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CHAPTER 1
The Frankfurt School
"Reconceiving Social Philosophy" refers to the project of Frankfurt School Critical Theory in general and Axel Honneth's appropriation of the project in particular. Faced with the failure of traditional philosophy, traditional humanities and sciences to significantly alleviate meaningless human suffering, extreme poverty, starvation, war, exploitation and the like, the members of the early Frankfurt School radically change the way we do social philosophy. In this chapter, I will outline and assess the project of the Frankfurt School to engage in a critical social theory that possesses explanatory, normative and practical force. This critical social theory differs from both traditional mainstream social philosophy and sociology. I will begin with an exposition of Max Horkheimer's re-conceptualisation of social philosophy as critical social theory and trace the realisation of this project in the first- and second-generation Frankfurt School. This will help to better understand the aims and challenges of the project and to locate Honneth in his philosophical-historical contexts. The work of each member of the different generations of the Frankfurt School is manifold, complex and diverse. For reasons of brevity, I will focus on Max Horkheimer and Herbert Marcuse's outlines of the project, Horkheimer and Theodor Adorno's execution of the project in their social analysis and Jürgen Habermas's appropriation of the original project as outlined, for example, in his inaugural lecture.
1.1. HORKHEIMER AND THE PROJECT OF A CRITICAL THEORY
The Institut für Sozialforschung (Institute for Social Research) was formed in 1923. From its inception, the institute was a Marxist centre for social research, associated with the Goethe Universität in Frankfurt. When Max Horkheimer becomes director of the institute, following Carl Grünberg and Friedrich Pollock, he formulates the programme of a new Critical Social Theory (CT).
The two programmatic texts I will discuss in this section are Horkheimer's 1930 inaugural lecture, "The Current Condition of Social Philosophy and the Task of an Institute for Social Research" ("Die gegenwärtige Lage der Sozialphilosophie und die Aufgaben eines Instituts für Sozialforschung", published in 1931), and his 1937 article "Traditional and Critical Theory" (TCT).
In his inaugural lecture, Horkheimer outlines the project of the Institute of Social Research under his directorship. He formulates his conception of social philosophy in opposition to the dominant Kantian and Hegelian approaches and proposes an interdisciplinary program. Rather than offering a definition of social philosophy, Horkheimer describes the task of the new discipline as the "philosophical interpretation of the fate of human beings, insofar as they are not just individuals but members of a community". Social philosophy must be concerned with all phenomena of human sociality — for example, state, law, right and economics, as well as culture and art.
Because Horkheimer formulates his view partly with reference to Kant and Hegel, appropriating some and rejecting other aspects of both, it makes sense to outline his project against both and thus to begin with brief remarks about Kantian and Hegelian approaches to social philosophy.
In contrast to Horkheimer's position, which is (also) strongly influenced by Marxism, Kantians interpret the meaning and significance of social phenomena, including social institutions and structures, in terms of the will of autonomous subjects. The abstract autonomous subject is the ground and end of social life and culture. In Hegel, the relationship between the individual and society is turned around. Autonomous agents do not create social structures, institutions and culture (art, religion, etc.); rather, society and history determine and create autonomous subjects. Social phenomena do not receive their meaning from individuals; instead, the life of individuals becomes meaningful and significant only in relation to "the whole" and the role the individual plays in this whole. In his critique, Horkheimer understands the Hegelian "whole" as society, the state, ultimately "world spirit" actualised. World spirit is the end of history and human beings are "sacrificed" for the actualisation of spirit. In the face of human suffering and death throughout history — that is, in face of the "slaughterhouse of history" (Schlachtbank der Geschichte), necessary for the self-actualisation of world spirit — the task of Hegelian social philosophy is "Verklärung" (transfiguration). Verklärung means that philosophy explains the suffering that might appear unjust and irrational as part of reason and as rational. It proceeds by showing that human suffering leads to the actualisation of spirit, ultimately in form of the state. The state in turn is where citizens can be truly free, and hence the state is rational. Verklärung, as Horkheimer asserts, is more than mere consolation in the face of suffering; it is reconciliation with suffering and so with the status quo. While the Hegelian metaphysical system has lost credibility, Horkheimer holds that social philosophy is still engaged in the Hegelian project of reconciling humans with ultimately meaningless and arbitrary suffering and death with reference to an "objective spirit". This objective spirit is conceived of as something superior to human individuals and it is able to provide meaning. Different philosophies, cultures and religions offer different interpretations of objective spirit.
