The Qur'an Revealed: A Critical Analysis of Said Nursi's Epistles of Light
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The Qur'an Revealed: A Critical Analysis of Said Nursi's Epistles of Light
643Hardcover
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Product Details
| ISBN-13: | 9783940924285 |
|---|---|
| Publisher: | Gerlach Press |
| Publication date: | 09/30/2013 |
| Pages: | 643 |
| Product dimensions: | 6.60(w) x 9.60(h) x 1.70(d) |
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The Qur'an Revealed: a Critical Analysis of Said Nursi's
Epistles of Light
By Colin Turner
Gerlach Press
Copyright © 2013 Gerlach PressAll rights reserved.
ISBN: 978-3-940924-90-2
CHAPTER 1
On Divine Unity
Introduction
The main focal point of the Quranic worldview, and the cornerstone upon which the whole edifice of Muslim religious thought has been founded, is the notion of tawhid, or the declaration of 'Divine unity'. There is, as many Western writers have pointed out, an uncompromising monotheism at the heart of the Islamic revelation which distinguishes Islam from other major religions. This is not to say that, in theory at least, the unity of God is any less a reality in, say, Christianity or Judaism, than it is in Islam. Traditionally, however, the emphasis on Divine unity in Muslim theology has far outweighed the attention paid to this concept by theologians in other faiths.
That there is one God, and that all created beings are created by and attributable to Him alone, is to express the concept of tawhid at its simplest level, uncluttered by the jargon of the theologians, who argued and debated the nature of Divine unity for several centuries after the death of Muhammad. This simple expression of Divine unity is one which can be read in and between every line of the Quran, which is not surprising given that the word 'God' occurs therein more than 3000 times.
What may come as a surprise at first glance, however, is that despite the numerous mentions of the word 'God', the Quran does not employ any rigorous philosophical arguments to prove God's existence. Indeed, it may be argued that the Quran does not attempt to prove the existence of God at all. Rather, in keeping with the mission of the prophets who preceded Muhammad, the Quran sets out to 'prove' not that there is a God, but that the God which exists – and to whose existence everyone ultimately attests, according to the Quran – is one. The Quran, it would appear, sees no need to prove the existence of God, not least because it presupposes that all humans are believers in an originator of being itself, regardless of how that originator is described. The central message of the Quran is thus not that God exists but that God is single and unique, and that everything that is 'other-than-God' depends on Him for its being. It is for this reason that the first fundamental of the Muslim faith is 'Divine unity' and not 'Divine existence'. However, in demonstrating Divine unity, the Quran also paints a vivid picture of the Creator so that man may augment his conceptual knowledge of God's oneness with a more immediate awareness of God's 'character', or the 'names' and 'attributes' by which He makes Himself known in the creation. For logic would seem to dictate that it is only through uncovering the truths and realities concerning God that man may come to know, worship and love Him, and in doing so fulfil the requirements of his role, ordained by the Quran, as Divine 'vicegerent' on earth.
Thus while it is true to say that the central objective of the Quran is to establish the truth of Divine unity, this is clearly not its only concern. In establishing the oneness of God, the Quran also paints a portrait of the Divine in terms that it believes are accessible to the human intellect. And what is true of the Quran is true, mutatis mutandis, of the Risale-i Nur, which Said Nursi always claimed was a mirror held up to the Quran, not just in terms of its content matter but also with regard to its epistemic presuppositions and practical methods of argumentation. Although it is not a work of systematic exegesis in the classical sense of the term, the Risale is a detailed exposition of the major themes of the Quran in general, and its central theme – tawhid – in particular. The overriding imperative of the Risale, then, is to establish not so much the existence of God as His oneness, and in this sense it can be said to follow closely and with great attention the contours of Quranic discourse on the Divine. Moreover, in keeping with the aims of the book that it mirrors, the Risale seeks not only to 'prove' the reality of Divine unity, but to paint a portrait of God that is not only accessible to modern readers but also that provides a solution for what Nursi argues is possibly the most grievous condition facing man, namely the weakening or the complete loss of religious belief.
On Nursian 'proofs'
Before we explore in greater depth Nursi's exposition of Divine Unity, it would be useful here to say a little about the basis upon which he builds his arguments or, as he routinely calls them, his 'proofs'. Whether he is making claims about the unity of God, the veracity of Muhammad's prophethood or the existence of the hereafter, Nursi's reasoning usually takes the form of a series of closely interconnected arguments – cosmological, teleological and so forth – which are intended to persuade the reader not only that the claim in question is reasonable but also that it is virtually inevitable. Nursi's repeated use of phrases such as 'is it at all possible ...' and 'surely one must conclude that ...' in rhetorical questions to those who would doubt the truth of his claims is evidence of the tone of self-assuredness and irrefragability that he wishes to put across in his argumentation.
