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Deterrence During Disarmament: Deep Nuclear Reductions and International Security
There is a broad sense in both Russia and the United States that deep nuclear reductions—a goal endorsed by both governments—would constitute a risky step into the unknown and could undermine international security. However, until now, the reasons behind these concerns—and whether they are justified—have not been properly explored. Based on a series of interviews with opinion formers in both Russia and the United States, this Adelphi maps out these concerns as they relate to the effectiveness of deterrence (including extended deterrence), the possible incentives to use nuclear weapons first in a crisis, the potential for rearmament and nuclear multipolarity. Contrary to popular belief, there is evidence against which these fears can be assessed. The practical experience of deterrence at low numbers that was acquired by the Soviet Union and the United States early in the Cold War, as well as by other nuclear-armed states, is highly relevant. Based on this experience and insights from deterrence theory, this Adelphi concludes that most of the challenges associated with low numbers are not really a consequence of arsenal size and, accordingly, that there are good reasons to believe that deep reductions would not undermine international security.

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Deterrence During Disarmament: Deep Nuclear Reductions and International Security
There is a broad sense in both Russia and the United States that deep nuclear reductions—a goal endorsed by both governments—would constitute a risky step into the unknown and could undermine international security. However, until now, the reasons behind these concerns—and whether they are justified—have not been properly explored. Based on a series of interviews with opinion formers in both Russia and the United States, this Adelphi maps out these concerns as they relate to the effectiveness of deterrence (including extended deterrence), the possible incentives to use nuclear weapons first in a crisis, the potential for rearmament and nuclear multipolarity. Contrary to popular belief, there is evidence against which these fears can be assessed. The practical experience of deterrence at low numbers that was acquired by the Soviet Union and the United States early in the Cold War, as well as by other nuclear-armed states, is highly relevant. Based on this experience and insights from deterrence theory, this Adelphi concludes that most of the challenges associated with low numbers are not really a consequence of arsenal size and, accordingly, that there are good reasons to believe that deep reductions would not undermine international security.

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Deterrence During Disarmament: Deep Nuclear Reductions and International Security

Deterrence During Disarmament: Deep Nuclear Reductions and International Security

by James Acton
Deterrence During Disarmament: Deep Nuclear Reductions and International Security

Deterrence During Disarmament: Deep Nuclear Reductions and International Security

by James Acton

Overview

There is a broad sense in both Russia and the United States that deep nuclear reductions—a goal endorsed by both governments—would constitute a risky step into the unknown and could undermine international security. However, until now, the reasons behind these concerns—and whether they are justified—have not been properly explored. Based on a series of interviews with opinion formers in both Russia and the United States, this Adelphi maps out these concerns as they relate to the effectiveness of deterrence (including extended deterrence), the possible incentives to use nuclear weapons first in a crisis, the potential for rearmament and nuclear multipolarity. Contrary to popular belief, there is evidence against which these fears can be assessed. The practical experience of deterrence at low numbers that was acquired by the Soviet Union and the United States early in the Cold War, as well as by other nuclear-armed states, is highly relevant. Based on this experience and insights from deterrence theory, this Adelphi concludes that most of the challenges associated with low numbers are not really a consequence of arsenal size and, accordingly, that there are good reasons to believe that deep reductions would not undermine international security.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9781138474314
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Publication date: 08/25/2017
Series: Adelphi series
Pages: 128
Product dimensions: 6.12(w) x 9.19(h) x (d)

Table of Contents

Introduction 7

Why is there renewed interest in nuclear arms reductions? 9

Assessing the effect of deep reductions: deterrence effectiveness and strategic stability 15

Parameters and assumptions 21

Chapter 1 Central deterrence 25

The case for the efficacy of small arsenals 27

Mirror imaging 31

Countervalue targeting 35

Russia and tactical nuclear weapons 36

Chapter 2 Extended deterrence 39

Damage limitation 40

How effective is damage limitation? 44

Looking back: the Berlin Crisis 49

Extended deterrence and conventional power 52

Would a larger US nuclear arsenal help offset conventional weaknesses? 53

Chapter 3 Crisis stability 57

Russian concerns 59

How much of a problem is crisis instability? 61

Managing Russia's fears 64

Basing modes and crisis stability 65

Chapter 4 Rearmament stability 71

Armament drivers during the Cold War 72

What might prompt a state to be the first to rearm? 75

If one state rearms, will the other follow? 79

Chapter 5 Nuclear multipolarity 83

Alliances 84

Opportunism 88

China's 'sprint to parity' and proliferation 89

Conclusions 93

Appendix: Where are we now? 101

Glossary 107

Endnotes 109

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