Russian Contributions to Game Theory and Equilibrium Theory

by Theo S. H. Driessen (Editor), Gerard van der Laan (Editor), Valeri A. Vasil'ev (Editor), Elena Yanovskaya (Editor)

Overview

V.A. Vasil’ev and E.B. Yanovskaya 1 Game theory in the USSR before 1990 In this introductory chapter first a short historical information about the development of game theory in the USSR before the 1990s is given. It should help to understand the choice of the papers in this volume. The development of game theory in the USSR began in the early sixties. N.N.Vorob’ev (1925- 1995) was the author of the first papers about game theory in Russian; he was also the leader of a group of PhD students and young researchers at Leningrad who studied this new fieldinmathematics. The early papers by Vorob’ev on enumerating equilibrium points in - matrix games ([74]), coalitional games where a player may belong to di erent coalitions ([77] and [78]) and equivalence of di erent types of strategies in games in extensive form ([75] and [76]), were published in Soviet journals having English translations, and so they became known in the West. Later on, game theory in the USSR exhibited significant progress, which deserved world-wide attention. However, many game-theoretic papers were published in Soviet journals and edited volumes which have never been translated into English. In the 1960s, the theory of zero-sum games was popular in the USSR.

Product Details

ISBN-13:	9783540314059
Publisher:	Springer Berlin Heidelberg
Publication date:	04/11/2006
Series:	Theory and Decision Library C , #39
Edition description:	2006
Pages:	254
Product dimensions:	6.10(w) x 9.25(h) x 0.02(d)

Table of Contents

Sufficient conditions for existence of Mi1-bargaining sets.- Noncooperative game theory and social choice.- A probabilistic model of social choice.- Equilibrium points in general noncooperative games and their mixed extensions.- On the theory of optimality principles for noncooperative games.- Cooperative game theory.- A sufficient condition for the coincidence of the core of a cooperative game with its solution.- On the Shapley function for games with an infinite number of players.- Cores and generalized NM-solutions for some classes of cooperative games.- Bargaining theory.- The linear bargaining solution.- On the superlinear bargaining solution.- Stable compromises under corrupt arbitration.- Equilibrium theory.- Stability of economic equilibrium.- An algorithmic approach for searching an equilibrium in fixed budget exchange models.- Equilibrated states and theorems on the core.