Handbook on Approval Voting / Edition 1

Handbook on Approval Voting / Edition 1

Pub. Date:
Springer Berlin Heidelberg


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Handbook on Approval Voting / Edition 1

Under Approval Voting, voters can ''approve" as many candidates as they want, and the candidate approved by the largest number of voters is elected. Since the publication of the seminal book written by Steven Brams and Peter Fishburn in 1983, a variety of theoretical and empirical works have enhanced our understanding of this method. The behavior of voters in such elections has been observed both in the laboratory and in the field; social choice theorists have analyzed the method from the axiomatic point of view; game theory and computer science have been used to scrutinize various strategic aspects; and political scientists have considered the structure of electoral competition entailed by Approval Voting. This book surveys this large body of knowledge through a collection of contributions written by specialists of the various disciplines involved.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9783642264139
Publisher: Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Publication date: 09/05/2012
Series: Studies in Choice and Welfare
Edition description: 2010
Pages: 480
Product dimensions: 6.10(w) x 9.25(h) x (d)

Table of Contents

to the Handbook on Approval Voting.- History of Approval Voting.- Acclamation Voting in Sparta: An Early Use of Approval Voting.- Going from Theory to Practice: The Mixed Success of Approval Voting.- Axiomatic Theory.- Collective Choice for Simple Preferences.- Axiomatizations of Approval Voting.- Committees.- Approval Balloting for Multi-winner Elections.- Does Choosing Committees from Approval Balloting Fulfill the Electorate’s Will?.- Strategic Voting.- The Basic Approval Voting Game.- Approval Voting in Large Electorates.- Computational Aspects of Approval Voting.- Probabilistic Exercises.- On the Condorcet Efficiency of Approval Voting and Extended Scoring Rules for Three Alternatives.- Behavioral Heterogeneity Under Approval and Plurality Voting.- In Silico Voting Experiments.- Experiments.- Laboratory Experiments on Approval Voting.- Framed Field Experiments on Approval Voting: Lessons from the 2002 and 2007 French Presidential Elections.- Approval Voting in Germany: Description of a Field Experiment.- Electoral Competition.- Classical Electoral Competition Under Approval Voting.- Policy Moderation and Endogenous Candidacy in Approval Voting Elections.- Meaning for Individual and Society.- Describing Society Through Approval Data.- Approval as an Intrinsic Part of Preference.

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