On the surface, stoicism and emotion seem like contradictory terms. Yet the Stoic philosophers of ancient Greece and Rome were deeply interested in the emotions, which they understood as complex judgments about what we regard as valuable in our surroundings. Stoicism and Emotion shows that they did not simply advocate an across-the-board suppression of feeling, as stoicism implies in today’s English, but instead conducted a searching examination of these powerful psychological responses, seeking to understand what attitude toward them expresses the deepest respect for human potential.
In this elegant and clearly written work, Margaret Graver gives a compelling new interpretation of the Stoic position. Drawing on a vast range of ancient sources, she argues that the chief demand of Stoic ethics is not that we should suppress or deny our feelings, but that we should perfect the rational mind at the core of every human being. Like all our judgments, the Stoics believed, our affective responses can be either true or false and right or wrong, and we must assume responsibility for them. Without glossing over the difficulties, Graver also shows how the Stoics dealt with those questions that seem to present problems for their theory: the physiological basis of affective responses, the phenomenon of being carried away by one’s emotions, the occurrence of involuntary feelings and the disordered behaviors of mental illness. Ultimately revealing the deeper motivations of Stoic philosophy, Stoicism and Emotion uncovers the sources of its broad appeal in the ancient world and illuminates its surprising relevance to our own.
Margaret Graver is the Aaron Lawrence Professor in Classics at Dartmouth College. Her publications include Cicero on the Emotions: Tusculan Disputations 3 and 4; Stoicism and Emotion; and, in collaboration with A.A. Long, a complete translation of Seneca’s Letters on Ethics.
Table of Contents
Acknowledgments Introduction: Emotion and Norms for Emotion
1 A Science of the Mind The Psychic Material The Central Directive Faculty Thought, Belief, and Action Affective Events
2 The Pathetic Syllogism Emotions and Ascriptions of Value Appropriateness Evaluations and Their Objects The Stoic Ethical Stance Eupathic Responses Classification by Genus Classification by Species Some Remaining Questions
3 Vigor and Responsibility Rollability Overriding Impulses Medea and Odysseus Plato and Platonists The Posidonian Objections Freedom
4 Feelings without Assent Beginnings and “Bitings” at Athens The Senecan Account “A Requirement of the Human Condition” Alexandrian Propatheiai A Stoic Essential
5 Brutishness and Insanity Orestes and the Phantastikon Melancholic Loss of Virtue Fluttery Ignorance Emotions as Causes Brutishness Seneca’s Three Movements
6 Traits of Character Scalar Conditions of Mind Fondnesses and Aversions Proclivities Habitudes of the Wise
7 The Development of Character Empiricism and Corruption The Twofold Cause Cicero’s Hall of Mirrors The Establishment of Traits Autonomy and Luck
8 City of Friends and Lovers Concern for Others Proper Friendship and the Wise Community Friendship and Self-Sufficiency Optimistic Love Ordinary Affections
9 The Tears of Alcibiades Wisdom and Remorse Strategies for Consolation The Status of Premise 2 Progressor-Pain and Moral Shame Apatheia Revisited
Appendix: The Status of Confidence in Stoic Classifications List of Abbreviations Notes Bibliography Index Locorum Index
