Electoral Incentives in Congress
David Mayhew’s 1974 thesis on the “electoral connection” and its impact on legislative behavior is the theoretical foundation for research on the modern U.S. Congress. Mayhew contends that once in office, legislators pursue the actions that put them in the best position for reelection. Carson and Sievert examine how electoral incentives shaped legislative behavior throughout the nineteenth century by looking at patterns of turnover in Congress; the renomination of candidates; the roles of parties in recruiting candidates and their broader effects on candidate competition; and, finally by examining legislators’ accountability. The results have wide-ranging implications for the evolution of Congress and the development of legislative institutions over time.
1127484738
Electoral Incentives in Congress
David Mayhew’s 1974 thesis on the “electoral connection” and its impact on legislative behavior is the theoretical foundation for research on the modern U.S. Congress. Mayhew contends that once in office, legislators pursue the actions that put them in the best position for reelection. Carson and Sievert examine how electoral incentives shaped legislative behavior throughout the nineteenth century by looking at patterns of turnover in Congress; the renomination of candidates; the roles of parties in recruiting candidates and their broader effects on candidate competition; and, finally by examining legislators’ accountability. The results have wide-ranging implications for the evolution of Congress and the development of legislative institutions over time.
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Electoral Incentives in Congress

Electoral Incentives in Congress

by Jamie L. Carson, Joel Sievert
Electoral Incentives in Congress

Electoral Incentives in Congress

by Jamie L. Carson, Joel Sievert

Hardcover

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Overview

David Mayhew’s 1974 thesis on the “electoral connection” and its impact on legislative behavior is the theoretical foundation for research on the modern U.S. Congress. Mayhew contends that once in office, legislators pursue the actions that put them in the best position for reelection. Carson and Sievert examine how electoral incentives shaped legislative behavior throughout the nineteenth century by looking at patterns of turnover in Congress; the renomination of candidates; the roles of parties in recruiting candidates and their broader effects on candidate competition; and, finally by examining legislators’ accountability. The results have wide-ranging implications for the evolution of Congress and the development of legislative institutions over time.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780472130795
Publisher: University of Michigan Press
Publication date: 05/25/2018
Series: Legislative Politics And Policy Making
Pages: 214
Product dimensions: 6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x 0.90(d)

About the Author

Jamie L. Carson is the UGA Athletic Association Professor of Public and International Affairs II in the Department of Political Science at the University of Georgia.
Joel Sievert is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Texas Tech University.

Table of Contents

List of Illustrations ix

Acknowledgments xi

1 Introduction 1

2 Contemporary and Historical Evidence for an Electoral Connection 13

3 Unpacking the Electoral Connection with Jeffery A. Jenkins 25

4 Candidates and Competition in US House Races, 1820-88 51

5 Nomination and Turnover Patterns in the US House 77

6 Ballots, Election Timing, and the Personal Vote 101

7 Electoral Accountability in US House Elections 121

8 Reevaluating Electoral Incentives in Congress 151

Notes 159

References 171

Index 187

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