Castles, Battles, and Bombs reconsiders key episodes of military history from the point of view of economics—with dramatically insightful results. For example, when looked at as a question of sheer cost, the building of castles in the High Middle Ages seems almost inevitable: though stunningly expensive, a strong castle was far cheaper to maintain than a standing army. The authors also reexamine the strategic bombing of Germany in World War II and provide new insights into France’s decision to develop nuclear weapons. Drawing on these examples and more, Brauer and Van Tuyll suggest lessons for today’s military, from counterterrorist strategy and military manpower planning to the use of private military companies in Afghanistan and Iraq.
"In bringing economics into assessments of military history, [the authors] also bring illumination. . . . [The authors] turn their interdisciplinary lens on the mercenary arrangements of Renaissance Italy; the wars of Marlborough, Frederick the Great, and Napoleon; Grant's campaigns in the Civil War; and the strategic bombings of World War II. The results are invariably stimulating."—Martin Walker, Wilson Quarterly
"This study is serious, creative, important. As an economist I am happy to see economics so professionally applied to illuminate major decisions in the history of warfare."—Thomas C. Schelling, Winner of the 2005 Nobel Prize in Economics
Jurgen Brauer is professor of economics in the James M. Hull College of Business at Augusta State University and the author of Arms Trade and Economic Development.
Hubert P. van Tuyll is professor of history and chair of the Department of History, Anthropology, and Philosophy at Augusta State University. He is the author of The Netherlands and World War I.
Table of Contents
List of Figures and Tables Preface
Chapter 1. Economics
Economics Principle I: Opportunity Cost Principle II: Expected Marginal Costs and Benefits Principle III: Substitution Principle IV: Diminishing Marginal Returns Principle V: Asymmetric Information and Hidden Characteristics Principle VI: Hidden Actions and Incentive Alignments Conclusion: Economics—and Military History
Chapter 2. The High Middle Ages, 1000–1300: The Case of the Medieval Castle and the Opportunity Cost of Warfare
Opportunity Cost and Warfare The Ubiquity of Castles The Cost of Castling The Advantages of Castles The Cost of Armies Castle Building and the Other Principles of Economics Conclusion
Chapter 3. The Renaissance, 1300–1600: The Case of the Condottieri and the Military
Labor Market The Principal-Agent Problem Demand, Supply, and Recruitment Contracts and Pay Control and Contract Evolution The Development of Permanent Armies Condottieri and the Other Principles of Economics Conclusion
Chapter 4. The Age of Battle, 1618–1815: The Case of Costs, Benefits, and the Decision to Offer Battle
Expected Marginal Costs and Benefits of Battle The 1600s: Gustavus Adolphus and Raimondo de Montecuccoli The 1700s: Marlborough, de Saxe, and Frederick the Great Napoleonic Warfare The Age of Battle and the Other Principles of Economics Conclusion
Chapter 5. The Age of Revolution, 1789–1914: The Case of the American Civil War and the Economics of Information Asymmetry
Information and Warfare North, South, and the Search for Information Major Eastern Campaigns through Gettysburg Grant in Virginia The American Civil War and the Other Principles of Economics Conclusion
Chapter 6. The Age of the World Wars, 1914–1945: The Case of Diminishing Marginal Returns to the Strategic Bombing of Germany in World War II
A Strategic Bombing Production Function Bombing German War Production Bombing the Supply Chain and the Civilian Economy Bombing German Morale Assessing the Effect of Strategic Bombing Strategic Bombing and the Other Principles of Economics Conclusion
Chapter 7. The Age of the Cold War, 1945–1991: The Case of Capital-Labor Substitution and France’s Force de Frappe
History of the Force de Frappe The Force Post–De Gaulle Justifying the Force The Force’s Effect on France’s Conventional Arms Substituting Nuclear for Conventional Forces The Force de Frappe and the Other Principles of Economics Conclusion
Chapter 8. Economics and Military History in the Twenty-first Century Economics of Terrorism
Economics of Military Manpower Economics of Private Military Companies Economics, Historiography, and Military History Conclusion
