The book explores what we can learn about the role of emotions and imagination in moral reasoning from psychopathic adults in the general community, from young children, and adolescents with callous unemotional traits, and from normal child development. It discusses the implications for philosophical moral psychology of recent experimental work on moral reasoning in the cognitive sciences and neurosciences. Conversely, it shows what cognitive scientists and neuroscientists have still to learn from philosophical perspectives on moral reasoning, moral reflection, and moral responsibility. Finally, it looks at whether experimental methods used for researching moral reasoning are consistent with the work in social psychology and with philosophical thought on adult moral reasoning in everyday life.
The volume's wide-ranging perspectives reflect the varied audiences for the volume, from students of philosophy to psychologists working in cognition, social and personality psychology, developmental psychology, abnormal psychology, and cognitive neuroscience.
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About the Author
Catriona Mackenzie is Professor of Philosophy and Director of the Research Centre for Agency, Values and Ethics at Macquarie University, Sydney. Her areas of research specialization include ethics, philosophical moral psychology, social and political philosophy, and applied ethics. She is co-editor of Relational Autonomy: Feminist Perspectives on Autonomy, Agency, and the Social Self (Oxford University Press, 2000), and Practical Identity and Narrative Agency (Routledge, 2008). Mackenzie has published articles in journals such as Australasian Journal of Philosophy, Hypatia, Journal of Applied Philosophy, Journal of Social Philosophy, Philosophical Papers, and Philosophical Explorations, as well as book chapters in numerous edited volumes. She was awarded the 2007 Australian Museum Eureka Prize for Research in Ethics.