Objectivism, Subjectivism, and Relativism in Ethics: Volume 25, Part 1

by Ellen Frankel Paul (Editor), Fred Miller, Jr (Editor), Jeffrey Paul (Editor)

Overview

Do we desire things because they are good, or are they good because we desire them? Objectivists answer that we desire things because they are good; subjectivists answer that things are good because we desire them. Further, does it make sense to account for moral disagreement by claiming, as the moral relativist does, that something might be good for one person but not for another? Some essays in this book consider whether objective moral truths can be grounded in an understanding of the nature of human beings as rational and social animals. Some discuss the ethical theories of historical figures—Aristotle, Aquinas, or Kant—or offer critical assessments of the work of recent and contemporary theorists—such as Moore, Putnam, Ayn Rand, Philippa Foot, and Rosalind Hursthouse. Other essays ask whether moral principles and values can be constructed through a process of practical reasoning or deliberation. Still others consider what the phenomenology of our moral experiences can reveal about moral objectivity.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9780521719636
Publisher:	Cambridge University Press
Publication date:	01/28/2008
Series:	Social Philosophy and Policy
Pages:	442
Product dimensions:	5.90(w) x 8.90(h) x 0.90(d)

About the Author

Ellen Frankel Paul received her doctorate from the Government Department at Harvard University in 1976. She has served as a National Fellow at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University, and as a member of the political science departments at Miami University and the University of Colorado at Boulder. She is currently Professor of Political Science at Bowling Green State University.

Fred D. Miller, Jr. received a doctorate in philosophy from the University of Washington. Since 1972 he has been a member of the Department of Philosophy at Bowling Green State University. He has had research fellowships at Harvard University, the Institute for Research in the Humanities at the University of Wisconsin, Madison, Princeton University, Jesus College at Oxford University, and at the Centre for Philosophy and Public Affairs at the University of St Andrews.

Jeffrey Paul is Professor of Philosophy at Bowling Green State University. He received his doctorate in philosophy at Brandeis University in 1984. He has also taught philosophy at Northern Kentucky University and at the University of Cincinnati. In 1981 he was Visiting Scholar at the Hoover Institution, Stanford University.

Table of Contents

1. Substantive moral theory Philip Pettit; 2. Virtue and nature Christopher W. Gowans; 3. The importance of metaphysical realism for ethical knowledge Douglas B. Rasmussen; 4. Why moral judgments can be objective Tibor R. Machan; 5. The importance of the subject in objective morality: distinguishing objective from intrinsic value Tara Smith; 6. Evaluative concepts and objective values: Rand on moral objectivity Darryl F. Wright; 7. Aristotelian constructivism Mark LeBar; 8. Moral construction as a task: sources and limits Thomas E. Hill, Jr.; 9. Constructing normative objectivity in ethics David B. Wong; 10. What does moral phenomenology tell us about moral objectivity? Terry Horgan and Mark Timmons; 11. Imaginative resistance and psychological necessity Julia Driver; 12. Objectivism and relational good Connie S. Rosati; 13. Foundations in Aquinas's ethics Scott MacDonald; 14. Revisionary intuitionism Michael Huemer; 15. Moral objectivity Nicholas Rescher.