Table of Contents
Preface xxi
Acknowledgments xxiii
Chapter 1 Introduction to Individual Rights 1
§1.1 Introduction and Overview 1
§1.2 The Fourteenth Amendment: An Introductory Overview 4
The Text of § 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment 4
A Brief Historical Survey 6
Early Judicial Trends in Construing the Fourteenth Amendment 8
§1.3 The Incorporation Doctrine 10
§1.4 The State Action Doctrine 14
§1.4.1 The Categorical Approach 17
Private Performance of a Public Function 17
Judicial Enforcement of Private Agreements 22
Joint Activity Between a State and a Private Party 25
State Endorsement of Private Conduct 30
§1.4.2 The Two-Part Approach 32
A State Actor Anomaly 40
§1.5 Congressional Enforcement of the Civil War Amendments 41
§1.5.1 Enforcement of the Thirteenth Amendment 41
§1.5.2 Enforcement of the Fourteenth Amendment 45
Parallel Enforcement 46
Nonparallel Enforcement 48
Congressional Interpretation 56
§1.5.3 Enforcement of the Fifteenth Amendment 57
Chapter 2 Substantive Due Process 61
§2.1 Introduction and Overview 61
The Origins of the Due Process Clause 61
Procedural versus Substantive Due Process 62
Executive Abuse of Power 63
Standards of Review 64
Economic versus Noneconomic Due Process 65
§2.2 The Rise and Fall of Economic Due Process 65
§2.2.1 Economic Due Process in the Lochner Era 65
Liberty to Contract 66
The Decision in Lochner v. New York 67
§2.2.2 The Demise of Lochner 69
§2.2.3 Property and Economic Liberty Today 71
Punitive Damages 74
§2.3 Noneconomic Liberty from Lochner to Carotene Products 79
§2.3.1 The Lochner Era and Noneconomic Liberties 79
§2.3.2 Carolene Products' Footnote Four 80
§2.4 Griswold and the Reemergence of Unenumerated Liberties 82
§2.4.1 Penumbras and Emanations 82
§2.4.2 Alternative Approaches: Liberty and the Ninth Amendment 84
§2.4.3 The Risks in Protecting Unenumerated Rights 85
§2.4.4 The Fundamental Rights Model with Variations 87
The Basic Fundamental Rights Model 87
The Concept of Impingement 88
Variations on the Basic Strict Scrutiny Model 89
§2.5 The Right of Privacy and Personal Autonomy 90
§2.5.1 Marriage 91
§2.5.2 Family Integrity 94
Family Living Arrangements 94
The Parent-Child Relationship 96
Nonparental Visitation Statutes 98
§2.5.3 Intimate Association 101
§2.5.4 Abortion 103
Roe v. Wade and the Trimester Framework 103
Planned Parenthood v. Casey and the End of the Trimester Approach 105
The Undue Burden Test 106
Facial versus As-Applied Challenges 113
§2.5.5 Sexual Intimacy 117
§2.5.6 Medical Treatment 118
A Right to Choose Certain Medical Treatment? 118
The Right to Reject Unwanted Medical Treatment 120
§2.5.7 The Right to Refuse Lifesaving Hydration and Nutrition 121
§2.5.8 Suicide and Physician-Assisted Suicide 124
§2.6 Other Protected Liberty Interests 127
§2.6.1 Freedom of Movement 127
Freedom from Physical Restraint 127
Freedom to Move About 129
§2.6.2 The Rights to Protection and Care 131
§2.6.3 Access to Courts 133
§2.6.4 Informational Privacy 134
§2.7 What Happened to Life? 135
Abortion 135
Subsistence Benefits 135
The Death Penalty 136
Death Caused by Government Officials 137
Chapter 3 The Takings Clause 139
§3.1 Introduction and Overview 139
§3.2 Condemnation and Inverse Condemnation 139
§3.3 The Requirement of Public Use 142
§3.4 An Approach to Analyzing Inverse Condemnation Problems 144
§3.5 The Difference Between Physical Occupation and Regulation 145
§3.6 Physical Occupations and Invasions 146
§3.7 Regulatory Takings 150
§3.7.1 Destroying All Use or Value 151
