Strategy and Game Theory: Practice Exercises with Answers

Strategy and Game Theory: Practice Exercises with Answers

Paperback(Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 2016)

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Product Details

ISBN-13: 9783319814100
Publisher: Springer International Publishing
Publication date: 06/13/2018
Series: Springer Texts in Business and Economics
Edition description: Softcover reprint of the original 1st ed. 2016
Pages: 341
Product dimensions: 6.10(w) x 9.25(h) x (d)

About the Author

Felix Muñoz-Garcia is an Associate Professor in the School of Economic Sciences at Washington State University. His research focuses on the areas of microeconomics, industrial organization, and game theory, with applications to environmental regulation under incomplete information and firms’ entry-deterring practices in polluting industries. He received a Ph.D. in Economics from the University of Pittsburgh in 2008. He has published in the Canadian Journal of Economics, Theory and Decision, Journal of Regulatory Economics, International Journal of Industrial Organization, and Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, among others.



Daniel Toro-González is an Associate Professor in the School of Economic and Business at Universidad Tecnologica de Bolivar. His research is in industrial organization and econometrics, with applications to technology adoption, transportation, and the food industry. He received a Ph.D. in Economics from Washington State University in 2012. He has published in the Journal of Agricultural and Resource Economics, Journal of Agricultural and Food Industrial Organization, and The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics.

Table of Contents

Chapter 1: Dominance Solvable Games.- Chapter 2: Pure Strategy Nash equilibrium and Simultaneous move games with complete information.- Chapter 3: Mixed Strategies, Strictly competitive games, and Correlated Equilibria.- Chapter 4: Sequential-move games with complete information.- Chapter 5: Applications to Industrial Organization.- Chapter 6: Repeated Games and Correlated Equilibria.- Chapter 7: Simultaneous‐move games with Incomplete Information.- Chapter 8: Auctions.- Chapter 9: Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium and Signaling games.- Chapter 10: More advanced signaling games.

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