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Chapter 1 - Japanese Navy Planning for Operation MO
It is challenging to unequivocally identify the precise moment when the Nippon Kaigun, the Imperial Japanese Navy, realized that the Coral Sea might become the site for a major carrier battle that affected the entire course of the Pacific War. The clash between two carrier task forces in early May 1942, notably the first one in history, undoubtedly resulted from the Japanese plan to seize Port Moresby, an important city located on the southwestern coast of the Papuan Peninsula of New Guinea, then an Australian mandate. But why did the military planners think they needed to control this remote place? The answer is straightforward: to achieve air superiority in the South Pacific area to cut off the critical supply lines between Australia and the United States, both mortal enemies to the Japanese war plan.
In the late summer of 1941, when the outbreak of the conflict between the Empire of Japan and the Allied powers in East Asia was still pending political decisions, the Nippon Kaigun had, naturally, elaborated a detailed strategy to defeat more potent enemies. Japanese chances of success were meager, but it was thought that a comprehensive and brilliant war plan, backed up by a steadfast determination to win, contrasted with the feeble will of Western nations, could improve the odds. Surprising the U.S. Pacific Fleet in Pearl Harbor and significantly reducing its combat potential for the following months was considered essential, but this was merely an opening move. The actual game was about to start with Nampō Sakusen, the so-called Southern Operation, allowing the Japanese to secure a vast area of Southeast Asia to acquire strategic natural resources for the mobilized economy. Tokyo had openly declared that “Asia for Asians,” governed and defended by the Japanese, needed to withhold the anticipated Allied, primarily American, counterattack from all possible directions. At this point, the idea of the defensive perimeter was born. If the Nippon Kaigun extended the controlled area far into the North, Central, and South Pacific areas, any U.S. Navy advance would result in its tragic defeat in the kantai kessen (the decisive battle), and colossal losses in a series of other operations, which would ultimately convince the Americans to agree to peace on Japan’s terms.
Notwithstanding some critical voices, this plan sounded rational at first glance. But it needed to be meticulously drawn up, particularly regarding the envisaged borders of the controlled area. Establishing the boundaries of the defensive perimeter in positions that were too advanced could strain the navy’s supply capacities, and locating frontal bases too close to the crucial areas, like the Dutch East Indies, would threaten the Japanese war machine, which was strongly dependent on raw materials extracted from the conquered colonies. The Rengō Kantai, better known as the Combined Fleet, also considered the areas that it was pivotal to secure in the South Pacific. In September and October 1941 the high command organized several war games on the battleship Nagato to consider possible developments of the future conflict. Among its key participants, who are also the main actors in this book, were officers of the Fourth Fleet, alternatively named in operational jargon Nan’yō Butai, the South Seas Force. Subordinated directly to the Combined Fleet since October 1940, the Fourth Fleet had its headquarters in Truk and was responsible for shielding the Caroline Islands, the Marshall Islands, and Palau, the “soft underbelly” of the home islands.
Despite the vast area that the Nan’yō Butai had to protect against its enemies, it always struggled to secure enough resources to feel confident while performing its assigned tasks. Even worse, in the first half of 1941, there were rumors suggesting that it would be reduced in size to benefit other fleets.[i] This threat never materialized, yet the struggle to prevent any warships, planes, or men from being removed away from the unit would become an inherent part of its existence. One might think that the unfortunate position of the Fourth Fleet was due the person in charge. This was not the case: the shireichōkan (commander in chief) since August 1941, Vice Adm. Shigeyoshi Inoue, was Adm. Yamamoto’s close associate and among his most trusted men. Together with Adm. Mitsumasa Yonai, the former prime minister and minister of the navy, they created saha no torio (the left-wing trio) of the Nippon Kaigun, which adamantly opposed the Tripartite Pact and wanted to avoid a clash with the United States.[ii] Perverse fate made Yamamoto the leading originator of the naval war strategy, Inoue one of his admirals on the critical section of the front, and Yonai a member of the cabinet who advocated for and later approved the unconditional surrender in 1945.
Inoue was born in 1889 in Sendai, the capital city of the Miyagi Prefecture, the eleventh son of a vineyard owner. His father was a former samurai retainer from the Sendai clan. However, the Meiji Revolution, which Inoue’s ancestors had tried to oppose as loyal vassals of the Tokugawa family, fundamentally reorganized Japanese society, and the legendary warriors were forced to rebrand themselves, becoming, among other things, entrepreneurs, politicians, public servants, or soldiers of the reformed armed forces. As a pupil, Inoue demonstrated exceptional intellectual potential, especially in math and English, yet his destiny was to return to a military career.[iii] Graduating from the renowned Naval Academy in 1911, he was ranked second in his class, losing only to Manichirō Kobayashi, who died in his thirties. This meant that Inoue was always considered the elite of the elite. Like others, he progressed up the military career ladder, but the episode that left a mark on his life and command style was joining the Kaigun Hōjutsu Gakkō, the Gunnery School, in 1912, where he was taught by Lt. Isoroku Yamamoto, a sempai (senior) who was six years older. He was also enrolled in the Kaigun Suirai Gakkō, the Torpedo School, in the second half of the year. Both specializations were inextricably linked to cutting-edge naval warfare and had a significant effect on the development of the outstanding reputation of the Nippon Kaigun at the time. When the Great War broke out, he performed patrol duties in the East China Sea for one month but didn’t see any combat action. More importantly, in 1917 he graduated from the Kaigun Daigakkō, the Naval War College. The next twenty years of his military career were filled with many national and overseas assignments, which earned him the rank of vice admiral in November 1939 while he was serving as the China Area Fleet’s chief of staff.
