Organizational Learning at NASA: The Challenger and Columbia Accidents

by Julianne G. Mahler, Maureen Hogan Casamayou

Overview

The 1986 Challenger accident taught important lessons. If NASA had institutionalized the insight from those lessons, the Columbia accident in 2003 might have been prevented. This comparative study of two space shuttle accidents offers insight into organizational learning-and what makes such learning difficult in public organizations.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9781589012660
Publisher:	Georgetown University Press
Publication date:	03/27/2009
Series:	Public Management and Change series
Edition description:	New Edition
Pages:	256
Sales rank:	463,711
Product dimensions:	5.90(w) x 8.90(h) x 0.80(d)
Age Range:	18 Years

About the Author

Julianne G. Mahler is an associate professor of government and politics at George Mason University.

Maureen Hogan Casamayou is a former research fellow and guest scholar at the Brookings Institution, and she has taught at Georgetown University, Mount Vernon College, and George Mason University.

Table of Contents

Preface

Part 1: Recognizing the Value of Organizational Learning1. Uncanny Similarities: The Challenger and Columbia Accidents2. Identifying Organizational Learning

Part 2. Analyzing the Causes of the Shuttle Accidents 3. Structures for Processing Information4. Contractor Relations5. Political and Budgetary Pressures6. Organizational Culture

Part 3: Institutionalizing Lessons about Public Organizational Learning7. The Challenges of Learning in Public Organizations8. Lessons from NASA about Organizational Learning

References

Index

What People are Saying About This

Thomas A. Birkland

This book's approach is interesting, very clearly presented, useful for researchers and students, and makes an important contribution to the field. I can see new and established scholars buying this book for its remarkably clear and insightful discussion of the ways in which we consider organizational learning and the things that prevent such learning from happening.

Eugene Bardach

NASA learned some important safety-related lessons after the Challenger accident. This valuable book analyzes how this happened. But the subsequent un-learning of these lessons led up to the Columbia accident 17 years later. Mahler's account of that process makes the book all the more valuable.

From the Publisher

"This book's approach is interesting, very clearly presented, useful for researchers and students, and makes an important contribution to the field. I can see new and established scholars buying this book for its remarkably clear and insightful discussion of the ways in which we consider organizational learning and the things that prevent such learning from happening."—Thomas A. Birkland, William T. Kretzer Distinguished Professor of Public Policy, School of Public and International Affairs, North Carolina State University

"For anyone interested in organizational learning, this book deserves attention. The authors identify and dissect the myriad factors influencing the Challenger and Columbia disasters, including NASA's decision making in a political setting."—W. Henry Lambright, The Maxwell School, Syracuse University

"NASA learned some important safety-related lessons after the Challenger accident. This valuable book analyzes how this happened. But the subsequent un-learning of these lessons led up to the Columbia accident 17 years later. Mahler's account of that process makes the book all the more valuable."—Eugene Bardach, professor of public policy, Goldman School of Public Policy, University of California, Berkeley

W. Henry Lambright

For anyone interested in organizational learning, this book deserves attention. The authors identify and dissect the myriad factors influencing the Challenger and Columbia disasters, including NASA's decision making in a political setting.

Editorial Reviews

This book deepens our understanding of the complexities of learning processes in the public service context, but it should also be useful to all scholars of organizations and organizational learning for its detailed analysis of the non-learning and unlearning that occurred between the two disasters.

Administrative Science Quarterly

[Offers] a well-organized, lucid and informative discussion both of organizational learning theory, and of relevant case details. It provides a well-balanced and evidence-based assessment of factors facilitating or inhibiting organizational learning processes. Moreover, this book is relatively unique in its case-based effort to refine and offer hypotheses relative to existing theory, while simultaneously providing practical insights for managers. The focus on underlying processes related to organizational learning is especially helpful because it renders the framework transferable across various public sector settings or events. Given the range of ongoing public sector concerns in complex and high risk areas such as health pandemics, nuclear proliferation and testing and international relations, this book will have broad relevance and appeal.

Management Learning

Mahler and Casamayou make new and creative use of the well-studied NASA case; surface novel insights about NASA as a public organization that enhances our understanding of the subtle and complex organizational and managerial circumstances surrounding these accidents; and extend our conceptual understanding of organizational performance, reform, and change. . . . This is a rich re-analysis of the organizational and managerial context of the Challenger and Columbia accidents. . . . Offers a very worthwhile set of theoretical improvements and practical lessons.

Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

NASA learned some important safety-related lessons after the Challenger accident. This valuable book analyzes how this happened. But the subsequent un-learning of these lessons led up to the Columbia accident 17 years later. Mahler's account of that process makes the book all the more valuable.

Eugene Bardach

For anyone interested in organizational learning, this book deserves attention. The authors identify and dissect the myriad factors influencing the Challenger and Columbia disasters, including NASA's decision making in a political setting.

W. Henry Lambright

This book's approach is interesting, very clearly presented, useful for researchers and students, and makes an important contribution to the field. I can see new and established scholars buying this book for its remarkably clear and insightful discussion of the ways in which we consider organizational learning and the things that prevent such learning from happening.

Thomas A. Birkland

"This book deepens our understanding of the complexities of learning processes in the public service context, but it should also be useful to all scholars of organizations and organizational learning for its detailed analysis of the non-learning and unlearning that occurred between the two disasters."—Administrative Science Quarterly

"[Offers] a well-organized, lucid and informative discussion both of organizational learning theory, and of relevant case details. It provides a well-balanced and evidence-based assessment of factors facilitating or inhibiting organizational learning processes. Moreover, this book is relatively unique in its case-based effort to refine and offer hypotheses relative to existing theory, while simultaneously providing practical insights for managers. The focus on underlying processes related to organizational learning is especially helpful because it renders the framework transferable across various public sector settings or events. Given the range of ongoing public sector concerns in complex and high risk areas such as health pandemics, nuclear proliferation and testing and international relations, this book will have broad relevance and appeal."—Management Learning

"Mahler and Casamayou make new and creative use of the well-studied NASA case; surface novel insights about NASA as a public organization that enhances our understanding of the subtle and complex organizational and managerial circumstances surrounding these accidents; and extend our conceptual understanding of organizational performance, reform, and change. ... This is a rich re-analysis of the organizational and managerial context of the Challenger and Columbia accidents. ... Offers a very worthwhile set of theoretical improvements and practical lessons."—Journal of Public Administration Research and Theory

From the Publisher