State and Agents in China: Disciplining Government Officials
Chinese government officials have played a crucial role in China's economic development, but they are also responsible for severe problems, including environmental pollution, violation of citizens' rights, failure in governance, and corruption. How does the Chinese Party-state respond when a government official commits a duty-related malfeasance or criminal activity? And how does it balance the potential political costs of disciplining its own agents versus the loss of legitimacy in tolerating their misdeeds? State and Agents in China explores how the party-state addresses this dilemma, uncovering the rationale behind the selective disciplining of government officials and its implications for governance in China.

By examining the discipline of state agents, Cai shows how selective punishment becomes the means of balancing the need for and difficulties of disciplining agents, and explains why some erring agents are tolerated while others are punished. Cai finds that the effectiveness of punishing erring officials in China does not depend so much on the Party-state's capacity to detect and punish each erring official but on the threat it creates when the Party-state decides to mete out punishment. Importantly, the book also shows how relaxed discipline allows reform-minded officials to use rule-violating reform measures to address local problems, and how such reform measures have significant implications for the regime's resilience.

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State and Agents in China: Disciplining Government Officials
Chinese government officials have played a crucial role in China's economic development, but they are also responsible for severe problems, including environmental pollution, violation of citizens' rights, failure in governance, and corruption. How does the Chinese Party-state respond when a government official commits a duty-related malfeasance or criminal activity? And how does it balance the potential political costs of disciplining its own agents versus the loss of legitimacy in tolerating their misdeeds? State and Agents in China explores how the party-state addresses this dilemma, uncovering the rationale behind the selective disciplining of government officials and its implications for governance in China.

By examining the discipline of state agents, Cai shows how selective punishment becomes the means of balancing the need for and difficulties of disciplining agents, and explains why some erring agents are tolerated while others are punished. Cai finds that the effectiveness of punishing erring officials in China does not depend so much on the Party-state's capacity to detect and punish each erring official but on the threat it creates when the Party-state decides to mete out punishment. Importantly, the book also shows how relaxed discipline allows reform-minded officials to use rule-violating reform measures to address local problems, and how such reform measures have significant implications for the regime's resilience.

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State and Agents in China: Disciplining Government Officials

State and Agents in China: Disciplining Government Officials

by Yongshun Cai
State and Agents in China: Disciplining Government Officials

State and Agents in China: Disciplining Government Officials

by Yongshun Cai

Paperback

$35.00 
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Overview

Chinese government officials have played a crucial role in China's economic development, but they are also responsible for severe problems, including environmental pollution, violation of citizens' rights, failure in governance, and corruption. How does the Chinese Party-state respond when a government official commits a duty-related malfeasance or criminal activity? And how does it balance the potential political costs of disciplining its own agents versus the loss of legitimacy in tolerating their misdeeds? State and Agents in China explores how the party-state addresses this dilemma, uncovering the rationale behind the selective disciplining of government officials and its implications for governance in China.

By examining the discipline of state agents, Cai shows how selective punishment becomes the means of balancing the need for and difficulties of disciplining agents, and explains why some erring agents are tolerated while others are punished. Cai finds that the effectiveness of punishing erring officials in China does not depend so much on the Party-state's capacity to detect and punish each erring official but on the threat it creates when the Party-state decides to mete out punishment. Importantly, the book also shows how relaxed discipline allows reform-minded officials to use rule-violating reform measures to address local problems, and how such reform measures have significant implications for the regime's resilience.


Product Details

ISBN-13: 9780804793513
Publisher: Stanford University Press
Publication date: 12/10/2014
Pages: 264
Product dimensions: 8.80(w) x 5.90(h) x 0.70(d)

About the Author

Yongshun Cai is Professor of Social Science, Hong Kong University of Science and Technology. He is the author of State and Laid-off Workers in Reform China (2006) and Collective Resistance in China (Stanford, 2010).

Table of Contents

Figures and Tables ix

Acknowledgments xi

1 Introduction 1

2 Government Officials' Malfeasance in China 20

3 The Politics of Disciplining Government Officials 49

4 Disciplining Officials for Duty-Related Malfeasance 71

5 Punishing Corrupt Agents 104

6 The Politics of Blame Avoidance 134

7 Reform-Minded Officials, State Tolerance, and Institutional Change 159

8 Conclusion 181

Appendix: Data Collection 195

3.1 Collection of 111 Cases of Media Exposure 197

3.2 Collection of 133 Cases of Officials' Duty-Related Malfeasance 198

4.1 Cases of Disciplining Cadres in Conflict Management 199

5.1 Cases of the Disciplining of 1,012 Officials 200

5.2 Cases of High-Ranking Officials Given Serious Legal Punishment (N = 41) 203

Notes 205

Index 241

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