Explorations into Constitutional Economics
These thirtyone essays form the foundation of 1986 Nobel Laureate James M. Buchanan's work on the constitutional economics paradigm he founded. Following the earlier collection, Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy, these essays include many that appeared in journals not easily accessible as well as some which have not previously been published.

The volume is organized in two parts: theoretical foundations and applications. The latter part includes papers on aspects of voting, monetary and fiscal constitutions, public goods supply, taxation and public debt, and property rights and externalities. This edition provides easier access and gives a wider exposure to a set of arguments and ideas that mark important steps in Buchanan's building of the Constitutional Economics Paradigm.

The vision of a new political economy developed and applied in the contributions of this volume will be of interest to scholars and students of economics as well as other disciplines from political science to philosophy, providing a valuable perspective and orientation to anyone who is concerned with the practical issues of policy making.

1000488521
Explorations into Constitutional Economics
These thirtyone essays form the foundation of 1986 Nobel Laureate James M. Buchanan's work on the constitutional economics paradigm he founded. Following the earlier collection, Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy, these essays include many that appeared in journals not easily accessible as well as some which have not previously been published.

The volume is organized in two parts: theoretical foundations and applications. The latter part includes papers on aspects of voting, monetary and fiscal constitutions, public goods supply, taxation and public debt, and property rights and externalities. This edition provides easier access and gives a wider exposure to a set of arguments and ideas that mark important steps in Buchanan's building of the Constitutional Economics Paradigm.

The vision of a new political economy developed and applied in the contributions of this volume will be of interest to scholars and students of economics as well as other disciplines from political science to philosophy, providing a valuable perspective and orientation to anyone who is concerned with the practical issues of policy making.

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Explorations into Constitutional Economics

Explorations into Constitutional Economics

Explorations into Constitutional Economics

Explorations into Constitutional Economics

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Overview

These thirtyone essays form the foundation of 1986 Nobel Laureate James M. Buchanan's work on the constitutional economics paradigm he founded. Following the earlier collection, Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy, these essays include many that appeared in journals not easily accessible as well as some which have not previously been published.

The volume is organized in two parts: theoretical foundations and applications. The latter part includes papers on aspects of voting, monetary and fiscal constitutions, public goods supply, taxation and public debt, and property rights and externalities. This edition provides easier access and gives a wider exposure to a set of arguments and ideas that mark important steps in Buchanan's building of the Constitutional Economics Paradigm.

The vision of a new political economy developed and applied in the contributions of this volume will be of interest to scholars and students of economics as well as other disciplines from political science to philosophy, providing a valuable perspective and orientation to anyone who is concerned with the practical issues of policy making.


Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780890969960
Publisher: Texas A&M University Press
Publication date: 06/01/2000
Series: Texas A&M University Economics Series , #9
Pages: 448
Product dimensions: 6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x 1.00(d)

About the Author


James M. Buchanan, recipient of the 1986 Nobel Prize in economic science, is Harris University Professor of Economics at George Mason University in Fairfax, Virginia. He is general director of the Center for Study of Public Choice and author or coauthor of more than a dozen books, including Freedom in Constitutional Contract and Economics: Between Predictive Science and Moral Philosophy.Robert D. Tollison is director of the Center for Study of Public Choice and Duncan Black Professor of Economics at George Mason University. Viktor J. Vanberg is research associate and professor of economics at the same institution.

Table of Contents

Prefacevii
Part I.Theoretical Foundations: The Constitutional Paradigm
1.Predictive Power and the Choice among Regimes3
2.The Achievement and Limits of Public Choice in Diagnosing Government Failure and in Offering Bases for Constructive Reform24
3.Rational Choice Models in the Social Sciences37
4.Man and the State51
5.Constitutional Economics57
Part II.Applications
Voting
6.Toward a Theory of Yes-No Voting71
7.What If There Is No Majority Motion?87
8.Voter Choice: Evaluating Political Alternatives101
9.Vote Buying in a Stylized Setting116
Monetary and Fiscal Constitution
10.Predictability: The Criterion of Monetary Constitutions129
11.An Outside Economist's Defense of Pesek and Saving149
12.Can Policy Activism Succeed?154
13.Ideas, Institutions, and Political Economy: A Plea for Disestablishment165
Public Goods Supply
14.The Evaluation of Public Services178
15.A Note on Public Goods Supply194
16.Breton and Weldon on Public Goods208
17.Public Goods in Theory and Practice213
18.Convexity Constraints in Public Goods Theory218
Taxation and Public Debt
19.Fiscal Choice through Time: A Case for Indirect Taxation?228
20.Efficiency Limits of Fiscal Mobility246
21.Tax Instruments as Constraints on the Disposition of Public Revenues264
22.Dialogues Concerning Fiscal Religion283
23.Proportional and Progressive Income Taxation with Utility-maximizing Governments294
24.Coercive Taxation in Constitutional Contract309
25.Organization Theory and Fiscal Economics: Society, State, and Public Debt329
Property Rights and Externalities
26.Private Ownership and Common Usage344
27.Notes on Irrelevant Externalities, Enforcement Costs, and the Atrophy of Property Rights359
28.The Institutional Structure of Externality371
29.The Coase Theorem and the Theory of the State385
30.Entrepreneurship and the Internalization of Externalities With401
31.Market Failure and Political Failure418
Index431
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