This book is an exploration and defense of the coherence of classical theism’s doctrine of divine aseity in the face of the challenge posed by Platonism with respect to abstract objects. A synoptic work in analytic philosophy of religion, the book engages discussions in philosophy of mathematics, philosophy of language, metaphysics, and metaontology. It addresses absolute creationism, non-Platonic realism, fictionalism, neutralism, and alternative logics and semantics, among other topics. The book offers a helpful taxonomy of the wide range of options available to the classical theist for dealing with the challenge of Platonism. It probes in detail the diverse views on the reality of abstract objects and their compatibility with classical theism. It contains a most thorough discussion, rooted in careful exegesis, of the biblical and patristic basis of the doctrine of divine aseity. Finally, it challenges the influential Quinean metaontological theses concerning the way in which we make ontological commitments.
|Publisher:||Springer International Publishing|
|Edition description:||1st ed. 2017|
|Product dimensions:||6.10(w) x 9.25(h) x (d)|
About the Author
William Lane Craig is Professor of Philosophy at Talbot School of Theology and Houston Baptist University. A Fellow of the Alexander von Humboldt-Stiftung, he delivered the Cadbury Lectures at the University of Birmingham in 2015. He has authored or edited over 40 books and over 150 articles in philosophical and theological journals. Research interests include metaphysics, philosophy of time, philosophy of religion, and philosophy of mathematics.
Table of Contents
Part 1. The Problematic.- Chapter 1. Introduction.- Chapter 2. Theology Proper and Abstract Objects.- Chapter 3. The Indispensability Argument for Platonism.- Part 2. Realist Solutions.- Chapter 4. Absolute Creationism.- Chapter 5. Non-Platonic Realism.- Part 3. Anti-Realist Solutions.- Chapter 6. Alternative Logics and Semantics.- Chapter 7. Fictionalism.- Chapter 8. Ultima Facie Interpretive Strategies.- Chapter 9. Pretense Theory.- Chapter 10. Neo-Meinongianism.- Chapter 11. Neutralism.- Part 4. Conclusion.- Chapter 12. Concluding Remarks.