America appears poised to redefine its extended deterrent commitment to NATO. This paper evaluates a selection of U.S. signals surrounding the slow-burning debate on the future of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons (NSNW) in Europe to determine a prevailing European understanding of the American NSNW policy preference. Despite the conspicuous silence in American intellectual and foreign policy circles defining what President Obama's Global Nuclear Zero commitment means to the future of NATOs NSNW, the most consistent thread among U.S. actions and rhetoric is an American perception of a changed threat environment. The result is a deliberate policy vector that reinterprets deterrence and intellectually relegates NSNW to the dustbin of history as a dangerous Cold War relic. This intent is interpreted by European allies through the prism of flexible response strategy resulting in a loss of commitment perception, linked to historical perceptions of graduated deterrence. The U.S. has had difficulty communicating and convincing our NATO allies to accept and adopt this strategic recasting because American policy elites have thus far failed to offer a compelling theoretical construct that continues to extend historically understood security assurances. This has caused the beginning of a reexamination of core alliance functions, potentially undermining the strength of consultative norms and shared purpose.
This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.
This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.
As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
America appears poised to redefine its extended deterrent commitment to NATO. This paper evaluates a selection of U.S. signals surrounding the slow-burning debate on the future of Non-Strategic Nuclear Weapons (NSNW) in Europe to determine a prevailing European understanding of the American NSNW policy preference. Despite the conspicuous silence in American intellectual and foreign policy circles defining what President Obama's Global Nuclear Zero commitment means to the future of NATOs NSNW, the most consistent thread among U.S. actions and rhetoric is an American perception of a changed threat environment. The result is a deliberate policy vector that reinterprets deterrence and intellectually relegates NSNW to the dustbin of history as a dangerous Cold War relic. This intent is interpreted by European allies through the prism of flexible response strategy resulting in a loss of commitment perception, linked to historical perceptions of graduated deterrence. The U.S. has had difficulty communicating and convincing our NATO allies to accept and adopt this strategic recasting because American policy elites have thus far failed to offer a compelling theoretical construct that continues to extend historically understood security assurances. This has caused the beginning of a reexamination of core alliance functions, potentially undermining the strength of consultative norms and shared purpose.
This work has been selected by scholars as being culturally important, and is part of the knowledge base of civilization as we know it. This work was reproduced from the original artifact, and remains as true to the original work as possible. Therefore, you will see the original copyright references, library stamps (as most of these works have been housed in our most important libraries around the world), and other notations in the work.
This work is in the public domain in the United States of America, and possibly other nations. Within the United States, you may freely copy and distribute this work, as no entity (individual or corporate) has a copyright on the body of the work.
As a reproduction of a historical artifact, this work may contain missing or blurred pages, poor pictures, errant marks, etc. Scholars believe, and we concur, that this work is important enough to be preserved, reproduced, and made generally available to the public. We appreciate your support of the preservation process, and thank you for being an important part of keeping this knowledge alive and relevant.
Loose Words, Not Nukes
30
Loose Words, Not Nukes
30
Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9781025125732 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Hutson Street Press |
| Publication date: | 05/22/2025 |
| Pages: | 30 |
| Product dimensions: | 6.14(w) x 9.21(h) x 0.06(d) |