Decisions, Uncertainty, and the Brain: The Science of Neuroeconomics / Edition 1 available in Paperback

Decisions, Uncertainty, and the Brain: The Science of Neuroeconomics / Edition 1
- ISBN-10:
- 0262572273
- ISBN-13:
- 9780262572279
- Pub. Date:
- 09/17/2004
- Publisher:
- MIT Press
- ISBN-10:
- 0262572273
- ISBN-13:
- 9780262572279
- Pub. Date:
- 09/17/2004
- Publisher:
- MIT Press

Decisions, Uncertainty, and the Brain: The Science of Neuroeconomics / Edition 1
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Overview
Product Details
ISBN-13: | 9780262572279 |
---|---|
Publisher: | MIT Press |
Publication date: | 09/17/2004 |
Series: | A Bradford Book |
Edition description: | New Edition |
Pages: | 400 |
Product dimensions: | 5.88(w) x 8.96(h) x 0.65(d) |
Age Range: | 18 Years |
About the Author
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments | xiii | |
Further Reading | xv | |
Economics | xv | |
Behavioral Ecology | xv | |
Preface | xvii | |
I | Historical Approaches | 1 |
1 | Rene Descartes and the Birth of Neuroscience | 3 |
Vaucanson's Duck | 3 | |
Rene Descartes | 5 | |
Understanding the Ancients | 9 | |
The Renaissance | 16 | |
Francis Bacon | 19 | |
William Harvey | 22 | |
Descartes's Synthesis | 27 | |
2 | Inventing the Reflex | 33 |
Enlightenment Views of Determinism in the Physical and Biological World | 33 | |
Determinism in Geometrical Mathematics and Geometrical Physics | 33 | |
Determinism and Behavior | 36 | |
Nondeterministic Behavior | 38 | |
The Birth of Analytic Mathematics: The End of Geometric World Models | 40 | |
Beyond Clockworks: Analytic Models of the Determinate Brain | 44 | |
Vaucanson's Duck in a Deterministic, but Analytic, World | 51 | |
3 | Charles Sherrington and the Propositional Logic of Reflexes | 55 |
Testing the Limits of Determinate Analytic Mathematics | 55 | |
Charles Scott Sherrington: The Confluence of Logic and Physiology | 60 | |
Sherrington's System: The Logic of the Nervous System | 63 | |
Dualism | 68 | |
The Godel Theorem: Finding the Limits of Determinate Mathematics | 72 | |
Alan Turing and Computability | 73 | |
4 | Finding the Limits of the Sherringtonian Paradigm | 77 |
Reflexes: Empirical Fact, Philosophical Paradigm, or Both? | 78 | |
The Reflex Model Is Not Adequate to Account for All Determinate Behavior. Additional Mechanisms Are Required | 80 | |
Sherrington's Cat | 80 | |
T. Graham Brown and Internal Rhythms | 82 | |
Erik Von Holtz: Adding to Reflex Theory | 87 | |
Reflexes Are Not, as Sherrington Argued, the Organizational Element for Behavior. Behavior May Be Structured Hierarchically | 95 | |
Paul Weiss | 95 | |
Nickolai Bernstein | 104 | |
Beyond Reflexes | 108 | |
5 | Neurobiology Today: Beyond Reflexology? | 111 |
NetTalk, a Neural Network That Reads Aloud | 113 | |
Classical Networks | 113 | |
The NetTalk System | 117 | |
Deciding Where to Look | 122 | |
6 | Global Computation: An Alternative to Sherrington? | 131 |
David Marr | 133 | |
Perceptrons and Computation | 135 | |
Marr's Approach | 137 | |
Vision | 139 | |
Unresolved Problems with Marr's Approach | 143 | |
7 | Modularity and Evolution | 145 |
Modules | 146 | |
Psychological Modules | 149 | |
Neurobiological Modules | 150 | |
Evolution | 151 | |
Gould and Lewontin | 153 | |
The Need for an Optimal Benchmark: Defining the Evolutionary Goals of Neural Computation | 154 | |
Achieving a Defined Goal: Phototransduction | 156 | |
Convergent Evolution: Cichlid Fishes | 159 | |
Generalizing to Complex Systems? | 164 | |
Marr, Evolution, and Modules: The Road Ahead | 166 | |
II | Neuroeconomics | 169 |
8 | Defining the Goal: Extending Marr's Approach | 171 |
The Goal of Behavior | 171 | |
Replacing Minimal Complexity: Inclusive Fitness | 172 | |
Replacing Determinate Models: Probability Theory | 175 | |
Uncertainty, Value, and Economics | 177 | |
The Birth of Probability Theory | 178 | |
Pascal's Idea: Combining Value and Probability | 187 | |
A Critical Advance in Valuation: Bernoulli | 189 | |
A Critical Advance in Probability: Bayes and Laplace | 192 | |
Thomas Bayes | 193 | |
Pierre-Simon Laplace | 197 | |
Valuation, Probability, and Decision: Foundations of Modern Economic Theory | 199 | |
Evolving Optimal Solutions or Optimal Brains? | 200 | |
Summary | 202 | |
9 | Evolution, Probability, and Economics | 205 |
Behavioral Ecology as a Theoretical Approach | 206 | |
Foraging Theory | 208 | |
The Prey Model | 211 | |
Empirical Tests of Foraging Economics | 217 | |
Conclusions from Testing the Prey Model | 221 | |
Summary | 222 | |
10 | Probability, Valuation, and Neural Circuits: A Case Study | 225 |
An Overview of Visual-Saccadic Processing | 226 | |
Visual Processing in the Primate Brain | 226 | |
Eye Movements and the Primate Brain | 229 | |
Linking Vision and Saccades | 231 | |
The Visual-Saccadic Function of Parietal Cortex | 233 | |
The Command Hypothesis | 234 | |
Attentional Enhancement | 237 | |
Attention Versus Intention | 242 | |
Resolving the Attention-Intention Debate? | 250 | |
The Cued Saccade and Distributed Cue Experiment | 251 | |
