This collection of essays by one of the most prominent and internationally respected philosophers of action theory is concerned with deepening our understanding of the notion of intention. These essays enrich Bratman's account of commitment involved in intending, and explore its implications for our understanding of temptation and self-control, shared intention and shared cooperative activity, and moral responsibility. This collection will be a valuable resource for a wide range of philosophers and their students, and will also be of interest to social and developmental psychologists, AI researchers, and game and decision theorists.
Table of Contents1. Introduction: planning agents in a social world; Part I. Acceptance and Stability: 2. Practical reasoning and acceptance in a context; 3. Planning and temptation; 4. Toxin, temptation, and the stability of intention; Part II. Shared Agency: 5. Shared cooperative activity; 6. Shared intention; 7. Shared intention and mutual obligation; 8. I intend that we J; Part III. Responsibility and Identification: 9. Responsibility and planning; 10. Identification, decision, and treating as a reason; Part IV. Critical Studies: 11. Davidson's theory of intention; 12. Castañeda's theory of thought and action; 13. Cognitivism about practical reason; 14. Critical study of Korsgaard's The Sources of Normativity.