The criticism that one may level at Nursi in his use of the word 'proofs' is, of course, that his 'proofs' are not really proofs at all, at least not in the philosophically or scientifically accepted senses of the term. Although the arguments he uses are presented as failsafe support for the claims he is making, whether it be the unity of God, the inevitability of resurrection or the inefficacy of material causes, the fact remains that if we examine the actual reasoning that Nursi employs, it is possible, as W. Mark Richardson points out, to reach the same conclusion with regard to Nursi as the Catholic theologian David Burrell reached after examining the cosmological arguments of Thomas Aquinas. For Burrell, Aquinas's arguments are not so much proofs in the generally accepted sense of the term as the results of the reasoning of the believing mind in response to the prompting of revelation. In other words, it may be argued that in looking at the creation and tracing its existence back to a Creator, Nursi is working not with a blank slate but with a substrate of faith – iman – which, as Richardson points out, leads to a particular reading or interpretation of creation. If this be the case, Nursi's arguments, then, should be seen not so much as irrefutable proofs as the 'reasonable steps of a believer' which, employing perfectly rational arguments, are taken to strengthen or consolidate belief 'once the interpretative framework is grounded in belief in God.' While the notion that Nursi's starting point is not the creation uninterpreted but, rather, a faith which leads to a particular reading and interpretation of creation, may be difficult at first for his devout readers to assimilate, it is in fact a notion that one finds in the Quran, which presents itself as a 'Book for those who believe in the unseen'. Quranic 'proofs', then, such as they are, be they in regard to Divine Unity, prophethood or the hereafter, are presented to those who read it with the prior assumption that they have some kind of belief in a creator, however inchoate that belief may be. The same, one may argue, may be said of the works of Said Nursi.
Given this, Nursi's use of the term 'proofs' should perhaps be understood as his way of giving the arguments he uses that extra bit of rhetorical weight in order to drive home in the reader's mind what for Nursi, at least, is the irrefutable truth.
On the notion of 'necessary existence'
As far as his exposition of the Divine is concerned, Nursi's prime objective throughout the Risale is, as mentioned in the introductory section of this chapter, to provide evidence of the existence in unity of God by highlighting the tension which exists between the innate impotence of created beings and the attributes of perfection which, their existential poverty notwithstanding, they appear to display.
Accordingly the thrust of Nursi's discourse is strictly mystico-theological, and so a search of the Risale-i Nur for the kind of arguments used by Muslim philosophers to furnish evidence of the existence of God would yield very little in terms of abstract metaphysical speculation. While Nursi makes use of certain cosmological and teleological arguments, he neither introduces them as such nor articulates them with the same technical rigour and philosophical nuances as one might expect from a Farabi or an Ibn Sina. One notable exception, however, is Nursi's exposition of 'necessary existence' (wujub al-wujud) and his attempt to furnish evidence for the existence of one who is, by default, 'necessarily existent' (wajib al-wujud). Nursi leaves his readers in no doubt that his aim is to demonstrate that God exists necessarily, albeit using methods which he believes are quite unlike those employed by other theologians.
Most people would accept readily that the things which comprise the phenomenal world are all contingent, for each of them might have been other than how it is, or indeed might not have existed at all. Indeed, the cosmological argument is often referred to as the 'argument from contingency'. But is it possible that God might not have existed? Traditionally, Muslim theologians and philosophers have been of one mind in claiming that God's existence is in a very real sense necessary, the qualitative difference of their respective arguments notwithstanding. One of the earliest and most famous expositions of 'necessary existence' in Muslim intellectual history is that of Ibn Sina (980-1037); while numerous variations on his argument have been formulated, his original thesis is still considered definitive by many scholars of classical Muslim thought. In brief, his thesis is as follows:
Every existing thing, if looked at in and of itself (min hayth dhatihi), not regarding anything else, is either such that existence is necessary for it in itself (fi nafsihi) or it is not. If its existence is necessary then it is God (al-Haqq) in Himself, the Necessarily Existent in Itself, namely the 'Self-Subsisting One' (al-Qayyum). If a thing is not necessary, then it cannot be said that it is impossible in itself after it has been presupposed to exist. Rather, if a condition were attached in respect of its essence, such as the condition of the absence – of its cause, then it would become impossible; or if a condition were attached in respect of its essence such as the condition of the existence of its cause, it would become necessary. But if a condition is not attached to it – neither the occurrence of a cause nor its absence then a third state is left over to it with respect to its essence, namely contingency (imkan). And it is, in respect of its essence, a thing which is neither necessary nor impossible. Thus every existent thing is either necessarily existent in itself or contingently existent in itself.
The crux of Ibn Sina's argument is that a contingent being can never be self-sufficient: with respect to existence, there is nothing within it which, essentially, tips the balance and gives precedence to its existence over its non-existence. It may be seen as 'necessary' once it comes into being, but only by virtue of the fact that its existence has been given precedence over its non-existence by a cause external to itself. Given that the complex of contingent beings known as the cosmos is contingent, then the argument is that, in order to avoid an infinite regress, there must be a being which exists necessarily, in and of itself, and upon which all contingent beings depend for their existence. And that 'necessary Being' is God.