Real Property 151
Personal Property 153
Measuring Loss in Value: The Denominator Problem 153
§3.7.2 Partial Deprivations 157
§3.7.3 The Nuisance Exception 160
§3.7.4 Remedies for Temporary Regulatory Takings 162
§3.8 Conditions Attached to Building Permits 163
§3.8.1 Only Certain Types of Conditions Qualify 164
§3.8.2 The Essential Nexus Requirement 166
§3.8.3 The Rough Proportionality Requirement 167
The Nature of the Condition 167
The Extent of the Condition 168
Chapter 4 The Contracts Clause 171
§4.1 Introduction and Overview 171
§4.2 The Preliminary Questions 172
§4.2.1 Is There a Contractual Obligation? 172
Implied Contractual Obligations 173
State Contract Law as an Implied Contractual Obligation 174
§4.2.2 Does a Change in State Law Impair a Contractual Obligation? 175
§4.2.3 Is the Impairment Substantial? 176
§4.3 The Balancing Test and the Reserved Powers Doctrine 179
§4.4 The Special Problems of Contracts to Which a State Is a Party 183
Chapter 5 Procedural Due Process and Irrebuttable Presumptions 187
§5.1 Introduction and Overview 187
§5.2 A Protected Liberty or Property Interest? 189
§5.2.1 What Constitutes Liberty? 189
§5.2.2 What Constitutes Property? 192
§5.2.3 The Relevance of Custom and Practice 196
§5.3 What Constitutes a Deprivation? 197
§5.4 The Content of Notice 199
§5.5 What Kind of Hearing Must Be Afforded? 200
§5.5.1 The "Bitter with the Sweet" Approach 201
§5.5.2 The Mathews v. Eldridge Test 202
§5.5.3 The Requirement of a Prior Hearing 204
§5.5.4 Exceptions to the Prior Hearing Requirement 205
§5.5.5 The Formality of the Prior Hearing 209
§5.6 Possible Post-Deprivation Remedies Where No Liberty or Property Interest Exists 211
§5.7 The Irrebuttable Presumption Doctrine 212
§5.7.1 Rebuttable and Irrebuttable Presumptions 212
§5.7.2 The Doctrine in Its Prime 213
§5.7.3 The Doctrine Today 214
Chapter 6 Equal Protection: Ordinary, "Suspect," and "Quasi-Suspect" Classifications 217
§6.1 Introduction and Overview 217
§6.2 Equal Protection: General Principles 220
§6.2.1 Detecting Discrimination: Facial, Design, and Applied 220
Facial Discrimination 220
Discrimination by Design 221
Discriminatory Application 221
§6.2.2 The Prima Facie Case 222
Disproportionate Impact 222
Discriminatory Purpose 224
Legislative History 225
The Manner of Adoption 226
Inferring Purpose from Impact and Other Circumstantial Evidence 228
Inferring Purpose from Application 228
The Keyes Presumption 229
Difficulties with the Purpose Element 230
§6.2.3 Rebutting the Prima Facie Case 232
§6.3 The Rational Basis Equal Protection Test 234
§6.4 Classifications on the Basis of Race or National Origin 238
§6.4.1 Race as a Suspect Classification 238
The Court's Early Treatment of Race 238
The Rationale for Strict Scrutiny 240
§6.4.2 Scrutiny as a Measure of Constitutionality 242
Compelling Interest 242
Narrowly Tailored 243
§6.4.3 Racial Segregation of Public Schools 245
Brown v. Board of Education 245
Implementing Brown 247
§6.4.4 Interdistrict Remedies 248
Proving an Interdistrict Violation 249
Responding to White Flight 251
§6.4.5 Remedying Segregation at the College Level 252
§6.4.6 Other Limitations on Desegregation Orders 254
Minimizing the Degree of Federal Interference 254
Duration of Federal Desegregation Orders 255
§6.4.7 Affirmative Action 258
Strict Scrutiny for Affirmative Action 259
Compelling Interests 261
Narrowly Tailored 265
§6.5 Classification on the Basis of Alienage 273
§6.5.1 The Standard for State and Local Laws 273
The Reason for Strict Scrutiny 273
