Objectivity, Invariance, and Convention: Symmetry in Physical Science
Most observers agree that modern physical theory attempts to provide objective representations of reality. However, the claim that these representations are based on conventional choices is viewed by many as a denial of their objectivity. As a result, objectivity and conventionality in representation are often framed as polar opposites.

Offering a new appraisal of symmetry in modern physics, employing detailed case studies from relativity theory and quantum mechanics, Objectivity, Invariance, and Convention contends that the physical sciences, though dependent on convention, may produce objective representations of reality. Talal Debs and Michael Redhead show that both realists and constructivists have recognized important elements of an understanding of science that may not be contradictory.

The position—“perspectival invariantism”—introduced in this book highlights the shortcomings of existing approaches to symmetry in physics, and, for the constructivist, demonstrates that a dependence on conventions in representation reaches into the domain of the most technical sciences. For the realist, it stands as evidence against the claim that conventionality must undermine objectivity. We can be committed to the existence of a single real ontology while maintaining a cultural view of science.

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Objectivity, Invariance, and Convention: Symmetry in Physical Science
Most observers agree that modern physical theory attempts to provide objective representations of reality. However, the claim that these representations are based on conventional choices is viewed by many as a denial of their objectivity. As a result, objectivity and conventionality in representation are often framed as polar opposites.

Offering a new appraisal of symmetry in modern physics, employing detailed case studies from relativity theory and quantum mechanics, Objectivity, Invariance, and Convention contends that the physical sciences, though dependent on convention, may produce objective representations of reality. Talal Debs and Michael Redhead show that both realists and constructivists have recognized important elements of an understanding of science that may not be contradictory.

The position—“perspectival invariantism”—introduced in this book highlights the shortcomings of existing approaches to symmetry in physics, and, for the constructivist, demonstrates that a dependence on conventions in representation reaches into the domain of the most technical sciences. For the realist, it stands as evidence against the claim that conventionality must undermine objectivity. We can be committed to the existence of a single real ontology while maintaining a cultural view of science.

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Objectivity, Invariance, and Convention: Symmetry in Physical Science

Objectivity, Invariance, and Convention: Symmetry in Physical Science

Objectivity, Invariance, and Convention: Symmetry in Physical Science

Objectivity, Invariance, and Convention: Symmetry in Physical Science

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Overview

Most observers agree that modern physical theory attempts to provide objective representations of reality. However, the claim that these representations are based on conventional choices is viewed by many as a denial of their objectivity. As a result, objectivity and conventionality in representation are often framed as polar opposites.

Offering a new appraisal of symmetry in modern physics, employing detailed case studies from relativity theory and quantum mechanics, Objectivity, Invariance, and Convention contends that the physical sciences, though dependent on convention, may produce objective representations of reality. Talal Debs and Michael Redhead show that both realists and constructivists have recognized important elements of an understanding of science that may not be contradictory.

The position—“perspectival invariantism”—introduced in this book highlights the shortcomings of existing approaches to symmetry in physics, and, for the constructivist, demonstrates that a dependence on conventions in representation reaches into the domain of the most technical sciences. For the realist, it stands as evidence against the claim that conventionality must undermine objectivity. We can be committed to the existence of a single real ontology while maintaining a cultural view of science.


Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780674022980
Publisher: Harvard University Press
Publication date: 02/15/2007
Pages: 208
Product dimensions: 6.12(w) x 9.25(h) x 0.75(d)

About the Author

Talal A. Debs is Research Associate at the Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, London School of Economics and Political Science.

Michael L. G. Redhead is Co-Director of the Centre for Philosophy of Natural and Social Science, London School of Economics and Political Science.

Table of Contents

Preface

Acknowledgments

Introduction

1. Scientific Representation

Two Dimensions of Representation

The Social Dimension

The Formal Dimension

A Combined Account

Conclusions

2. Models, Symmetry, and Convention

Models and Symmetry

Ambiguity and Convention

Representation, Symmetry, and Convention

3. A New Appraisal of Symmetry

Heuristic Power

Universality

Objectivity

Against Invariantism

Perspectival Invariantism

4. Simultaneity and Convention

Simultaneity

Simultaneity and Perspectival Invariance

5. Objectivity in the Twin Paradox

An Introduction to the Twin Paradox

Explaining the Twins

Time and Perspectival Invariance

6. Localization in Quantum Theory

Position and Localization

Representing a Localized Particle

Localization and Perspectival Invariance

Conclusion

Appendix A

Appendix B

Notes

Index

What People are Saying About This

Debs and Redhead claim that invariants in the fundamental theories of physics are ultimately "perspectival" because invariance is always relative to specified transformations or symmetries. Moreover, they argue, the choice of a perspective is ultimately conventional. These and other controversial claims are sure to engage not only philosophers of physics but other philosophers of science and the broader science studies community as well.

Ronald N. Giere

Debs and Redhead claim that invariants in the fundamental theories of physics are ultimately "perspectival" because invariance is always relative to specified transformations or symmetries. Moreover, they argue, the choice of a perspective is ultimately conventional. These and other controversial claims are sure to engage not only philosophers of physics but other philosophers of science and the broader science studies community as well.
Ronald N. Giere, Center for Philosophy of Science, University of Minnesota

Gerald Holton

In this engaging book, Debs and Redhead offer a courageous and novel answer to two questions that are still at the frontier of current scholarship: What precisely is being presented by scientific presentations? Are they attempts to approximate an objective representation of reality, or is any such attempt fatally undermined by its inescapable conventionalist choices?
The evenhanded and persuasive answers to these questions, bolstered by three case studies from modern theoretical physics, will greatly interest a wide range of scholars--historians and philosophers of science, social constructivists as well as realists.
Gerald Holton, Mallinckrodt Research Professor of Physics, and Research Professor of History of Science, Harvard University

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