Thus runs the argument of the classical Muslim philosophers. Nursi's approach is somewhat different. In order to demonstrate the necessity of Divine existence, Nursi first tries to establish the innate existential poverty of created beings and their concomitant need for God for their coming into being and their continued existence. While he does give a brief account of the nature of contingency in the abstract, as it were, his arguments are based for the most part on his appraisal of the phenomenal world as one that is characterised by its utter dependence on the ground of all Being, i.e. God, for all that it is and all that it has. The nearest thing to a dedicated discussion on necessary existence in the Risale is the Thirty-Third Word, which is the source for the passages below in which Nursi infers Divine necessity from the existential poverty of created beings.
If we look, we see that all things and especially living creatures have numerous different needs and numerous different wants. And those wants and needs are provided for them at the appropriate time, in unexpected ways, from places they do not know and their hands cannot reach; succour comes to them. But the power of these needy beings is insufficient for even the smallest of those endless things they wish for; they cannot meet their needs. Consider yourself: of how many things are you in need that your hands cannot reach, like your external and inner senses and their needs? Compare all other living creatures with yourself. See, just as singly they testify to the Necessary Existence and point to His unity, so in their totality they show to man's reason a Necessarily Existent One behind the veil of the Unseen, a Single One of Unity, among titles of Most Generous, All-Compassionate, Nurturer and Disposer. O ignorant unbeliever and dissolute heedless one! With what can you explain this wise, percipient, compassionate activity? Deaf nature? Blind force? Senseless chance? Can you explain it through impotent, lifeless causes?
The innate inability of beings to know precisely what their bodies need as sustenance and how that sustenance is to be deployed serves for Nursi as evidence that there must of necessity exist One who is able to give them what they need in a wise and compassionate manner. Otherwise, one would have to attribute the provision of sustenance to other contingent beings, which is precluded by the fact that they too are characterised by their own existential poverty. Moreover, having established to his own satisfaction that there must of necessity be a provider that is not contingent, he is able then to show that this provider is single and unique. For if that provider were one of several or many providers, it too would be limited, contingent and, ultimately, in need of a provider itself.
The Divine name al-Samad is also invoked by Nursi in his discourse on necessity. God's samadiyya, which is translated here as 'eternal besoughtedness', denotes the eternal self-sufficiency of the Divine together with the dependence of all created beings on Him for their entry into the phenomenal world and the continuation of their existence. There are in the concept of samadiyya connotations of necessity, as Nursi shows when he talks about the innumerable possible ways in which a being might take form before it is created, and the singularity and uniqueness that is 'stamped' on it once it appears.
While in their existence and individuality (tashakhkhusat), things are in a hesitant (mutaraddid), bewildered (mutahayyir), and shapeless form among innumerable possible ways, they are suddenly given a most well-ordered and wise aspect of individuality. For example, every human being has on his face characteristics which differentiate him from all his fellow humans, and it is equipped with utter wisdom with external and inner senses. This proves that the face is a most brilliant stamp of Divine oneness. And just as each face testifies to the existence of an All-Wise Maker and points to His existence, so too the stamp which all faces display in their totality shows to the mind's eye that all things are a seal peculiar to their Creator. O denier! To what workshop can you refer these stamps which can in no way be imitated, and the stamp of Eternal Besoughtedness which is on the totality?
The fact that beings are 'hesitant' and 'bewildered' is arguably the same as saying that there is nothing in their essence which dictates that their future form be like this or like that, let alone whether they exist at all. For Nursi, 'hesitation' and 'bewilderment' prove that the giving of both existence and forms is dependent on One who exists necessarily, and Who, being al-Samad, is eternal, totally self-sufficient and thus susceptible neither to creation, destruction or mutability.
Logical versus factual/ontological necessity
It has been suggested by some modern scholars that it is perhaps best to avoid speaking of God as a necessary being at all, lest the necessity in question be misconstrued as logical rather than factual and/or ontological. Although the renowned Christian theologian John Hick does not suggest that the notion of necessity be jettisoned, he does call for a more nuanced understanding of the terminology it employs. According to Hick, it is imperative to distinguish between two fundamentally different and irreconcilable notions of necessary existence.
(Continues...)
Excerpted from The Qur'an Revealed: a Critical Analysis of Said Nursi's by Colin Turner. Copyright © 2013 Gerlach Press. Excerpted by permission of Gerlach Press.
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Table of Contents
Acknowledgements ix
Foreword Dale F. Eickelman xi
Introduction 1
1 On Divine Unity 9
2 Existence and Entities 55
3 On Nature and Causation 95
4 On Aspects of the Unseen: Life, Spirit and Angels 133
5 Man in the cosmos: Nursi and the human 'I' 173
6 Revelation and Prophethood 191
7 The Quran and Muhammad 203
8 The Hereafter 245
9 Belief and Unbelief 283
10 On Worship and Righteous Action 301
11 Spirituality 337
12 On Divine Determining and Free Will 363
13 On Sincerity and Brotherhood 399
14 On Love 433
15 Practical Wisdom and Pastoral Theology 465
16 Civilization 513
17 Politics 537
18 On jihad 557
Notes 571
Index 615