Governmental or Political Functions 274
Undocumented Aliens 276
§6.5.2 The Standard for Federal Laws 277
§6.6 Classification on the Basis of Gender or Legitimacy 278
§6.6.1 Gender as a Quasi-Suspect Classification 278
§6.6.2 Mid-Level Scrutiny as a Measure of Constitutionality 280
Important and Legitimate Objectives 280
Proof of Actual Purpose 281
Means Substantially Related to Goal 282
Comparing the Tests for Gender and Race Discrimination 288
§6.6.3 Legitimacy 289
§6.7 Other Possibly Disfavored Bases of Classification 291
§6.7.1 The Rejection of New "Suspect" and "Quasi-Suspect" Classes 291
§6.7.2 Discrimination Against Out-of-Staters 292
§6.7.3 Discrimination Against the Mentally Retarded 293
§6.7.4 Discrimination on the Basis of Sexual Orientation 294
Chapter 7 Equal Protection: Fundamental Rights 297
§7.1 Introduction and Overview 297
§7.2 Equal Protection and Fundamental Rights 297
§7.3 The Right to Vote 300
§7.3.1 The Absolute versus the Equal Right to Vote 300
§7.3.2 Selective Denial of the Franchise 302
§7.3.3 Individual Vote Dilution: "One Person, One Vote" 306
The Problem: Unequal Weighting of Votes 306
"One Person, One Vote" 309
At-Large Election Schemes 310
Reapportionment 311
§7.3.4 Group Vote Dilution 313
Minimizing Group Voting Strength 313
Dilution Through At-Large Elections 314
Dilution Through Gerrymandering 315
Dilution Through Use of Multimember Districts 316
Vote Dilution and Nonracial Groups: Partisan Political Gerrymandering 317
§7.3.5 Nondilutional Race-Based Districting 320
§7.3.6 Access to the Ballot 326
§7.3.7 Unequal Vote Count 328
§7.4 The Right to Travel 329
§7.4.1 Durational Residency Requirements 330
§7.4.2 Fixed-Point and Fixed-Date Residency Requirements 333
§7.4.3 The Equal Protection Alternative to Strict Scrutiny 335
§7.4.4 Bona Fide Residency Requirements 336
§7.5 Access to the Courts 338
§7.6 Welfare and Subsistence 340
§7.7 Access to a Basic Education 343
§7.8 A Sliding-Scale Approach to Equal Protection 345
§7.8.1 Problems with the Three-Tier Model 345
§7.8.2 Marshall's Sliding-Scale Approach 345
§7.8.3 Plyler v. Doe 346
Chapter 8 The First Amendment: Freedom of Speech and of the Press 349
§8.1 Introduction and Overview 349
§8.2 Introductory Themes 350
§8.2.1 Defining Terms: Speech and Press 350
§8.2.2 Protected and Unprotected Speech 355
§8.2.3 The Distinction Between Matters of Public and Private Concern 356
§8.2.4 The Special Problem of Prior Restraints 358
§8.2.5 The Overbreadth and Vagueness Doctrines 363
§8.3 Content-Based Restrictions on Speech 369
§8.3.1 What Constitutes a Content-Based Restriction? 369
§8.3.2 Advocacy of Unlawful Conduct: The Clear and Present Danger Test 373
§8.3.3 Fighting Words, True Threats, and Hate Speech 381
§8.3.4 Free Speech Limitations on Defamation (and Other Torts) 384
The Burdens Imposed by the Actual Malice Standard 385
The Contexts in Which the Actual Malice Standard Applies 387
The Standards for Private-Plaintiff Lawsuits 388
The First Amendment and Speech-Premised Torts Generally 388
§8.3.5 Campaign Financing, Campaign Advocacy, and Restrictions on the Initiative Process 390
Campaign Financing and Campaign Advocacy 390
Restrictions on Judicial Elections 395
Restrictions on the Initiative Process 396
§8.3.6 Commercial Speech 397
The Definition of Commercial Speech 397
The Rationale for Protecting Commercial Speech 400
The Central Hudson Test 401
Mandatory Disclosure Requirements 408
§8.3.7 Sexually Explicit Speech-Obscenity and Pornography 410
A Definition of Obscenity 410
