Against Knowledge Closure
Knowledge closure is the claim that, if an agent S knows P, recognizes that P implies Q, and believes Q because it is implied by P, then S knows Q. Closure is a pivotal epistemological principle that is widely endorsed by contemporary epistemologists. Against Knowledge Closure is the first book-length treatment of the issue and the most sustained argument for closure failure to date. Unlike most prior arguments for closure failure, Marc Alspector-Kelly's critique of closure does not presuppose any particular epistemological theory; his argument is, instead, intuitively compelling and applicable to a wide variety of epistemological views. His discussion ranges over much of the epistemological landscape, including skepticism, warrant, transmission and transmission failure, fallibilism, sensitivity, safety, evidentialism, reliabilism, contextualism, entitlement, circularity and bootstrapping, justification, and justification closure. As a result, the volume will be of interest to any epistemologist or student of epistemology and related subjects.
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Against Knowledge Closure
Knowledge closure is the claim that, if an agent S knows P, recognizes that P implies Q, and believes Q because it is implied by P, then S knows Q. Closure is a pivotal epistemological principle that is widely endorsed by contemporary epistemologists. Against Knowledge Closure is the first book-length treatment of the issue and the most sustained argument for closure failure to date. Unlike most prior arguments for closure failure, Marc Alspector-Kelly's critique of closure does not presuppose any particular epistemological theory; his argument is, instead, intuitively compelling and applicable to a wide variety of epistemological views. His discussion ranges over much of the epistemological landscape, including skepticism, warrant, transmission and transmission failure, fallibilism, sensitivity, safety, evidentialism, reliabilism, contextualism, entitlement, circularity and bootstrapping, justification, and justification closure. As a result, the volume will be of interest to any epistemologist or student of epistemology and related subjects.
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Against Knowledge Closure

Against Knowledge Closure

by Marc Alspector-Kelly
Against Knowledge Closure

Against Knowledge Closure

by Marc Alspector-Kelly

Paperback

$45.00 
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Overview

Knowledge closure is the claim that, if an agent S knows P, recognizes that P implies Q, and believes Q because it is implied by P, then S knows Q. Closure is a pivotal epistemological principle that is widely endorsed by contemporary epistemologists. Against Knowledge Closure is the first book-length treatment of the issue and the most sustained argument for closure failure to date. Unlike most prior arguments for closure failure, Marc Alspector-Kelly's critique of closure does not presuppose any particular epistemological theory; his argument is, instead, intuitively compelling and applicable to a wide variety of epistemological views. His discussion ranges over much of the epistemological landscape, including skepticism, warrant, transmission and transmission failure, fallibilism, sensitivity, safety, evidentialism, reliabilism, contextualism, entitlement, circularity and bootstrapping, justification, and justification closure. As a result, the volume will be of interest to any epistemologist or student of epistemology and related subjects.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9781108463294
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 10/28/2021
Pages: 254
Product dimensions: 5.98(w) x 9.02(h) x 0.51(d)

About the Author

Marc Alspector-Kelly is Professor of Philosophy at Western Michigan University. His work in epistemology, the philosophy of science, and the history of analytic philosophy has been published in numerous leading journals including Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Philosophy of Science, Synthese, and Philosophical Studies.

Table of Contents

1. Motivation, strategy, and definition; 2. Counterexamples; 3. Denying premise 1: Skepticism; 4. Denying premise 2: Warrant transmission; 5. Transmission, skepticism, and conditions of warrant; 6. Front-loading; 7. Denying premise 3: warrant for P as warrant for Q; 8. Denying premise 4: warrant by background information; 9. Denying premise 5: warrant by entitlement; 10. Abominable conjunctions, contextualism, and the spreading problem; 11. Bootstrapping, epistemic circularity, and justification closure.
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