An Alternative Approach: Goals, Probability, and Valuation | 255 | |
Encoding Probability | 256 | |
Encoding Valuation | 261 | |
Variables That Guide Choice Behavior | 263 | |
Summary | 266 | |
Falling into the Dualist Trap | 268 | |
11 | Irreducible Uncertainty and the Theory of Games | 271 |
Irreducible Uncertainty in a Populated World | 273 | |
Billiard Balls | 273 | |
Flipping a Laplacian Coin | 275 | |
The Theory of Games | 276 | |
An Introduction to Game Theory | 278 | |
Opponent Actions and Expected Utility | 281 | |
John Nash and Modern Game Theory | 282 | |
Limitations of the Equilibrium Approach | 287 | |
Biology and the Theory of Games | 288 | |
The Hawk-Dove Game | 289 | |
Can Animals Really Produce Unpredictable Behaviors? | 293 | |
Applying Game Theory to Animal Behavior | 294 | |
Summary | 297 | |
12 | Games and the Brain | 299 |
Volition, Free Will, and Mathematical Games | 299 | |
Playing the Inspection Game | 300 | |
Theory | 301 | |
Behavior | 304 | |
Summary | 309 | |
Shifting to a Single Player | 309 | |
Game-Playing Monkeys | 311 | |
The Physiology of a Complex Behavior | 313 | |
Summary | 317 | |
13 | Putting It All Together I. Behavior and Physiology | 319 |
The Neuroeconomic Program | 319 | |
Using Neuroeconomics | 321 | |
Neuroeconomic Examples | 322 | |
Example 1 | Visual Attention | 323 |
Example 2 | Evaluating Visual Motion | 328 |
Example 3 | Learning Prior Probabilities | 330 |
Example 4 | Learning About Values | 332 |
Limits of the Theory: Will It Be Good Enough? | 334 | |
Summary | 336 | |
14 | Putting It All Together II. Philosophical Implications | 337 |
Classical Dualism and Physiological Monism | 337 | |
Alternatives to Classical Dualism and Physiological Monism | 338 | |
Free Will | 340 | |
Consciousness | 342 | |
Finis | 344 | |
References | 347 | |
Index | 355 |
What People are Saying About This
Glimcher's seminal book is a must-read in the emerging field of neuroeconomics. His analysis of the biological foundations of economic behavior makes for exciting reading for economists and neuroscientists alike, who will be fascinated by his insightful research connecting neuronal firing and economic decision making.
Glimcher has achieved an extraordinary synthesis of perspectives that have remained isolated for far too long. He views the brain as a system designed to maximise neither pleasure nor social or economic success, but biological fitness instead. He goes on to show why this matters in fields as disparate as psychology, economics and his own field of neurobiology. This is an impressive and highly readable journey through vast areas of scientific and philosophical knowledge.
Glimcher does extraordinary neuroscience and relates it to the most fundamental of all questions: how the brain makes decisions. His use of game theory to characterize decision making in both humans and monkeys under conditions of strategic conflict is unique. What could be more important than studying the neurobiological basis of volitional choice in earnest? The implications and applications of his work are singular.
Glimcher does extraordinary neuroscience and relates it to the most fundamental of all questions: how the brain makes decisions. His use of game theory to characterize decision making in both humans and monkeys under conditions of strategic conflict is unique. What could be more important than studying the neurobiological basis of volitional choice in earnest? The implications and applications of his work are singular.
Michael S. Gazzaniga, Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Dartmouth College
Glimcher has achieved an extraordinary synthesis of perspectives that have remained isolated for far too long. He views the brain as a system designed to maximise neither pleasure nor social or economic success, but biological fitness instead. He goes on to show why this matters in fields as disparate as psychology, economics and his own field of neurobiology. This is an impressive and highly readable journey through vast areas of scientific and philosophical knowledge.
Alex Kacelnik, Professor of Behavioural Ecology, Oxford UniversityGlimcher's seminal book is a must-read in the emerging field of neuroeconomics. His analysis of the biological foundations of economic behavior makes for exciting reading for economists and neuroscientists alike, who will be fascinated by his insightful research connecting neuronal firing and economic decision making.
Kevin A. McCabe , Professor of Economics and Law, and Director of the Neuroeconomics Laboratory at the Interdisciplinary Center for Economic Science, George Mason UniversityGlimcher does extraordinary neuroscience and relates it to the most fundamental of all questions: how the brain makes decisions. His use of game theory to characterize decision making in both humans and monkeys under conditions of strategic conflict is unique. What could be more important than studying the neurobiological basis of volitional choice in earnest? The implications and applications of his work are singular.
Michael S. Gazzaniga, Center for Cognitive Neuroscience, Dartmouth College