Nonobscene Sexually Explicit Speech-Pornography 414
Indecent or Vulgar Speech 417
Indecent Speech and the Internet 418
§8.3.8 Speech that Depicts Actual Violence or Cruelty 422
§8.3.9 Content Discrimination Within Categories of Unprotected Speec 423
§8.3.10 Compelled Speech 425
§8.3.11 Ad Hoc Balancing 428
§8.3.12 Free Speech Rights of Public Employees and Other Voluntary Participants in Government Programs 430
§8.4 Content-Neutral Restrictions on Speech: The Time, Place, and Manner Test 434
§8.4.1 Content Neutrality 435
§8.4.2 Narrowly Tailored to Advance a Significant Governmental Interest 437
§8.4.3 Alternate Channels for Communication 441
§8.4.4 Prior Restraints 443
§8.4.5 Injunctions 443
§8.4.6 The Special Problem of Copyrights 444
§8.5 The Nature of the Public Forum 445
§8.5.1 Traditional Public Forum 447
§8.5.2 Designated Public Forum 449
§8.5.3 Nonpublic Forum 453
§8.5.4 Student Speech in Public Schools 456
§8.6 Government Speech 460
§8.7 The First Amendment Right of Association 465
The Right of Association and State Regulation of Elections 475
§8.8 Special Problems of the Media 478
§8.8.1 Access to Information 479
§8.8.2 Access to Criminal Proceedings 479
§8.8.3 Gag Orders in Criminal Proceedings 480
§8.8.4 The Publication of Truthful, Lawfully Obtained Information 480
§8.8.5 The Protection of Confidential Sources 482
§8.8.6 Forced Access to the Press: Print Media 483
§8.8.7 The First Amendment and Modern Technologies 484
The Broadcast Media 484
Developing Technologies-Cable Operators 486
Developing Technologies -The Internet 488
Chapter 9 The First Amendment: Freedom of Religion 491
§9.1 Introduction and Overview 491
§9.2 The Establishment Clause: Themes, Theories, and Tests 492
§9.2.1 Separationist Theory 493
§9.2.2 Nonpreferentialist Theory 493
§9.2.3 Three Compromise Approaches 494
§9.2.4 The Lemon Test 495
Secular Purpose 495
Primary Effect That Neither Advances Nor Inhibits Religion 497
Not Foster Excessive Entanglement with Religion 498
§9.3 The Establishment Clause Applied: Discrimination Between Religions 500
§9.3.1 The Ban on Officially "Established" Religions 501
§9.3.2 The limitation on Conferring a Preferred Status 501
§9.3.3 The Limitation on Imposing a Disfavored Status 503
§9.4 The Establishment Clause Applied: The Nondiscriminatory Promotion of Religion 506
§9.4.1 Public Aid to Parochial Schools 507
§9.4.2 Prayer in Public Schools 518
§9.4.3 Other Contexts 525
§9.5 The Free Exercise Clause 527
§9.5.1 The Distinction Between Belief and Conduct 528
§9.5.2 The Protection of Religious Belief 529
The Right to Profess Religious Beliefs 531
Ecclesiastical Disputes 533
§9.5.3 The Protection of Religiously Motivated Conduct 535
The Purposeful Suppression or Selective Nonfunding of Religiously Motivated Conduct 536
The Nonpurposeful Regulation of Religously Motivated Conduct 544
The Incidental Burdening of Religiously Motivated Conduct 550
§9.6 The Accommodation of Religion 553
Chapter 10 The Right to Keep and Bear Arms 557
§10.1 Introduction and Overview 557
§10.2 District of Columbia v. Heller 558
§10.2.1 Interpreting the Second Amendment 558
§10.2.2 Applying the Second Amendment 561
§10.2.3 The Supreme Court's Post-Heller Decisions 562
§10.3 The Scope of the Right 563
§10.3.1 The Range of Protected Arms 563
§10.3.2 The Right to Bear Arms Outside the Home 564
§10.4 Applying the Second Amendment 566
§10.4.1 Weapons in Common Use for Lawful Purposes 566
§10.4.2 The Appropriate Standard of Review 567
Table of Cases 575
Index 591
