Pub. Date:
Cambridge University Press
Political Game Theory: An Introduction

Political Game Theory: An Introduction

by Nolan McCarty, Adam Meirowitz


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Political Game Theory: An Introduction

Political Game Theory is a self-contained introduction to game theory and its applications to political science. The book presents choice theory, social choice theory, static and dynamic games of complete information, static and dynamic games of incomplete information, repeated games, bargaining theory, mechanism design and a mathematical appendix covering, logic, real analysis, calculus and probability theory. The methods employed have many applications in various disciplines including comparative politics, international relations and American politics. Political Game Theory is tailored to students without extensive backgrounds in mathematics, and traditional economics, however there are also many special sections that present technical material that will appeal to more advanced students. A large number of exercises are also provided to practice the skills and techniques discussed.

Product Details

ISBN-13: 9781107438637
Publisher: Cambridge University Press
Publication date: 10/30/2014
Edition description: New Edition
Pages: 446
Product dimensions: 5.98(w) x 9.02(h) x 1.18(d)

About the Author

Nolan McCarty is Associate Dean and Professor of Politics and Public Affairs at the Woodrow Wilson School at Princeton University. His recent publications include Polarized America: The Dance of Ideology and Unequal Riches (2006 with Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal), The Realignment of National Politics and the Income Distribution (1997 with Keith Poole and Howard Rosenthal), as well as many articles in periodicals such as the American Political Science Review and the American Journal of Political Science.

Adam Meirowitz is Associate Professor of Politics and Jonathan Dickenson Bicentennial Preceptor at Princeton University. Recent publications include Probabilistic Voting and Accountability in Repeated Elections with Uncertain Policy Constraints (2006) in the Journal of Public Economic Theory and In Defense of Exclusionary Deliberation: Communication and Voting with Private Beliefs and Values (2006) in the Journal of Theoretical Politics. He is a recipient of the Heinz Eulau Award from the American Political Science Association and the Robert H. Durr award from the Midwest Political Science Association.

Table of Contents

1. Introduction; 2. The theory of choice; 3. Choice under uncertainty; 4. Social choice theory; 5. Games in the normal form; 6. Bayesian games in the normal form; 7. Extensive form games; 8. Dynamic games of incomplete information; 9. Repeated games; 10. Bargaining theory; 11. Mechanism design and agency theory; 12. Mathematical appendix.

What People are Saying About This

From the Publisher

"At last, a challenging but accessible graduate-level text for a serious course in game theory for political scientists. Teaching game theory in the context of political-science examples, this book will be the standard text for many years to come." Robert Powell, Berkeley

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