Militia Order in Afghanistan: Guardians or Gangsters?
This book offers a new insight into when and why paramilitary groups in Afghanistan engage in protective or predatory behavior against the civilians they purportedly defend.

In Afghanistan’s counterinsurgency environment, America leaned on militias to provide order and stabilize communities cut off from weak central government institutions. However, the lucrative market of protection challenged militia loyalty, as many engaged in banditry, vendettas, and predation. This book examines the varying militia experiments in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2020 and their outcomes through three sub-national case studies. It argues that successful militia experiments in Afghanistan involved inclusion of local orders, where communities had well-established social structures and accountability mechanisms in place, and state patrons relied upon those structures as a restraint against militia behavior. Complementary management ensured patrons leaned on communities for strong accountability systems. But such environments were far from the norm. When patrons ignored community controls, militias preyed on civilians as they monopolized the market of protection. This book adds to the rich literature on the U.S. experience in Afghanistan, but differs by focusing on the interplay between states, communities, and militias.

This book will be of much interest to students of military and strategic studies, Asian politics, security studies and International Relations.

1138639649
Militia Order in Afghanistan: Guardians or Gangsters?
This book offers a new insight into when and why paramilitary groups in Afghanistan engage in protective or predatory behavior against the civilians they purportedly defend.

In Afghanistan’s counterinsurgency environment, America leaned on militias to provide order and stabilize communities cut off from weak central government institutions. However, the lucrative market of protection challenged militia loyalty, as many engaged in banditry, vendettas, and predation. This book examines the varying militia experiments in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2020 and their outcomes through three sub-national case studies. It argues that successful militia experiments in Afghanistan involved inclusion of local orders, where communities had well-established social structures and accountability mechanisms in place, and state patrons relied upon those structures as a restraint against militia behavior. Complementary management ensured patrons leaned on communities for strong accountability systems. But such environments were far from the norm. When patrons ignored community controls, militias preyed on civilians as they monopolized the market of protection. This book adds to the rich literature on the U.S. experience in Afghanistan, but differs by focusing on the interplay between states, communities, and militias.

This book will be of much interest to students of military and strategic studies, Asian politics, security studies and International Relations.

180.0 In Stock
Militia Order in Afghanistan: Guardians or Gangsters?

Militia Order in Afghanistan: Guardians or Gangsters?

by Matthew P. Dearing
Militia Order in Afghanistan: Guardians or Gangsters?

Militia Order in Afghanistan: Guardians or Gangsters?

by Matthew P. Dearing

Hardcover

$180.00 
  • SHIP THIS ITEM
    Qualifies for Free Shipping
  • PICK UP IN STORE

    Your local store may have stock of this item.

Related collections and offers


Overview

This book offers a new insight into when and why paramilitary groups in Afghanistan engage in protective or predatory behavior against the civilians they purportedly defend.

In Afghanistan’s counterinsurgency environment, America leaned on militias to provide order and stabilize communities cut off from weak central government institutions. However, the lucrative market of protection challenged militia loyalty, as many engaged in banditry, vendettas, and predation. This book examines the varying militia experiments in Afghanistan from 2001 to 2020 and their outcomes through three sub-national case studies. It argues that successful militia experiments in Afghanistan involved inclusion of local orders, where communities had well-established social structures and accountability mechanisms in place, and state patrons relied upon those structures as a restraint against militia behavior. Complementary management ensured patrons leaned on communities for strong accountability systems. But such environments were far from the norm. When patrons ignored community controls, militias preyed on civilians as they monopolized the market of protection. This book adds to the rich literature on the U.S. experience in Afghanistan, but differs by focusing on the interplay between states, communities, and militias.

This book will be of much interest to students of military and strategic studies, Asian politics, security studies and International Relations.


Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780367710453
Publisher: Taylor & Francis
Publication date: 07/19/2021
Series: Contemporary Security Studies
Pages: 192
Product dimensions: 6.12(w) x 9.19(h) x (d)

About the Author

Matthew P. Dearing is an Associate Professor of Regional and Analytical Studies at the College of International Security Affairs, National Defense University.

Table of Contents

Foreword by Hassan Abbas 1. Introduction 2. Embedded Militias in Afghanistan 3. Gangland in Northern Afghanistan 4. Vigilante Uprisings in Ghazni 5. Guardians of Paktika 6. From Guardians to Territorial Force
From the B&N Reads Blog

Customer Reviews