ISBN-10:
0815340397
ISBN-13:
9780815340393
Pub. Date:
03/28/2001
Publisher:
Taylor & Francis
Learning and Coordination: Inductive Deliberation, Equilibrium and Convention / Edition 1

Learning and Coordination: Inductive Deliberation, Equilibrium and Convention / Edition 1

by Peter Vanderschraaf

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Overview

Learning and Coordination: Inductive Deliberation, Equilibrium and Convention / Edition 1

Vanderschraaf develops a new theory of game theory equilibrium selection in this book. The new theory defends general correlated equilibrium concepts and suggests a new analysis of convention.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780815340393
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Publication date: 03/28/2001
Series: Studies in Ethics Series
Edition description: New Edition
Pages: 244
Product dimensions: 6.00(w) x 9.00(h) x 0.56(d)

About the Author

Peter Vanderschraaf is Assistant Professor in the Department of Philosophy and Social and Decision Sciences at Carnegie Mellon University.

Table of Contents

1. Social Interactions and Principles of Rational Decision; 1.0 Introduction; 1.1 Examples of Social Coordination Problems; 1.2 Noncooperative Games; 1.3 Nash Equilibrium; 1.4 Examples Revisited; 1.5 Equilibrium-in-Beliefs; 1.6 Conclusions; 2. Rationalizability and Correlated Equlibrium Concepts; 2.0 Introduction; 2.1 Rationalizability; 2.3 Correlated Equilibrium Concepts; 3. Equilibrium Selection via Inductive Dynamic Deliberation; 3.0 Introduction; 3.1 The Dirichlet Rule; 3.2 Inductive Deliberation with Endogenous Correlation; 3.3 Correlating With Stages of the World; 3.4 Dirichlet Dynamics With Imperfect Memory; 3.5 Random Sampling Dirichlet Deliberation; 3.6 Deliberators With Variable States; 4. The Emergence of Social Convention; 4.0 Introduction; 4.1 Lewis' Characterization of Conventions; 4.2 Convention as Correlated Equilibrium; 4.3 Dynamical Explanations of Conventions; References; Index

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