Inoue’s position in the Nippon Kaigun was significantly enhanced after September 1940, when he openly opposed the Japanese alliance with Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy and spoke against the advance to French Northern Indochina.[iv] The prolonged “Chinese incident” opened his eyes to the reality of war and allowed him to understand the evolution of the battlefield. The emergence of increasingly advanced aircraft reversed his vision of what a dominant force looked like. By as early as October 1940 he had been appointed head of the Kaigun Kōkū Hombu, the Navy Aviation Bureau, and from this position he criticized the Maru 5 Plan in January 1941, which envisaged the expansion of the Nippon Kaigun by prioritizing the construction of capital warships at the expense of the aircraft carriers. Inoue dared to speak frankly, saying that the doctrine regarding the decisive battle with the U.S. Navy, understood traditionally as an artillery and torpedo duel, was outdated and that participating in the race to have more battleships and cruisers was consuming most of the limited resources. He also suggested scattering army forces among fortresses on Pacific islands instead of concentrating them on the mainland, because on the mainland they could easily starve to death as a result of the American blockade. Above all, he emphasized defending the shipping lines and paying special attention to submarine warfare.[v] His suggestions were generally proved to be correct in the following years. However, no matter how good his ideas were, they directly opposed those of the Navy Minister, Adm. Koshirō Oikawa. Some Japanese historians say this is why Inoue was later disregarded for appointments in the navy leadership. Notably, though, he didn’t give up quickly. He spent the next six months persuading Oikawa and other central figures that the war against the United States would be suicide and that if there was any hope of having an equal fight, the Nippon Kaigun had to invest in naval aviation. His battle was lost in July 1941 when the army entered French Southern Indochina, which triggered the Allied oil embargo policy and the Japanese rapid preparations toward a military resolution rather than diplomacy. Inoue, one of the few who had read Mein Kampf carefully in its original and grasped Hitler’s idea of using Japan as a tool, knew that the armed conflict with the Americans would end in disaster.
There was no consensus on Inoue’s next assignment, but he was eventually appointed commander in chief of the Fourth Fleet in August 1941. He was subject to Yamamoto’s orders, and the close bond between the two admirals could have yielded positive results. However, the Combined Fleet’s commander remained neutral regarding Inoue’s struggle for peace and distanced himself from the case. According to Rear Adm. Yoshio Yamamoto, who collaborated with our leading actor in the China Area Fleet, Inoue’s nickname, kamisori (the razor), might have given the impression that he was a cold person, but open-minded people could perceive his kind and peace-loving heart. It was known that geishas adored Inoue, and this connection with Japanese societal norms explained a lot about his personality.[vi] But what kind of field commander was he? His intellect and accurate observations didn’t automatically translate into tactical or operational successes. In the first days of the Pacific War, Inoue supervised the invasion of Guam and Wake. While the first landing operation ended with a sweeping Japanese victory in three days, the second revealed hidden weaknesses of the Nippon Kaigun. It took Inoue more than two weeks to conquer Wake, but the other great triumphs resulting from the Nampō Sakusen made the Combined Fleet forget about this incidental setback. The Fourth Fleet couldn’t dwell on one faltering step either, because the next month was to bring a crucial invasion of Rabaul, in New Britain. However, a watchful eye would already have noticed that Inoue was not made for major offensive operations. The most accurate description of him has probably been provided by Masataka Chihaya, a Japanese veteran and famous historian, who said he was a “unique military politician in the Nippon Kaigun and educator.”[vii] Undoubtedly, he was a great personality, yet his nature didn’t fulfill the definition of an inspirational chieftain leading his men to glorious victories.
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[i] Senshi Sōsho, vol. 38, 94.
[ii] Mori, 13.
[iii] Inoue Shigeyoshi Denki Kankōkai (ed.), 7.
[iv] Inoue Shigeyoshi Denki Kankōkai (ed.), 267.
[v] Inoue Shigeyoshi Denki Kankōkai (ed.), 291.
[vi] Agawa, 221.
[vii] Chihaya, Nippon Kaigun Shippai, 160.
