of the developments in which he has made pioneering contributions.
Drew Fudenberg
The analysis of evolutionary dynamics and other forms of nonequilibrium adjustment in games has been one of the most active research areas in game theory in the 1990s, and Larry Samuelson has been one of its leading practitioners. This book gathers and unifies his work in the area, ranging from strong results on standard aggregate models, such as the replicator dynamic, to new models that make learning by individual players explicit and take account of the extensive form structure of the game. The book will be of interest to every serious student of the field.
Endorsement
Larry Samuelson is one of the leading figures in the burgeoning field of evolutionary game theory. This book is a careful and lucid exposition of some of the developments in which he has made pioneering contributions.
—
Eric S. Maskin, Professor of Economics, Harvard University
From the Publisher
Evolutionary game theory has recently become an extremely active area of research. This book provides a unified presentation of Samuelson's comprehensive and wide-ranging research in this area. Samuelson is one of the foremost researchers in evolutionary game theory, and the book includes his significant contributions to, and developments of, these important models.
—
Eddie Dekel, Professor, Economics Department, Northwestern University
Although John Nash already pointed out in his 1950 PhD thesis that strong rationality assumptions are not necessary to justify his fundamental equilibrium concept, it has only been in the last decade that the formal links between bounded rationality and equilibrium play have been formally explored. This book, authored by one of the main contributors to the area, provides an excellent overview of the lessons that have been learned. On the one hand, the book shows that simple dynamic models, such as the replicator equation, may arise naturally in economic settings, and it analyses the consequences of such models. On the other hand, it shows that the 'dynamics' matter, thus arguing for a careful modelling of actual human learning processes.
—
Eric van Damme, Professor of Economics, CentER for Economic Research, Tilburg University, The Netherlands
The analysis of evolutionary dynamics and other forms of nonequilibrium adjustment in games has been one of the most active research areas in game theory in the 1990s, and Larry Samuelson has been one of its leading practitioners. This book gathers and unifies his work in the area, ranging from strong results on standard aggregate models, such as the replicator dynamic, to new models that make learning by individual players explicit and take account of the extensive form structure of the game. The book will be of interest to every serious student of the field.
—
Drew Fudenberg, Professor of Economics, Harvard University
A serious discussion of important topics in evolutionary game theory. Samuelson contrasts deterministic against stochastic approaches, normal-form analysis against extensive-form analysis.
—
Jörgen W. Weibull, A.O. Wallenberg Professor of Economics, Stockholm School of Economics
Larry Samuelson is one of the leading figures in the burgeoning field of evolutionary game theory. This book is a careful and lucid exposition of some of the developments in which he has made pioneering contributions.
—
Eric S. Maskin, Professor of Economics, Harvard University
Eric van Damme
Although John Nash already pointed out in his 1950 PhD thesis that strong rationality assumptions are not necessary to justify his fundamental equilibrium concept, it has only been in the last decade that the formal links between bounded rationality and equilibrium play have been formally explored. This book, authored by one of the main contributors to the area, provides an excellent overview of the lessons that have been learned. On the one hand, the book shows that simple dynamic models, such as the replicator equation, may arise naturally in economic settings, and it analyses the consequences of such models. On the other hand, it shows that the 'dynamics' matter, thus arguing for a careful modelling of actual human learning processes.
