Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East / Edition 1

by Salim Yaqub

Overview

Under the Eisenhower Doctrine, the United States pledged to give increased economic and military aid to receptive Middle Eastern countries and to protect—with U.S. armed forces if necessary—the territorial integrity and political independence of these nations from the threat of "international Communism." Salim Yaqub demonstrates that although the United States officially aimed to protect the Middle East from Soviet encroachment, the Eisenhower Doctrine had the unspoken mission of containing the radical Arab nationalism of Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, whom Eisenhower regarded as an unwitting agent of Soviet expansionism. By offering aid and protection, the Eisenhower administration hoped to convince a majority of Arab governments to side openly with the West in the Cold War, thus isolating Nasser and decreasing the likelihood that the Middle East would fall under Soviet domination.

Employing a wide range of recently declassified Egyptian, British, and American archival sources, Yaqub offers a dynamic and comprehensive account of Eisenhower's efforts to counter Nasserism's appeal throughout the Arab Middle East. Challenging interpretations of U.S.-Arab relations that emphasize cultural antipathies and clashing values, Yaqub instead argues that the political dispute between the United States and the Nasserist movement occurred within a shared moral framework—a pattern that continues to characterize U.S.-Arab controversies today.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780807855089
Publisher:	The University of North Carolina Press
Publication date:	03/15/2004
Series:	New Cold War History
Edition description:	1
Pages:	392
Product dimensions:	6.12(w) x 9.25(h) x 0.88(d)

About the Author

Salim Yaqub is assistant professor of American and international history at the University of Chicago.

Table of Contents

	Abbreviations	xi
	Introduction	I
1	The United States and the Arab Middle East, 1941-1956	23
2	Birth of a Doctrine, November 1956-January 1957	57
3	Launching the Doctrine, January-April 1957	87
4	The Conservative Moment, March-June 1957	119
5	The Syrian Crisis, July-December 1957	147
6	The Nasserist Onslaught, January-April 1958	181
7	The Lebanese Crisis, April-July 1958	205
8	Death of a Doctrine, July 1958-December 1960	237
	Epilogue	269
	Notes	277
	Bibliography	347
	Acknowledgments	361
	Index	365

What People are Saying About This

From the Publisher

Presents a compelling case for a fresh interpretation of the U.S.-Arab dynamic. . . . A thoughtful, persuasively argued study that makes a valuable contribution. . . . Should be considered mandatory reading for anyone seeking to understand the interaction of U.S. Cold War imperatives with the realities of Middle Eastern politics.—Journal of Cold War Studies



In laying bare such manifold American dilemmas in the region for the pivotal years of 1957 and 1958, Yaqub in a sharp analysis and clear language provides much needed historical contextualizations for problems still haunting the region and the world today.—Australasian Journal of American Studies



This is a richly documented and detailed, yet eminently readable, study—the best available on the Eisenhower Doctrine and on those two tumultuous years, with still-relevant lessons for what works and what does not in Middle East diplomacy.—Foreign Affairs



What emerges clearly from [Yaqub's account] is how little Washington understood the consequences of foisting its cold war obsessions upon a region with other things on its mind. . . . Brilliantly analyzed. . . . Sparkling.—The Nation



[A] comprehensive study. . . . Drawing on extensive research . . . [Yaqub] carefully develops the formulation and implementation of . . . policies in what was becoming a central area for U.S. strategic policy development.—Choice



This is a fine volume, well written, meticulous in its research, penetrating and sure-footed in its analysis, and fair to Washington as well as to the Arab actors. The book is a vivid reminder of Washington's difficulty in recognizing that nationalist forces in the third world could not be forced into a Cold War mold, a difficulty that would plague us with more tragic consequences in Vietnam a decade later.—Middle East Journal



Yaqub . . . presents insights into Arab politics that, in light of current events in the Middle East, American policy makers should digest in trying to understand the perception of America in the Arab world.—Journal of American History



Yaqub examines the Eisenhower Doctrine on the basis of copious research, multinational perspective, and sharp analysis. His regional approach proves superior by enabling him to make insightful observations about the interconnectedness of events in various countries. His work makes a notable contribution to our understanding of U.S. relations with Arab states.—Peter L. Hahn, Ohio State University

Editorial Reviews

"In laying bare such manifold American dilemmas in the region for the pivotal years of 1957 and 1958, Yaqub in a sharp analysis and clear language provides much needed historical contextualizations for problems still haunting the region and the world today."

-- "Australasian Journal of American Studies"

"Presents a compelling case for a fresh interpretation of the U.S.-Arab dynamic. . . . A thoughtful, persuasively argued study that makes a valuable contribution. . . . Should be considered mandatory reading for anyone seeking to understand the interaction of U.S. Cold War imperatives with the realities of Middle Eastern politics."
-- "Journal of Cold War Studies"

From the Publisher

Coming just a decade after the 1947 Truman Doctrine, the Eisenhower Doctrine was the second Cold War presidential doctrine keyed to the Middle East. This time the Soviet threat was seen as reaching into the heart of the Arab world, but the more immediate strategic goal in the wake of the Suez crisis was lining up Arab states against Egyptian President Gamal Abdel al-Nasser and his brand of Arab nationalism — which proved to be a hard sell. Yaqub concentrates on 1957 and 1958, covering congressional hearings, the unsuccessful effort to "line up" Arab states (the Richards mission), and the quixotic U.S. notion that Saudi Arabia's King Saud could serve as the counterweight to Nasser. He also covers the crises that followed in Jordan, Syria (a failed U.S. effort to topple the regime), and thereafter the 1958 coup in Iraq (seen as Nasserist at the time) and beleaguered Lebanese President Camille Chamoun's appeal for U.S. troops. Ultimately, the effort to get Arabs to stand up and be counted against Nasserism only caused them to be counted out. This is a richly documented and detailed, yet eminently readable, study — the best available on the Eisenhower Doctrine and on those two tumultuous years, with still-relevant lessons for what works and what does not in Middle East diplomacy.

Foreign Affairs