Epistemic Agency, Volume 23

by Ernest Sosa (Editor), Enrique Villanueva (Editor), Baron Reed (Editor)

Overview

This book collects cutting edge essays on epistemic agency and related topics by distinguished senior contributors to epistemology, as well as rising figures in the field. The assembly of scholars is impressive, as is reflected by the quality and range of their contributions.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9781118825761
Publisher:	Wiley
Publication date:	12/09/2013
Series:	Philosophical Issues: A Supplement to Nous , #23
Pages:	409
Product dimensions:	6.00(w) x 8.90(h) x 0.90(d)

About the Author

Series Editors
Ernest Sosa is Board of Governors Professor of Philosophy at Rutgers, and has published extensively in epistemology, metaphysics, and other areas.

Enrique Villanueva is a member of the Instituto de Investigaciones Juridicas at UNAM, and has published in the philosophy of mind.

Guest Editor
Baron Reed is Associate Professor in the Philosophy Department at Northwestern University, and his main areas of interest are epistemology (scepticism) and the history of epistemology.

Table of Contents

1. Knowledge and Action

Pyrrhonian Skepticism and Human  Agency
ERNEST SOSA  1

Skeptical Challenges and Knowing Action 
STEPHEN HETHERINGTON  18

Fallibilism, Epistemic Possibility, and  Epistemic Agency
BARON REED  40

2. Agency and Responsibility

Rational ‘Ought’ Implies ‘Can’  
RALPH WEDGWOOD  70

Obsessive Thoughts and Inner Voices
LUCY O’BRIEN  93

The Possibility of Epistemic Responsibility
MIGUEL´ANGEL FERNANDEZ 109

Epistemic Responsibility and Doxastic Agency
CONOR MCHUGH  132

Is Epistemic Agency Possible?  
PASCAL ENGEL  158

Epistemic Agency: Some Doubts  
KIERAN SETIYA  179

Can Virtue Epistemology Capitalize on JTB’s Appeal?
E. J. COFFMAN  199

3. Intellectual Virtues

In Defense of Reflection
VALERIE TIBERIUS  223

Intellectual Autonomy
LINDA ZAGZEBSKI  244

A Neo-Stoic Approach to Epistemic Agency
SARAH WRIGHT  262

Why We Cannot Rely On Ourselves for Epistemic Improvement
KRISTOFFER AHLSTROM-VIJ  276

4. Reasoning and Epistemic Norms

Scope for Rational Autonomy
MARK SCHROEDER  297

Why We Reason the Way We Do
NISHI SHAH  311

Cognitive Diversity and Epistemic Norms
JESSICA BROWN  326

Epistemic Commitments, Epistemic Agency and Practical Reasons
MICHAEL P. LYNCH  343

The Rejection of Epistemic Consequentialism
SELIM BERKER  363

What Is an Inference?  
RAM NETA  388

Errata  408