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Overview
The role of experience in cognition is a central and ancient philosophical concern. How, theorists ask, can our private experiences guide us to knowledge of a mind-independent reality? Exploring topics in logic, philosophy of mind, and epistemology, Conscious Experience proposes a new answer to this age-old question, explaining how conscious experience contributes to the rationality and content of empirical beliefs.
According to Anil Gupta, this contribution cannot be determined independently of an agent’s conceptual scheme and prior beliefs, but that doesn’t mean it is entirely mind-dependent. While the rational contribution of an experience is not propositional—it does not, for example, provide direct knowledge of the world—it does authorize certain transitions from prior views to new views. In short, the rational contribution of an experience yields a rule for revising views. Gupta shows that this account provides theoretical freedom: it allows the observer to radically reconceive the world in light of empirical findings. Simultaneously, it grants empirical reason significant power to constrain, forcing particular conceptions of self and world on the rational inquirer. These seemingly contrary virtues are reconciled through novel treatments of presentation, appearances, and ostensive definitions.
Collectively, Gupta’s arguments support an original theory: reformed empiricism. He abandons the idea that experience is a source of knowledge and justification. He also abandons the idea that concepts are derived from experience. But reformed empiricism preserves empiricism’s central insight: experience is the supreme epistemic authority. In the resolution of factual disagreements, experience trumps all.
Product Details
ISBN-13: | 9780674987784 |
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Publisher: | Harvard University Press |
Publication date: | 02/11/2019 |
Pages: | 440 |
Product dimensions: | 6.40(w) x 9.30(h) x 1.50(d) |
About the Author
Table of Contents
Preface xi
Précis xix
1 The Problem of Conscious Experience 1
1A Logical and Naturalist Inquiries 1
1B Skepticism and Russell's Acquaintance Model of Experience 13
2 A Coherence Theory of Perceptual Judgments 33
2A Sellars's Theory of Experience 34
2B Sellars on the Reasonableness of Perceptual Judgments 45
2C Critical Observations I 51
2D Critical Observations II 53
3 Simple Theories of Perceptual Judgments 63
3A Characterization of Simple Theories 63
3B Simple Relational Theories 67
3C Simple Informational Theories 72
3D Simple Intentional Theories 76
3E Problems with the Simple Given 84
4 The Hypothetical Given
4A Rational Transitions 93
4B General Remarks on Logical Interdependence 105
4C On Convergence 109
4D Logical Interdependence and Holism 121
5 Presentation and the Transparency of Experience 126
5A Presentation without Acquaintance 127
5B Moore on the Transparency of Experience 130
5C Mind-Independence and Externality 137
5D Phenomenology and Introspection 143
6 Appearances 155
6A Subjective Identity and Appearances 155
6B Illusions and Hallucinations 166
6C Intentionalist Objections 174
7 The Role of Appearances in Cognition 185
7A The Equivalence Principle 185
7B Connotation and Denotation 197
7C The Skeptical Meditation 201
7D Summary of the Account of Experience 211
8 Experience and Concept 218
8A Historical Introduction 219
8B Ostensive Definition: Denotation 228
8C Ostensive Definition: Connotation, Symbol, Concept 242
8D Conceptual Criticism 252
9 Empirical Transformations 264
9A Ontology, Logical and Proper 265
9B Specks, Images, Clouds 276
9C Conceptions of Color 287
9D A Sketch of the Dialectical Situation 293
10 Empirical Dialectic and Empirical Proofs 299
10A Empirical and Mathematical Dialectic Compared 300
10B Some Features of Empirical Proofs 312
10C Compelling Empirical Proofs 323
11 The General Logic of Empirical Dialectic 333
11A Rationality and Dialectical Power 333
11B Ur-Convergence 341
11C Summary of the Main Features of Empirical Dialectic 344
12 Physicalism from the Logical Point of View 355
12A Kripke's Argument against Mental-Physical Identity 356
12B Types of Physicalism 370
12C Physicalism within the Bounds of Reason 378
References 385
Index 403