Peleliu Progress
U.S. forces haven’t decisively won a ground war since WWII. How could matching capabilities 77 years ago now enhance national security? By noting that the modern-day firepower- and technology-driven U.S. military no longer relies upon separate fireteam maneuvers. So, neither it--nor any foreign Army it trains--can quickly advance through severely broken terrain. It no longer has any way of handling all that compartmentalization. Peleliu Progress (from the author of The Last Hundred Yards) reveals what GIs learned the hard way on Peleliu that allowed their parent services to win the final WWII battle at Okinawa.
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Peleliu Progress
U.S. forces haven’t decisively won a ground war since WWII. How could matching capabilities 77 years ago now enhance national security? By noting that the modern-day firepower- and technology-driven U.S. military no longer relies upon separate fireteam maneuvers. So, neither it--nor any foreign Army it trains--can quickly advance through severely broken terrain. It no longer has any way of handling all that compartmentalization. Peleliu Progress (from the author of The Last Hundred Yards) reveals what GIs learned the hard way on Peleliu that allowed their parent services to win the final WWII battle at Okinawa.
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Peleliu Progress

Peleliu Progress

by H. John Poole
Peleliu Progress

Peleliu Progress

by H. John Poole

Overview

U.S. forces haven’t decisively won a ground war since WWII. How could matching capabilities 77 years ago now enhance national security? By noting that the modern-day firepower- and technology-driven U.S. military no longer relies upon separate fireteam maneuvers. So, neither it--nor any foreign Army it trains--can quickly advance through severely broken terrain. It no longer has any way of handling all that compartmentalization. Peleliu Progress (from the author of The Last Hundred Yards) reveals what GIs learned the hard way on Peleliu that allowed their parent services to win the final WWII battle at Okinawa.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9781735453019
Publisher: Posterity Press
Publication date: 06/15/2021
Pages: 302
Product dimensions: 5.40(w) x 8.40(h) x 0.80(d)

About the Author

After serving as a rifle company commander for eight months in Vietnam, Poole finished up his 28-year USMC career as the SNCOIC of the 3rd Marine Division Squad Leaders School on Okinawa in 1993. Since that time, he has researched the small-unit tactics of America’s various enemies and written 19 tactics/intel. manual supplements. He has been to Communist China (twice), North Korea, North Vietnam, Cambodia, Venezuela, Pakistan (twice), Bangladesh, Malaysia, Iran, Lebanon, Sudan, Tanzania, Zambia, South Africa, Morocco, and Russia. Between early tours in the Marine Corps (from 1969 to 1971), he served as a criminal investigator with the Illinois Bureau of Investigation.

Table of Contents

Illustrations
Foreword
Preface
Acknowledgments

Part One: The Effect of History on Future Events
Chapter 1: The Chinese Communist Co-Prosperity Sphere
Chapter 2: The Bairoko Incident
Chapter 3: The Assault on Biak

Part Two: Then Peleliu Was Encountered
Chapter 4: Next Stepping Stone for U.S. in the Pacific
Chapter 5: The Initial Ambush at Peleliu
Chapter 6: Pelelius Developing Ambush Pattern
Chapter 7: Extent of Subterranean Chambers on Peleliu
Chapter 8: Rest of the Initial Ambush
Chapter 9: The Forward Slopes of Bloody Nose Ridge
Chapter 10: The Attempt to Climb Walt Ridge
Chapter 11: Degree of Tunneling in the Southern Massif
Chapter 12: Foe Who Kept Popping Up Behind U.S. Lines
Chapter 13: Initial Access to Top of the Umurbrogol
Chapter 14: Scramble for the Pocket

Part Three: What Was Learned That's Still Useful
Chapter 15: Peleliu Lessons
Chapter 16: What Made the Taking of Peleliu Important

Notes
Source Notes
Endnotes

Glossary
Bibliography
About the Author
Name Index

What People are Saying About This

Dr., founder/editor, "Red Team Journal" - Mark Mateski

“In the not too distant future, military analysts will look back at John’s books and ask ‘Why didn’t we listen?’ His warning is clear: material dominance masks . . . American weaknesses in small-unit tactics (founder/editor, ‘Red Team Journal’).”

Gen., USMC (Ret.), former Head of CENTCOM - Anthony C. Zinni

“Have our [present-day] combat arms units, particularly the infantry units, become overloaded, road bound, operating-base tethered, distracted by social changes, over-reliant on technology, and prevented from experiencing stressful training to the extent that facing a battle like Peleliu would result in a disastrous outcome (former Head of CENTCOM )?”

Retired U.S. Army historian of 35 years - Kim Holien

“[T]he American military has become more and more dependent upon technology, such as AUVs [autonomous underwater vehicles] and satellites, both of which will prove of little . . . [value] against the Chinese use of caves along it’s Pacific Rim and offshore islands ( retired U.S. Army historian of 35 years).”

Maj.Gen., USMC (Ret.), former Head of 1st Marine Division - John H. Admire

“Peleliu introduced new Japanese strategies to defeat traditional Marine Corps amphibious capabilities. Ultimately, the Marines won because of their relentless courage and ‘boots on the ground’ adaptability to war. John Poole’s Peleliu Progress describes yesterday’s lessons as today’s forces adapt to future warfare (former Head of 1st Marine Division).”

July 2021 - 2nd MarDiv battalion commander

“There are many lessons to be learned from our hard fought battles of WWII. . . . [A] war with China would be nothing like anything we’ve seen . . . [lately], so we’ll need be prepared on . . . [small-unit] infantry tactics.”

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