There are two key problems with Hegel for Horkheimer: Verklärung and a lack of an objective standard to adjudicate between different conceptions of objective spirit. For one, Horkheimer ultimately rejects Verklärung itself, the task of reconciling human beings with meaningless horrors. This rejection forms part of his critical attitude towards idealism in the 1937 essay. The other problem is the inability of social philosophy to formulate a standard by which to evaluate the different notions of objective spirit. Social philosophy is unable to claim that some interpretations are more rational than others, which must thus be rejected. In the remainder of this essay, Horkheimer focuses on this second, intellectual weakness. Social philosophy must not just describe different notions of the whole or objective spirit. In order to maintain intellectual force, social philosophy must be able to come up with objective criteria that prevent a slide into relativism. It must be capable of rejecting reconciliation in terms of a "Volksgeist" (a spirit of the people, the fate of a people) as less rational than other explanations.
Horkheimer suggests that in order to properly interpret social phenomena and in order to be able to judge social structures and institutions, social philosophy must be placed into a dialectical relationship with other core sciences, like sociology, psychology, political economy and so on. The relationship between all these sciences must be such that philosophical investigations are informed by empirical data and, equally, the collection of specific data and frameworks of interpretation are informed by philosophical insight. Which disciplines are considered to be core disciplines depends on the social and historical conditions. For example, under conditions of capitalism, economy might be a core subject for analysis of society. This interdisciplinary commitment, the dialogical relationship between different core subjects, remains a feature of the project today, maintained by most contemporary Critical Theorists, including Habermas and Honneth, though the late Horkheimer and Adorno will abandon it.
Horkheimer clarifies his project further in the seminal 1937 essay "Traditional and Critical Theory". Here he argues that a contemporary social theory must be a Critical Theory. He explains what a Critical Theory of society is by contrasting it with traditional theory along five main dimensions: the question of the aim of a theory, the nature of the relationship between theory and object, the relation between theory and desires or interests and — similarly and importantly — the relation between theory and praxis and the role of history.
1.1.1. The Aim of Traditional Theory
Horkheimer traces his account of traditional theory back to René Descartes and Cartesian foundationalism, according to which knowledge can be derived from a few fundamental principles. These foundational principles are themselves either self-evident or based on induction from basic observations or they are stipulations. The aim of traditional theory is to formulate a system of propositions which offers an internally coherent picture of reality. These theories should not contain any irrelevant propositions — that is, propositions about matters that do not in some way influence the subject matter of the theory. The ultimate goal is to formulate a "universal system of sciences", in which all the sciences would be based on the same premises with mathematics as the universal language of the sciences. Horkheimer claims that this conception of theory underlies natural sciences as well as human and social sciences. Disputes between different sciences, disciplines or schools are disputes about the respective role of theoretical work versus observation and induction. Such methodological disagreements are not disagreements about the nature of theory as such.
The task of traditional theory is not limited to an increase of knowledge; rather, the task is ultimately to enable control over the subject matter, be it the physical world, the human body, economics or society. Traditional theories are tested with reference to their ability to predict processes or events in their fields. They should inform, and hence support, technological developments and ultimately contribute to the control over nature. In this sense, they are also considered socially useful. While scientific theories are linked to technological progress, the sciences understand themselves as engaged in a "value neutral" activity — that is, an activity which is not determined by political, social, moral or economic interests. Vis-à-vis their social and political context, traditional scientists take themselves to be involved in an independent, self-sufficient type of work. The knowledge they increase is objective knowledge. In fact, Horkheimer speaks of a divided self where individuals think of themselves either as disinterested researchers or as citizens with interests, but never as both simultaneously. This division is a mark of an irrational structure of society and part of the aim of Critical Theory will be to overcome such internal divisions of the self which reflect tensions between work relations and individual spontaneity and goals.
