Table of Contents

Preface ix

Acknowledgments xiii

1 Introduction 1

A Case Study Approach 2

Sender Countries and Their Motives 5

Limitations on the Use of Sanctions 7

Historical Overview 9

Plan of the Book 18

Appendix 1A 20

2 Analyzing the Utility of Sanctions 43

Anatomy of a Sanctions Episode 43

Framework for Analysis 50

Foreign Policy Goals 52

Overview of the Variables Affecting the Costs of Defiance and Compliance 55

3 Political Variables 65

Modest Changes in Policy 66

Regime Change 67

Disrupting Military Adventures 69

Impairing Military Potential 70

Other Major Policy Changes 72

Politics, the Cold War, and Sanctions Targets 73

Appendix 3A 75

4 Economic Variables 89

Size of Sender and Target Countries 89

Trade Linkages 90

Types of Sanctions 91

Economic Health and Political Stability of Target Countries 99

Cost of Sanctions to Targets 101

Cost of Sanctions to Senders 108

Appendix 4A 113

5 Sanctions after the Cold War 125

Evolution of US Sanctions Policy 126

New Targets and Goals for Sanctions 131

The United Nations and Postwar Sanctions Policy 131

Congressional Intervention in Sanctions Policy 133

State and Local Government Sanctions 136

The Incredible Lightness of "Smart Sanctions" 138

New Challenges for Sanctions Policy 141

Appendix 5A 148

6 Conclusions and Policy Recommendations 155

Are Sanctions Effective? 158

Policy Recommendations: Using Sanctions More Effectively 160

Conclusion: Look Before You Leap 178

Appendix A Econometric Analysis of Economic Sanctions 181

Appendix B Impact of US Economic Sanctions on Trade 193

Appendix C Methodology Used to Estimate the Cost of Sanctions to the Target Country211

Bibliography 215

About the Authors 223

Index 225

Tables

Table 1.1 Sanctions episodes initiated, cost to targets, and world exports, 1915-2000 18

Table 1A.1 Chronological summary of economic sanctions for foreign policy goals, 1914-2000 20

Table 1A.2 Post-2000 sanctions episodes 34

Table 1A.3 Selected pre-World War I episodes of economic sanctions for foreign policy goals 39

Table 3A.1 Cases involving modest changes in the target-country policies: Political variables 75

Table 3A.2 Cases involving regime change and democratization: Political variables 78

Table 3A.3 Cases involving disruption of military adventures (other than major wars): Political variables 83

Table 3A.4 Cases involving impairment of military potential (including major wars): Political variables 84

Table 3A.5 Cases involving other major changes in target-country policies (including surrender of territory): Political variables 86

Table 3A.6 Episodes by target region 88

Table 4.1 GATT Article XXI exemptions 95

Table 4.2 Economic health and political stability, by policy goal 100

Table 4.3 Characteristics of threat cases compared with all others 107

Table 4A.1 Cases involving modest changes in target-country policies: Economic variables 113

Table 4A.2 Cases involving regime change and democratization: Economic variables 116

Table 4A.3 Cases involving disruption of military adventures (other than major wars): Economic variables 120

Table 4A.4 Cases involving impairment of military potential (including major wars): Economic variables 121

Table 4A.5 Cases involving other major changes in target-country policies (including surrender of territory): Economic variables 123

Table 5.1 Success by period 127

Table 5.2 US experience with sanctions since World War II 129

Table 5A.1 Selected Sanctions legislation by specific issue or country 148

Table 6.1 Success by policy goal 159

Table 6.2 Success and prior relations, by policy goal 164

Table 6.3 Average trade linkage, by policy goal and success score 165

Table 6.4 Success and regime type, by policy goal 166

Table 6.5 Economic health and political stability, by policy goal and success score 167

Table 6.6 Average cost to target, by policy goal 170

Table 6.7 Success by sanction type 170

Table 6.8 Success and duration of sanctions episodes, by policy goal 171

Table 6.9 Success and international cooperation with sender, by policy goal 174

Table 6.10 Success and cooperation from an international organization, by policy goal 174

Table 6.11 Success and international assistance to target, by policy goal 175

Table 6.12 Success and companion policies, by policy goal 176

Table 6.13 Average cost to sender, by policy goal and success score 177

Table A.1 Regression variables 185

Table A.2 Binary logit model regression results for the probability of "limited success" or better 189

Table B.1 Core gravity model variables 195

Table B.2 US economic sanctions in effect in 2000 197

Table B.3 Indicator variables for US economic sanctions 199

Table B.4 Impact of US economic sanctions on bilateral trade between target countries and the United States 202

Table B.5 Impact of US economic sanctions on bilateral trade between target countries and all partners 204

Table B.6 US trade losses owing to US economic sanctions in effect in 2000 208

Table B.7 All partner trade losses owing to US economic sanctions in effect in 2000 209

Table C.1 Combined elasticity and the sanctions multiplier 214

Figures

Figure 2.1 Expected outcomes, depending on relative motivation and sender leverage 51

Figure 5.1 Sanctions trends after the Cold War, 1990-99 126

Figure 5.2 Increasing congressional involvement, 1940-99 135

Figure 5.3 Evolution of congressional role in imposing sanctions, 1940-99 136

Figure C.1 Welfare loss from the imposition of export sanctions 212

Boxes

Box 4.1 GATT Article XXI 93

Box 6.1 Reinforcing the stick with carrots 169

Box A.1 Defining the dependent variable in analyses of economic sanctions effectiveness 183