Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility

Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility

by Robert Powell


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Nuclear Deterrence Theory: The Search for Credibility by Robert Powell

Applying recent advances in game theory to the study of nuclear deterrence, the author examines some of the most complex and problematic issues in deterrence theory. Game-theoretic analysis allows the author to model the effects on deterrence strategies of first-strike advantages, of limited retaliation, and of the number of nuclear superpowers involved in the international system. With the formalizations he develops, the author is able to demonstrate the fundamental similarity of the two seemingly disparate deterrence strategies that have evolved in response to the superpower arms buildup; the strategy that leaves something to chance and the strategy of limited retaliation.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780521063999
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 06/05/2008
Pages: 240
Product dimensions: 6.10(w) x 9.10(h) x 0.60(d)

Table of Contents

Preface; 1. Introduction; 2. The nuclear revolution and the problem of credibility; 3. The dynamics of nuclear brinkmanship; 4. Stability and longer brinkmanship crises; 5. Crisis stability in the nuclear age; 6. Stability and the lack of control; 7. The strategy of limited retaliation; 8. An appraisal; Appendix: some introductory notes on game theory; References; Index.

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