Bargaining and Markets / Edition 1

by Martin J. Osborne, Ariel Rubinstein

Overview

The formal theory of bargaining originated with John Nash's work in the early 1950s. This book discusses two recent developments in this theory. The first uses the tool of extensive games to construct theories of bargaining in which time is modeled explicitly. The second applies the theory of bargaining to the study of decentralized markets. Rather than surveying the field, the authors present a select number of models, each of which illustrates a key point. In addition, they give detailed proofs throughout the book. It uses a small number of models, rather than a survey of the field, to illustrate key points, and includes detailed proofs given as explanations for the models. The text has been class-tested in a semester-long graduate course.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780125286329
Publisher:	Emerald Group Publishing Limited
Publication date:	04/28/1990
Series:	Economic Theory, Econometrics, and Mathematical Economics
Edition description:	New Edition
Pages:	236
Product dimensions:	5.98(w) x 9.02(h) x 0.67(d)

Table of Contents

Introduction. Bargaining Theory: The Axiomatic Approach. Nash's Solution. The Strategic Approach. A Model of Alternating Offers. The Relation between the Axiomatic and Strategic Approaches. A Strategic Model of Bargaining between Incompletely Informed Players. Models of Decentralized Trade: First Approach Using the Nash Solution. Strategic Bargaining in a Steady State Market. Strategic Bargaining in a Market with One-Time Entry. The Role of the Trading Procedure. The Role of Anonymity. References. Index.