Decision-Making in Committees: Game-Theoretic Analysis
Political and economic institutions are typically governed by committees that face the challenge to reconcile the preferences of their members. How should decision rules be designed to generate fair and sustainable agreements, for example if committee members represent groups of different sizes? This book uses game-theoretic concepts and models to address the issue of political decision-making processes. In addition to providing a survey on basic game-theoretic tools in the analysis of political decisions, the author looks at specific issues such as two-tiered voting systems or the influence of lobbyists on legislative committees, and shows how the models can be applied to real-world contexts such as the EU decision-making institutions.

1111356693
Decision-Making in Committees: Game-Theoretic Analysis
Political and economic institutions are typically governed by committees that face the challenge to reconcile the preferences of their members. How should decision rules be designed to generate fair and sustainable agreements, for example if committee members represent groups of different sizes? This book uses game-theoretic concepts and models to address the issue of political decision-making processes. In addition to providing a survey on basic game-theoretic tools in the analysis of political decisions, the author looks at specific issues such as two-tiered voting systems or the influence of lobbyists on legislative committees, and shows how the models can be applied to real-world contexts such as the EU decision-making institutions.

54.99 In Stock
Decision-Making in Committees: Game-Theoretic Analysis

Decision-Making in Committees: Game-Theoretic Analysis

by Nicola Friederike Maaser
Decision-Making in Committees: Game-Theoretic Analysis

Decision-Making in Committees: Game-Theoretic Analysis

by Nicola Friederike Maaser

Paperback(2010)

$54.99 
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Overview

Political and economic institutions are typically governed by committees that face the challenge to reconcile the preferences of their members. How should decision rules be designed to generate fair and sustainable agreements, for example if committee members represent groups of different sizes? This book uses game-theoretic concepts and models to address the issue of political decision-making processes. In addition to providing a survey on basic game-theoretic tools in the analysis of political decisions, the author looks at specific issues such as two-tiered voting systems or the influence of lobbyists on legislative committees, and shows how the models can be applied to real-world contexts such as the EU decision-making institutions.


Product Details

ISBN-13: 9783642041525
Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Publication date: 02/01/2010
Series: Lecture Notes in Economics and Mathematical Systems , #635
Edition description: 2010
Pages: 126
Product dimensions: 6.10(w) x 9.25(h) x 0.36(d)

Table of Contents

Games and Political Decisions.- Committees as Representative Institutions.- Robust Equal Representation.- Committees and Lobby Coalition Formation.
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