In line with their self-understanding as disinterested researchers, scientist in the traditional theory paradigm also think of the objects of their theory as unaffected by theory. The independence of the object from theory is one of the key tenets of traditional theory. This presumed independence allows theory to be objective. It allows the discovery of natural laws that exist beyond the influence of human beings. For Horkheimer, as we will see below, the independence of object assumption is problematic for epistemological and social reasons. Epistemologically, Horkheimer argues, it is simply a mistaken view of the nature of perception and knowledge formation. Socially it is problematic because it can lead to fatalism or conformism — that is, it invites a view of the world as inevitably the way it is. Traditional theory relies on and reaffirms a distinction between thinking and theoretical activity and action in the world. The independence-of-the-object assumption is thus related to two further presuppositions: assumptions about the relation between theory and praxis and attitudes towards the role of history for theory. In terms of the relation between theory and praxis, the role of theory is reduced to the contribution that theory makes to the development of technology. The role of history for theory is similarly reduced to technological progress, especially in terms of instruments that aid data collection.
1.1.2. Critical Theory
The object of Critical Theory is "the specific individual in his real relation with other individuals and groups, in his conflict with a specific class and in his thus mediated entanglement with the social whole and nature". The "individual in his real relation" is seen here in opposition to the bourgeois ideal of the independent, autonomous and abstract ego as well as in opposition to collectivist views which conceive of the individual as a mere part of an organism. These collectivist conceptions underlie fascist movements as well as Nazism and Stalinism. The aim of Critical Theory and critical activity is human emancipation. Critical Theory thus reverses the relation between theory and praxis. This goes hand in hand with an epistemologically and emancipatory motivated rejection of "disinterested" theory. Horkheimer argues that the relationship between object and theory is always interdependent and co-constitutive, and both objects and theory are subject to historical changes. Historical self-reflection is thus important for an adequate social philosophy — that is, Critical Theory. Because, as Horkheimer shows, all theory is always formulated from a standpoint and for a purpose — and this purpose determines aspects of the structure of the theory. Horkheimer claims that the open partisanship and explicit commitment to human emancipation is at the root of all structural differences between traditional and Critical Theory — for example, the differences mentioned above but also differences referring to a normative dimension that serves as a critical standpoint, the notion and critique of ideology and regression as mechanisms that prevent emancipation. For Critical Theory, reality is the product of social praxis, it is created by society and can thus be changed through human activity, even if any particular individual meets reality as externally given and is — on their own — impotent in the face of it.
However, while the structural differences can be explained in terms of the different aims of traditional and Critical Theory, Horkheimer's critique of and reaction to traditional theory is based primarily on epistemological positions which have normative implications.
1.1.3. Neutrality
Horkheimer takes issue with the idea of a disinterested researcher or interest-independent, objective knowledge. All knowledge and all theoretical activity are determined by interest. While Critical Theory explicitly commits to the interest in human emancipation, the interests driving the traditional sciences and traditional theory might be far less explicit. There are several interests at play. For one, traditional theory is grounded in an interest in human survival. Human survival involves survival in at times adverse and dangerous nature. Hence, traditional theory is tasked with enabling the domination of nature through discovery of regularity and formulation of natural laws which allow prediction and — eventually — manipulation (through technology). Science and technology are thus rooted in the need for preservation and are also inextricably linked to domination of nature. Eventually, survival in nature through control and domination necessitates the development of human civilizations. Science and technology are now also involved in the ordering of societies, which involves social control and domination. The traditional sciences are interested specifically in the maintenance of a status quo of the bourgeois order from which they originate. They support the status quo by reproducing and hence affirming — under the guise of objectivity — notions of inevitability, of givenness of physical and social nature as well as by maintaining social institutions which are linked to the particular way in which science is done, especially the economic sphere and the structure of the universities under bourgeois capitalism. Critical Theory, in contrast, opposes the partisanship with the powers that be and the lack of self-reflection and self-awareness about its own complicity in political domination.
1.1.4. Independence of Object
Traditional theory understands its object as given, independent of theory and also not changeable through theory. Consequently, the human individual experiences herself as passive even though she is active. This view of the object as theory-independent, externally given, is mistaken in Horkheimer's eyes. Rather, there is a relation of mutual dependence and co-creation. Our perception of the objects of theory and hence our formulation of and focus on these objects is determined by theory. This stance in the philosophy and psychology of perception has a long history, and Horkheimer traces his position back to Immanuel Kant, where "the individual ... receives sensible reality, as a simple sequence of facts, into his world of ordered concepts. The latter too ... have developed along with the life process of society".
(Continues…)
Excerpted from "Axel Honneth"
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Copyright © 2019 Dagmar Wilhelm.
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