Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America's Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan

Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America's Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan

by Steve Coll

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Product Details

ISBN-13: 9781594204586
Publisher: Penguin Publishing Group
Publication date: 02/06/2018
Pages: 784
Sales rank: 71,509
Product dimensions: 6.20(w) x 9.10(h) x 1.80(d)

About the Author

Steve Coll is the author of the Pulitzer Prize-winning Ghost Wars and the dean of the Graduate School of Journalism at Columbia University, and from 2007 to 2013 was president of the New America Foundation, a public policy institute in Washington, D.C. He is a staff writer for The New Yorker, and previously worked for twenty years at The Washington Post, where he received a Pulitzer Prize for explanatory journalism in 1990. He is the author of seven other books, including On the Grand Trunk Road, The Bin Ladens, Private Empire, and Directorate S.

Table of Contents

Author's Note xi

List of Maps xvii

Cast of Characters xix

Introduction 1

Part 1 Blind into Battle, September 2001-December 2001

1 "Something Has Happened to Khalid" 11

2 Judgment Day 24

3 Friends Like These 43

4 Risk Management 66

5 Catastrophic Success 87

Part 2 Losing the Peace, 2002-2006

6 Small Change 115

7 Taliban for Karzai 136

8 The Enigma 147

9 "His Rules Were Different Than Our Rules" 160

10 Mr. Big 182

11 Ambassador vs. Ambassador 198

12 Digging a Hole in the Ocean 214

13 Radicals 234

Part 3 The Best Intentions, 2006-2009

14 Suicide Detectives 253

15 Plan Afghanistan 266

16 Murder and the Deep State 280

17 Hard Data 296

18 Tough Love 308

19 Terror and the Deep State 326

20 The New Big Dogs 349

21 Losing Karzai 371

22 A War to Give People a Chance 388

Part 4 The End of Illusion, 2010-2014

23 The One-man C.I.A. 415

24 The Conflict Resolution Cell 438

25 Kayani 2.0 450

26 Lives and Limbs 463

27 Kayani 3.0 494

28 Hostages 513

29 Dragon's Breath 530

30 Martyrs Day 544

31 Fight and Talk 562

32 The Afghan Hand 586

33 Homicide Division 607

34 Self-inflicted Wounds 625

35 Coups d'État 645

Epilogue: Victim Impact Statements 670

Acknowledgments 689

Notes 693

Bibliography 729

Index 737

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Directorate S: The C.I.A. and America's Secret Wars in Afghanistan and Pakistan 2 out of 5 based on 0 ratings. 2 reviews.
Enver Masud More than 1 year ago
Steve Coll is wrong on the seminal event of this century. It is for this reason I give Directorate S one star. In December 1989, the Washington Post reported, “military experts from previous administrations told Congress today that the $300 billion annual Pentagon budget could be safely cut in half over the next decade”. In September 2000, The Project for the New American Century wrote, “Preserving the desirable strategic situation in which the united states now finds itself requires a globally preeminent military capability . . . the process of transformation . . . is likely to be a long one, absent some catastrophic and catalyzing event — like a new Pearl Harbor.” Was 9/11 the “new Pearl Harbor”? The attacks on 9/11 led to the U.S. war on Afghanistan — a war planned prior to 9/11, after negotiations with the Taliban for a pipeline had broken down. Both Hamid Karzai, the interim president of Afghanistan, and Zalmay Khalilzad, the U.S. special envoy, were formerly employed as consultants to Unocal, the U.S. oil company which spent much of the 1990s seeking to build a pipeline through Afghanistan. Zalmay Khalilzad drew up Unocal’s risk analysis on its proposed trans-Afghan gas pipeline. In 2003, Zalmay Khalizad became the U.S. ambassador to Afghanistan, and on June 22, 2005 was sworn in as ambassador to Iraq. On February 11, 2002, the Irish Times reported: The Pakistani President, Gen. Pervez Musharraf, and the Afghan interim leader, Mr. Hamid Karzai, agreed yesterday that their two countries should develop “mutual brotherly relations and cooperate in all spheres of activity” — including a proposed gas pipeline from Central Asia to Pakistan via Afghanistan. On March 2, 2007, General Wesley Clark, former NATO Supreme Allied Commander, during an interview televised on Democracy Now! stated: About 10 days after 9/11, I went through the Pentagon, . . . , and one of the generals called me in. . . . He says, "We've made the decision we're going to war with Iraq." . . . So I came back to see him a few weeks later, and by that time we were bombing in Afghanistan. I said, "Are we still going to war with Iraq?" And he said, "Oh, it's worse than that." . . . "This is a memo that describes how we're going to take out seven countries in five years, starting with Iraq, and then Syria, Lebanon, Libya, Somalia, Sudan and, finishing off, Iran. Today, 3000+ military and intelligence personnel, engineers, architects, professors, and pilots do not believe the official account of 9/11. The 9/11 Commission Chair Thomas H. Kean and Vice Chair Lee H. Hamilton wrote in their book — Without Precedent: The Inside Story of the 9/11 Commission — that they were "setup to fail". Mr. Coll doesn't tell the reader any of this. By omitting essential information on the seminal event of this century, the reader is poorly informed.
Fareed 6 months ago
Directorate S recaps the events in Afghanistan post 9/11. The main message of the book is that all the troubles in Afghanistan are because of ISI. ISI is no doubt upto no good in Afghanistan, has allowed terrorists to create trouble in India, and let them loose in Pakistan as well. But to blame ISI for all the issues is a stretch. Reading the book it comes through clearly that US really had no plan for Afghanistan. Al Qaeda was clearly the target but no thought process to what happens after you bomb a country that is barely functional. Instead of finishing off Al Qaeda resources were diverted to Iraq so they slipped out and regrouped. When resources were provided some years later, the US tried all kinds of things but with limited success. The problem was compounded by having the CIA, Pentagon, and State Dept. not being on the same page. Nonetheless its a well written book that recaps events across the years.