Implicit Contract Theory

by Sherwin Rosen (Editor)

Overview

This volume brings together the most innovative and important work on implicit contract theory, a key area of research which has developed over the past 20 years. Implicit contract theory is concerned with the workings of the macro—labour market over business cycles and focuses on a series of key questions including, how economists can explain unemployment levels and employment fluctuations during recessions in terms of rational economic behaviour, and, why wages do not fall to clear the market.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9781852787486
Publisher:	Edward Elgar Publishing
Publication date:	03/01/1994
Series:	The International Library of Critical Writings in Economics series , #35
Pages:	496
Product dimensions:	6.62(w) x 9.62(h) x (d)

About the Author

Edited by the late Sherwin Rosen, formerly, Edwin A. and Betty L. Bergman Professor, Department of Economics, University of Chicago, US

Table of Contents

CONTENTS

PART 1

BASIC IDEAS

1. Costas Azariadis (1975), ‘Implicit Contracts and Underemployment Equilibria’
2. Martin Neil Baily (1974), ‘Wages and Employment under Uncertain Demand’
3. Donald F Gordon (1974), ‘A Neo—Classical Theory of Keynesian Unemployment’
4. Clive Bull (1987), ‘The Existence of Self—Enforcing Implicit Contracts’

PART 2

EMPIRICAL BACKGROUND: TEMPORARY LAYOFFS AND JOB DURATION

5. Martin S. Feldstein (1975), ‘The Importance of Temporary Layoffs: An Empirical Analysis’
6. David M. Lilien (1980), ‘The Cyclical Pattern of Temporary Layoffs in United States Manufacturing’
7. Robert E.Hall (1982), ‘The Importance of Lifetime Jobs in the U. S. Economy’

PART 3

THE IMPORTANCE OF WAGE AND PRICE RIGIDITY

8. Robert J.Gordon (1982), ‘Why U. S. Wage and Employment Behaviour Differs from that in Britain and Japan’
9. Dennis W. Carlton (1986), ‘The Rigidity of Prices’

PART 4

UNEMPLOYMENT COMPENSATION

10. Martin Feldstein (1978), ‘The Effect of Unemployment Insurance on Temporary Layoff Unemployment’
11. Robert H. Topel (1983), ‘On Layoffs and Unemployment Insurance’

PART 5

CRITIQUE AND EXTENSIONS

12. George A .Akerlof and Hajime Miyazaki (1980), ‘The Implicit Contract Theory of Unemployment Meets the Wage Bill Argument’
13. Tomio Kinoshita (1987), ‘Working Hours and Hedonic Wages in the Market Equilibrium’
14. Richard Rogerson (1988), ‘Indivisible Labor, Lotteries and Equilibrium’
15. Gary D. Hansen (1985), ‘Indivisible Labor and the Business Cycle’

PART 6

PRIVATE INFORMATION

16. V. V. Chari (1983), ‘Involuntary Unemployment and Implicit Contracts’
17. Jerry Green and Charles M. Kahn (1983), ‘Wage—Employment Contracts’
18. Sanford J. Grossman and Oliver D. Hart (1983), ‘Implicit Contracts under Asymmetric Information’

PART 7

INTEGRATION AND ASSESSMENTS

19. Oliver D. Hart (1983), ‘Optimal Labour Contracts under Asymmetric Information: An Introduction’
20. Sherwin Rosen (1985), ‘Implicit Contracts: A Survey’

PART 8

RELATED APPROACHES

21. Ian M. McDonald and Robert M .Solow (1981), ‘Wage Bargaining and Employment’
22. Assar Lindbeck and Dennis J. Snower (1988), ‘Cooperation, Harassment, and Involuntary Unemployment: An Insider—Outside Approach’
23. Carl Shapiro and Joseph E. Stiglitz (1984), ‘Equilibrium Unemployment as a Worker Discipline Device’